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1Introduction
Roger T. AMES and Peter D. HERSHOCK
T h e  l a st  q ua rt er  c en t u ry  has brought remarkable progress across 
a broad spectrum of domains. The recent worldwide recession notwithstand-
ing, global wealth has increased at historically unprecedented rates. Medical 
advances have made life expectancies around the world the highest in his-
tory. The Internet and smartphone revolutions have made information almost 
miraculously accessible to an ever-increasing portion of the world’s people. And 
democracy movements across North Africa and the Middle East have raised 
hopes for the ideals of universal suffrage and human rights.
Yet alongside these undeniably positive effects of the contemporary pro-
cesses of industrialization and globalization there have come widening gaps of 
wealth, income, resource use, and risk. Recognition has dawned that human 
activity is capable of adversely affecting such planetary-scale phenomena as 
the climate, amplifying the conditions for opportunity migration, and caus-
ing potentially catastrophic economic disruption. The manufacturing and 
consumption booms that are fueling global economic growth have accelerated 
environmental degradation, including urban environments; transportation 
advances have accentuated the likelihood of global pandemics; development-
heightened appetites for energy have made recourse to high-risk fuel extraction 
and power-generating technologies matters of perceived national necessity; and 
the conditions for continued economic and political vitality have become ever 
more intimately keyed to those for volatility.
This “perfect storm” comprised of successes mixed with ever-amplifying 
challenges has several underlying conditions that encourage us to view our cur-
rent situation as marking an era-defining shift from prioritizing the technical 
to giving privilege to what is ethical. First, human beings and our ways of being 
in the world are complicit in some immediate way for the predicaments we are 
facing. Second, these predicaments are not constrained by national or social 
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boundaries. Crises such as pandemics and global warming have global reach and 
affect everyone regardless of nationality or status. Third, an organic relation-
ship obtains among this set of pressing challenges, rendering them zero-sum—
we either address them all or we can resolve none of them. This means that these 
challenges cannot be met seriatim by individual players. Rather, we are facing 
largely human-precipitated predicaments that can only be engaged wholesale by 
a world community acting in concert. Finally, the predicaments with which we 
find ourselves ever more powerfully confronted can only be resolved by effect-
ing a radical change in human intentions, values, and practices.
At the same time, however, the growth dynamics of the “network soci-
ety” and “global informational capitalism” are fueled by the multiplication and 
magnification of differences. In combination with the near ubiquitous embrace 
of democratic ideals that urge respect for individual voices, there is a glaring 
absence of a robust global culture of respectful and open deliberation. The stage 
is thus set for intensifying confrontations among groups and value systems, each 
claiming rights to sovereign conduct—conditions that are ill-suited to global 
predicament resolution. A signal result is the growing awareness of the limits of 
liberalism writ at global scale in a world of increasingly complex interdependen-
cies. Corollary to this is a growing recognition of the need to consider alterna-
tives to the bifurcation of the liberal and illiberal approaches to world order that 
framed the conflicts of the Cold War era and that continues to inform much of 
contemporary national policy-making and international relations.
In a single generation, the rise of Asia, and particularly the rise of China, 
has precipitated a sea change in the prevailing economic and political order of 
the world. In the quarter century since 1989, the Asia Pacific Economic Coop-
eration (APEC) forum has grown to include twenty-one Asia-Pacific nations 
with 40 percent of the world’s population, the GDP in the Asia-Pacific region 
has more than tripled, and trade in and with the region has increased by over 
400 percent. The Chinese economy has grown at annual double-digit rates to 
overtake Japan as the second largest economy in the world, and is predicted to 
become the world’s largest economy at some time in the 2020s.
Asian development generally and the global impact of China’s growth more 
specifically are producing seismic changes in the world’s economic order and 
international relations. To date, these changes have remained largely entrained 
with the troubling dynamics of the “perfect storm” noted above. But this recon-
figuration of economic and political dominance nevertheless opens possibilities 
for cultural changes of the sort required to challenge a world cultural order that 
has long been dominated by a powerful liberalism, especially since this liberal-
ism has proven impotent with respect to the global predicaments and equity 
issues that promise to shape the course of the twenty-first century. Challenges 
might be posed, for example, from the perspectives of indigenous peoples, or 
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from religious traditions like Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. But there is 
much to recommend considering the cultural resources offered by what Robert 
Bellah referred to as “secular religions” like Confucianism.
When we look for the cultural resources necessary to respond to global pre-
dicaments, primary among them are resources suited to replacing the familiar 
competitive pattern of single actors pursuing their own self-interest with a col-
laborative pattern of players strengthening possibilities for coordination across 
national, ethnic, and religious boundaries. As is now widely appreciated, Con-
fucian cultures celebrate the relational values of deference and interdependence. 
That is, relationally constituted persons are to be understood as embedded in 
and nurtured by unique, transactional patterns of relations—a conception of 
person that contrasts rather starkly with the more familiar model of discrete, 
self-determining individuals that is an artifact of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Western European approaches to modernization and nation-state 
building and that has become closely associated with liberal democracy. Might 
a contemporary Confucian ethic that locates moral conduct within a thick and 
richly textured pattern of family, community, and natural relations be a force for 
challenging and changing the international cultural order?
James P. Carse provides us with a distinction between finite and infinite 
games that might be useful in beginning to think through how Confucian values 
could make a difference in a newly emerging cultural order.1 Using the “game” as 
an analogy for purposeful human endeavors, James Carse distiguishes between 
finite games that are played to win by single actors according to a finite set of 
rules over a finite period of time. Finite games thus have specifiable beginnings 
and ends, and result in both winners and losers. The pervasiveness of what has 
become an ideology of individualism and rational-choice theory makes finite 
games a familiar model of the way in which we are inclined to think about our 
daily transactions as particular persons, as corporations, and as sovereign states, 
across a range of activities that entail competition, including sports, business, 
education, and foreign affairs.
Infinite games are different. They are not played to win, but rather to 
enhance the quality of play. Infinite games thus have no discernible begin-
nings or endings, and rather than focusing on competition among single actors, 
they focus attention on strengthening relationships with the ultimate goal of 
sharing in advancing human flourishing, not sorting out winners from losers. 
The relationship among family members might be a good example of the infi-
nite games we play, where parents are resolutely committed to continuing to 
strengthen the relationship they have with their children so that together they 
can respond productively to whatever increasingly complex problems their lives 
lived together might present. In the case of infinite games, the interdependence 
of relationships means that the success and prosperity of parents and children 
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are coterminous and mutually entailing—they either succeed or fail together. 
Infinite games are always win-win or lose-lose.
What is Confucianism? In English this tradition takes its name from “Con-
fucius,” but not so in Chinese. “Confucianism” as ruxue 儒學 does not appeal 
to the person of Confucius; it is rather the learning of the ru class of intellec-
tuals dating back to the Shang dynasty who are responsible for inheriting the 
tradition, reforming and reauthorizing it for their own time and place, and then 
passing it on to the succeeding generation with the recommendation that they 
do the same. It is for this reason that we have argued for a narrative rather than 
an analytical understanding of Confucianism.2 Confucian philosophies are not 
finite games playing in hope of winning argumentative victories, but rather as 
infinite games of continually enhancing relational quality in response to always 
changing circumstances.
In short, framing our question as “What is Confucianism?” in analytical 
terms tends to essentialize Confucianism as a specific ideology—a technical 
philosophy—that can be stipulated with varying degrees of detail and accuracy. 
“What” is a question that is perhaps more successfully directed at attempts at 
systematic philosophy where through analysis one can seek to abstract the for-
mal, cognitive structure in the language of principles, theories, and concepts. 
However, the “what” question is at best a first step in evaluating the content 
and worth of a holistic and thus fundamentally aesthetic tradition that takes 
as its basic premise the uniqueness of each and every situation, and in which 
the goal of ritualized living is to redirect attention back to the level of concrete 
feeling. Beyond the “what” question, we need to ask more importantly after the 
always transforming and reforming content of a still persistent tradition; that is, 
we need to address Confucian practice. Thus, our central question is: how has 
“Confucianism” functioned historically generation after generation within the 
specific conditions of an evolving Chinese culture to try to make the most of its 
circumstances?
However we might choose to characterize “Confucianism,” it is more than 
any particular set of precepts or potted ideology identified post hoc within dif-
ferent phases or epochs of China’s cultural narrative. Confucianism is not so 
much an isolatable doctrine or a commitment to a certain belief structure as it 
is the continuing narrative of a community of people—the center of an ongoing 
“way” or dao of thinking and living. Approaching the story of Confucianism 
as a continuing cultural narrative presents us with a rolling, continuous, and 
always contingent tradition out of which emerges its own values and its own 
logic. A narrative understanding of Confucianism is made available to us by 
drawing relevant correlations among specific historical figures and events. Con-
fucianism is importantly biographical and genealogical—the stories of forma-
tive models. And in reflecting on the lives of Chinese philosophers—a survey of 
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often passionate, sometimes courageous intellectuals who as heirs to the tra-
dition of the “scholar-official” (shi 士) advance their own programs of human 
values and social order—we become immediately aware that any account of the 
existential, practical, and resolutely historical nature of this tradition makes it 
more (and certainly less) than what would be defined as “philosophers” doing 
“philosophy” within the contemporary Western context.
Over time, this intergenerational embodiment and transmission of an 
aggregating Confucian culture spread throughout the East Asian world of 
Korea, Japan, and Vietnam to become a pan-Asian phenomenon that over the 
centuries has shaped and been shaped by this family of distinctive and yet inter-
related cultures. And, the evidence today is that many in Asia feel that Confu-
cian culture can make valuable contributions to the articulation of a new world 
cultural order. Enormous resources are being invested in China and other Asian 
cultural spheres to renew traditional Confucian learning as a repository of values 
and conceptual resources that can be drawn upon to shape their own responses 
to contemporary dynamics. Within China, we have over the past two decades 
witnessed a dramatic rise of “Schools of Canonical Learning” ( guo xueyuan 國
學院) across college campuses. And internationally, at the best institutions of 
higher learning across America and the globe, we have seen the proliferation of 
now almost four hundred Chinese government-funded “Confucius Institutes” 
(Kongzi xueyuan 孔子學院). It is clear that Confucian philosophy is being 
actively promoted both domestically and internationally by a collaboration of 
academic and political forces within China itself.
In July 2013 academic representatives from the traditional Confucian 
 cultures—China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam—together with other interna-
tional scholars held a preparatory meeting at Sungkyunkwan University in 
Korea and agreed to establish a World Consortium for Research in Confu-
cian Cultures. This initial meeting was followed by the inaugural conference 
of this Consortium at the University of Hawai‘i and the East-West Center in 
October 2014. The conference sought to explore critically the meaning and 
value of Confucian cultures in a newly emerging world cultural order by ask-
ing the following questions: What are Confucian values within the context of 
the disparate Confucian cultures of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam? What 
relevance do Confucian values have for a changing world cultural order? What 
are the limits and the historical failings of Confucian culture and how are 
these weaknesses to be critically addressed? How must Confucian culture be 
reformed in our generation if it is to become an international resource for posi-
tive change? This volume of essays aims at opening intercultural prospects on 
answering these questions, but also on responding to the distinctive ethical and 
moral challenges of flourishing together in an increasingly interdependent and 
predicament-rich world.
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This book is divided into four parts: “Confucianisms in a Changing World 
Cultural Order,” “Different Confucianisms,” “Clarifying Confucian Values,” 
and “Limitations and the Critical Reform of Confucian Cultures.” The four 
chapters in Part I, “Confucianisms in a Changing World Cultural Order,” argue 
that Confucian traditions are not merely of historical interest, but also offer 
resources that have significant and growing contemporary relevance. Part II, 
“Different Confucianisms,” addresses the historically and culturally complex 
nature of Confucianism. The five chapters in this section explore how differences 
among Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese engagements with Confu-
cian texts and practices open up spaces for mutual contribution—opportuni ties 
for “growing” Confucian thought through intercultural comparison.
Part III, “Clarifying Confucian Values,” includes two chapters that seek to 
bring key Confucian values into high-resolution focus: contingency and loy-
alty. Whereas a main stream of Western philosophy has focused on the search 
for epistemic certainty and the derivation of universal principles in accordance 
with which to organize the moral life, the evolution of Confucian thought has 
been rooted in bringing the concrete and particular roles and relationships that 
are constitutive of personal and communal identity into ever higher resolution 
and then deepening the resolve with which one strives to enhance relational 
quality. Examining the concepts of contingency and loyalty makes usefully con-
crete how Confucian commitments structure the moral life. Finally, the four 
chapters in Part IV, “Limitations and the Critical Reform of Confucian Cul-
tures,” acknowledge the open nature of Confucian traditions and the impor-
tance therein of reflexive critique—a readiness to revise and reform the constel-
lation of values that shape the emergence and evolution of Confucian cultures. 
It is only a vital and critical Confucianism that will have real relevance for a new 
and emerging world cultural order.
Notes
1. James Carse, Finite and Infinite Games (New York: Ballantine, 1987).
2. “New Confucianism: A Native Response to Western Philosophy,” in Chinese Politi-
cal Culture, ed. Hua Shiping (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).
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Rethinking Confucianism’s Relationship to  
Global Capitalism
Some Philosophical Reflections for a Confucian Critique of  
Global Capitalism
Sor-hoon TAN
I n  a  pa p er  that I presented at the 2011 East-West Philosophers Conference, 
I argued that while the highest Confucian ideal requires that one enjoy an ethi-
cal life even in poverty, there is a second best option that combines Confucian 
ethical values with the pursuit of material wealth—exemplified by Confucius’ 
student Zigong and taken up by twentieth-century rushang 儒商 (Confucian 
merchants)—that “fits better with the pressures of contemporary life in capital-
ist societies.”1 In retrospect, this seems too accepting of the current capitalist sys-
tem, despite my repeated caution in the same paper and elsewhere that Confu-
cians today have strong reasons to criticize, inter alia, the increasing inequalities 
of global capitalism, and that instead of instrumentalizing Confucian values to 
aid capitalism Confucians should provide critical perspectives to constrain and 
reform capitalism to serve Confucian ethical life.2 The present chapter attempts 
to contribute to a Confucian critique of global capitalism. It may not be enough 
to convince those who see the Confucian revival in the twentieth century as a 
postcolonial discourse providing ideological support for the very power rela-
tions of global capitalism that Confucianism purports to criticize.3 Nor will it 
satisfy radicals who seek nothing less than the complete overthrow of the capi-
talist system.4 Furthermore, a Confucian critique of global capitalism is not a 
task for philosophers alone, but will require multidisciplinary and multi-sector 
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collaboration. What I offer here are merely some philosophical reflections that 
I hope will contribute to that larger project.
Confucianism and Capitalism: A Century of Debate
The relationship between Confucianism and capitalism has long been the sub-
ject of debate. At the beginning of the last century, Max Weber had extended 
his theory about the connection between the Protestant ethic and “the spirit of 
capitalism” to the study of the religions of China, suggesting that Confucian-
ism, with its very different values, was among the reasons why modern capital-
ism did not develop endogenously in China, despite its long history of domestic 
and international commerce and trade.5 The “Weberian thesis” had its critics 
from the beginning, and revisions have been proposed, especially since East 
Asian societies perceived in some ways as “Confucian”—Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, South Korea, and Taiwan—have achieved impressive economic growth 
within the post–World War II capitalist system.6 The same cultural-economic 
dynamic is assumed to be at work in the rise of China in the world economy 
over the last few decades. Even though Confucianism failed to bring about capi-
talism, it has proven conducive to capitalism once countries enter that system. 
According to the proponents of the “Post-Confucian thesis,” not only has Con-
fucian ethics, with “the belief in thrift, hard work, filial piety, and loyalty in the 
extended family, and most of all, the respect for scholarship and learning,” con-
tributed to East Asia’s impressive economic growth, overtaking European and 
North American capitalist economies; it also offers an alternative development 
model for modernization.7 Its cultural resources have enabled Confucian East 
Asia to achieve modern societies that are less adversarial, less individualistic, and 
less self-interested than their Western counterparts.8 Confucianism has inspired 
criticism and rejection of the liberal-democratic models of Western Europe and 
North America both in the “Asian values” debate of the eighties and nineties 
and in the continuing discussions of China’s future and its role in a globalizing 
world.9
Some blame the 1997 Asian financial crisis on crony capitalism associ-
ated with Asian values, including Confucian values, suggesting they belonged 
to “the dustbin of history.”10 Others place the blame on the current capitalist 
system itself, particularly the excessively rapid rate of liberalization in markets 
and financial arrangements, and other policies of the U.S. Treasury and Inter-
national Monetary Fund.11 The crisis probably had relatively less impact on the 
Chinese economy because China had more financial controls than other more 
open economies in East Asia, and the key difference separating Asian countries 
that were devastated by the crisis and those that managed to weather it better 
was not their values but the nature and degree of their international exposure 
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to highly mobile capital.12 The more recent 2008 financial crisis, which began 
in the United States, could not be blamed on “Asian values,” and the “Beijing 
consensus” is now challenging the “Washington consensus” as an alternative 
global economic model.13 While the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party 
present the aim of their economic reforms in terms of a market economy that 
supports “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” recent studies of the Chinese 
economy and society predominantly reveal a transition to some form of capital-
ism, albeit with significant differences from the mature capitalist economies of 
Western Europe and North America.14 Assessments of these differences vary 
as to whether they are strengths or weaknesses. Among those who promote 
Confucianism as a source of strength in China’s development, Daniel A. Bell 
identifies the features of East Asian capitalism that are more salient in “East 
Asian countries informed by the Legalistic Confucian heritage”—Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and the PRC—“than in developed societies 
in North America and Western Europe” as evidence that Confucianism offers 
an alternative model that promotes economic productivity while securing the 
welfare of those most vulnerable to the negative effects of capitalism.15
My own approach to the relation between Confucianism and global capi-
talism will be from a different angle, offering some preliminary reflections on 
the philosophical ideals of the early Confucian texts and tentative suggestions 
on how they might contribute to a critique of global capitalism.
The Early Confucian Approach to Economic Problems  
as Ethical Problems
Early Confucians considered the material welfare of the people to be a central 
responsibility of government, and this introduced economic concerns into their 
teachings. Just as these teachings approached political problems by advocating 
virtuous government as an ethical solution, the Analects, the Mencius, and the 
Xunzi approached economic problems pertaining to the satisfaction of human 
wants with finite resources from an ethical perspective. Analects 13.9 recom-
mends that governments make those who live in their territories prosperous and 
then educate them. For Confucius, in order to provide for the people’s material 
welfare, equitable distribution is more important than a constant increase in pro-
duction (16.1). Confucius believed in “helping the needy” instead of “making 
the rich richer” (6.4).16 The indiscriminate gratification of every desire has no 
inherent value, as Confucians distinguish between ethical and unethical desires 
and believe that unethical desires should be restrained or eliminated through 
self-cultivation—the highest ethical ideal is to be able to delight in the virtuous 
life even in the midst of poverty (4.5, 6.11).17 Confucius would not endorse the 
obsessive, unrestrained pursuit of income and wealth by individual persons, of 
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profit by businesses, and of GDP growth by countries. Solutions to economic 
problems must not just seek the most efficient way to maximize production and 
accumulation, but rather should ethically aim to improve people’s lives.
Early Confucians were realistic enough to accommodate people’s material-
istic pursuits, since their highest ideal of enjoying virtue in the midst of poverty 
was beyond the reach of the average person, and certainly not the starting point 
for personal cultivation. Mencius, who in some ways is even more uncompro-
mising than Confucius when it comes to the conflict between materialistic and 
ethical pursuits, nevertheless points out that for most people economic secu-
rity is a precondition for the pursuit of the ethical life. He argues that physical 
deprivation is demoralizing and drives people to do wrong, so in order to lead 
people to live an ethical life, a government must first take care of the people’s 
livelihood:
Only an exemplary person can have a constant heart in spite of a lack of 
constant means of support. The people, on the other hand, will not have 
constant hearts if they are without constant means. Lacking constant 
hearts, they go astray and fall into excesses, stopping at nothing. . . . Hence, 
when determining what means of support the people should have, a clear-
sighted ruler ensures that these are sufficient for the care of parents on the 
one hand and for the support of wife and children on the other, so that 
people always have sufficient food in good years and escape starvation 
in bad; only then does he drive them toward goodness. In this way the 
people find it easy to follow him.18
The task of a humane government is to ensure that everyone has the means to 
maintain a minimum level of material welfare, and this begins with assisting 
those who are worst off because of their relative lack of productive ability and 
social support (Mencius 1B5). Confucian humaneness (ren 仁) constrains com-
petition and the pursuit of efficiency.
The Mencius gives priority to ethical considerations over economic pro-
ductivity and efficiency:
When wasteland is not brought under cultivation and wealth is not 
accumulated, this, too, is no disaster for the state. But when those above 
ignore the rites, those below ignore learning, and lawless people arise, 
then the end of the state is at hand. (Mencius 4A1)
Mencius thus condemns those who “open up wasteland and increase the yield 
of the land” as deserving of punishment. Increasing economic productivity by 
exploiting more natural resources and increasing factor efficiency are not ethi-
Confucianism’s Relationship to Global Capitalism 13
cally wrong in themselves—quite the contrary; the context of the passage shows 
that Mencius rejects such activities only when they impose severe hardship on 
the majority for the gain of a minority.19
Mencius adopts an ethical rather than an economic approach when con-
sidering the various taxation practices known to the early Chinese. Mencius 
criticizes the gong 貢 method practiced during the Xia dynasty, on the basis 
of its impact on the welfare of the people, instead of encouraging economic 
productivity or efficiency. The taxation method that Mencius prefers is called 
zhu 助, which means “to give help.” According to Mencius, it does not differ 
from the other methods in quantum (“all three amounted to a taxation of one 
in ten”). Mencius justifies his choice by the ethical effect of this method, which 
involves the communal cultivation of “public land” in the “well-field system” 
( jingdi 井地):
If those who own land within each jing befriend one another both at 
home and abroad, help each other to keep watch, and succor each other 
in illness, they will live in love and harmony. A jing is a piece of land mea-
suring one li square, and each jing consists of 900 mu. Of these, the cen-
tral plot of 100 mu belongs to the state, while the other eight plots of 100 
mu each are held by eight families who share the duty of caring for the 
plot owned by the state. Only when they have done this duty dare they 
turn to their own affairs. (Mencius 3A3)20
The cultivation of the central plot of “public land” educates the people to give 
priority to what is shared over what is privately owned, and working together on 
the public land also nurtures relationships of cooperation and mutual help and 
contributes to communal harmony.
Other than the state’s attention to economic matters, we find early Confu-
cian texts referring to ordinary people exchanging goods in markets, and men-
tioning merchants and traders.21 In defending Confucianism against rival teach-
ings, Mencius rejects Xu Xing’s idea of “one price in the market” by defending 
price differences for different goods (Mencius 3A4). While Mencius might 
seem to understand better how market transactions work and is more friendly 
to a “market economy,” one should not jump to the unwarranted conclusion 
that Mencius shares the modern view that the price mechanism is always the 
best way of allocating resources for production or infer from this that he is a 
supporter of “free markets” in the contemporary sense. While he recognizes the 
usefulness of markets, he does not approve of profit maximization:
In antiquity, the market was for the exchange of what one had for what 
one lacked. The authorities merely supervised it. There was, however, a 
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despicable fellow who always looked for a vantage point and, going up on 
it, gazed into the distance to the left and to the right in order to secure 
for himself all the profit there was in the market (wang shili 罔市利). The 
people all thought him despicable, and, as a result, they taxed him. The 
taxing of traders began with this despicable fellow. (Mencius 2B10)
Disapproval of those who leave the land or abandon their craft for more profit-
able trade and commerce is probably behind Xunzi’s inclusion of “reducing the 
number of merchants and traders” among policies that will “allow people to 
make a generous living.”22
Whereas the Analects and the Mencius address economic issues in passing 
when discussing various aspects of good government as an ethical problem, in 
the Xunzi economics is arguably the topic of book 10, “Enriching the State.” 
Taking up such a topic, unusual for a Confucian, was a response to historical 
circumstances: states such as Qi and Qin had reorganized both their structure 
and their economy to become powerful and wealthy, and Mozi, whose philoso-
phy Mencius considered a key rival to Confucianism, had examined the rela-
tion between the nature of government and a country’s prosperity and argued 
the need for economic incentives and proper resource management as essen-
tial for good government. There were various theories on how to make a state 
rich and powerful, most of which implicitly or explicitly challenge Confucius’ 
ethical emphasis in his teachings about good government.23 To have a chance 
of being adopted by rulers, Confucian teachings had to address their economic 
and political aspirations; Xunzi tries to do this while advancing the cause of 
Confucian ethics in opposition to rival schools. Even as Xunzi focuses on the 
fundamental economic problem of scarcity, his solution is typically Confucian: 
a state will prosper if the government adopts Confucian ethical practices—
which for Xunzi is encapsulated in “ritual and appropriateness” (liyi 禮義)—on 
the personal as well as the policy level. Any other way of pursuing wealth will 
eventually fail.
Mozi criticizes Confucian ritual practices as wasteful of resources, and 
recommends “moderation of use” as the way for a state to be self-sufficient. 
Xunzi rejects this proposal as self-defeating and exaggerating the problem of 
“inadequacy” of resources. Mozi’s solution permits a standard of living that is 
barely above survival and provides insufficient incentive to mobilize the peo-
ple to produce economically or serve the state in any way, and “will result in a 
decreasing population, a diminishing number of office holders, and the eleva-
tion of toilsome and bitter efforts, with each member of the Hundred Clans 
having equal responsibilities and tasks and equivalent efforts and toils.” This 
deprived state undermines authority and exacerbates “social anarchy,” which is 
the “misfortune truly common to the whole world” rather than the problem 
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of inadequacy (Xunzi 10.8). Xunzi believes that nature is bountiful enough 
that human beings can satisfy, beyond the needs of survival, those desires the 
pursuit of which produces the refinements and accomplishments of civilization 
highly valued by Confucians. He sees human beings and nature in a relation of 
interdependence, where humans should be careful of the power and resources of 
nature—neither completely at its mercy nor seeking to control it completely.24 
While the production of an agricultural society owes much to the vicissitudes of 
nature, it is the responsibility of governments to ensure that the people “do not 
suffer the misfortune of cold and hunger, even though the year has been marked 
by calamities, natural disasters, floods and droughts” (Xunzi 10.7).
The use of resources not only translates into expenditure but may also be 
productive. How many desires can be satisfied depends not just on how much 
there is in terms of natural resources but also on how human beings manage and 
employ these resources in economic production and other productive activi-
ties. Central to the productive activities that support human civilization are the 
division of labor and cooperation, both of which require what Xunzi calls fen 分 
(“differentiation”—also translated as “class divisions”), instituted in the rituals 
that define relational roles and regulate social interactions, including the distri-
bution of burdens and benefits (Xunzi 10.1).25 A society governed by Confu-
cian ethical norms is economically productive because it is harmonious.
Although Xunzi rejects Mozi’s anti–ritual-and-music philosophy, he 
adopts the latter’s idea of “moderation of use” ( jieyong 節用), but insists that 
moderation must be effected “by means of ritual” and, in addition, that it is 
necessary to “let the people make a generous living through the exercise of gov-
ernment” (Xunzi 10.2). Xunzi advocates that governments adopt policies that 
encourage people’s economic productivity by allowing them to devote more 
efforts to their own livelihood and allowing them to keep more of what they 
produce. Endorsing the satisfaction of desires beyond meeting survival needs 
does not turn Xunzi into a hedonist, nor would he go along with rampant con-
sumerism, given his disapproval of “reckless extravagance” and his belief that 
“desires given free rein without limitation” would be impossible to satisfy and 
destroy any hope of social order (Xunzi 10.1). He would undoubtedly view gov-
ernments who pursue GNP growth to the exclusion of all else as practicing the 
“thieving way” of pandering to the people and weakening them the way spoiling 
a child ruins her future (Xunzi 10.10). Confucian rituals moderate use by regu-
lating the satisfaction of desires according to ethical norms that set out what is 
due to people occupying different positions in society, each of which should be 
occupied by one whose virtues match the position. Unlike Confucius and Men-
cius, Xunzi may be seen as explicitly advocating meritocracy in going beyond 
just appointing the person most suited for any position to also matching the 
person’s salary or reward to their contribution. “His emolument [lu 祿] must 
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match his services to the state” (Xunzi 10.3a).26 Although Xunzi is thinking 
mainly in terms of official appointments in government, such meritocracy also 
benefits economic organizations.
Xunzi is very conscious that meritocracy implies inequality, “sharp divi-
sions and graded differences,” which are not merely economic. These serve as 
incentives that, together with penalties, change people’s behavior, including 
their economic productivity (Xunzi 10.9). Xunzi emphasizes, however, that 
such inequality is not intended to gratify the “reckless extravagance or boastful 
fondness for elegance” of the ruling or upper classes, but rather is ethical in pur-
pose, “to brightly illumine the forms and patterns of humaneness and to make 
comprehensible the obedience and accord required by humane principles” and 
“to nurture virtue and to differentiate the trivial from the important” (Xunzi 
10.4). Inequality is valued only when it contributes to the flourishing of the 
community and benefits all members. It is acceptable to those who receive less 
only when they believe that the inequality is justified because those who receive 
more contribute to the security and well-being of those who receive less and 
moreover deserve respect for exemplary conduct (Xunzi 10.5).
Thus, people find an exemplary ruler who is “loyal, honest, fair, and impar-
tial . . . more pleasing to them than incentives and commendations,” and one 
who leads by example is “more awe-inspiring than punishments and penalties” 
(Xunzi 10.10). While incentives are important when appropriately employed, 
the ethical power of virtuous rulers—who lead and nurture the people “as 
though they were watching over an infant”—is more important in unifying the 
people in harmonious cooperation and industrious striving, both of which will 
contribute to wealth. When those with power appropriate riches unethically 
by oppressing and stealing from those they govern or employ, such unjustified 
inequality will lead to “the greatest dangers and ruination” (Xunzi 10.6). From 
Xunzi’s perspective, economic production is a cooperative enterprise the suc-
cess of which depends on ethical conduct on the part of all, but especially those 
who govern or who hold power, be it political or economic, and the distribu-
tion of the products should be according to the ethical criteria of sustaining a 
harmonious community rather than according to principles of economic com-
petitiveness. Xunzi’s book 10, “Enriching the State,” ostensibly concerned with 
economics, aims to establish the priority of ethical concerns.
The Ethical Critique of Global Capitalism
According to Deepak Lal, the basic human instinct to trade that archeologists 
trace to the Stone Age was disruptive of settled agricultural society and threat-
ened the communal bonds that all agrarian civilizations tried to foster. Xunzi’s 
recommendation to “reduce the number of merchants and traders” is typical of 
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what Lal calls the “communalist ethics” of premodern agrarian societies, before 
the divergence between communalism and individualism led to the development 
of capitalism and the economic rise of the West.27 Although he dismisses most 
ethical complaints against global capitalism as “atavistic, harking back to the 
material beliefs of the old agrarian civilizations,” Lal concedes that “morality is 
needed to rein in opportunistic behavior.”28 Lal maintains that morality that has 
played a role in controlling transaction costs throughout human history is found 
in local traditions and works better when it is part of such practices than when 
the state tries to enforce behavioral norms, although such morality can be influ-
enced by the behavior of governments, NGOs, or supranational institutions.29
Confucianism is among Lal’s “local traditions.” However, instead of a Con-
fucian critique of global capitalism, adopting Lal’s framework would merely 
offer a capitalist Confucian ethics that fosters selected virtues, such as frugal-
ity, diligence, honesty, and trustworthiness, which increase productivity and 
enhance cooperation and efficiency by reducing the costs of transaction in vari-
ous economic activities, from the factory floor to management to customer rela-
tions to international finance and trade. Such an ethics would condemn cases 
where businesses profit by deceiving consumers, sometimes at the cost of lives, 
of CEOs escaping with their golden parachutes while ordinary people lose their 
jobs and life savings, or of taxpayers ending up with the bill for the reckless 
and downright irresponsible behavior of greedy bankers. Although not without 
critical perspectives, this approach is inadequate because it diagnoses the prob-
lems as arising from ethical failure on the part of individual persons; it assumes 
that global capitalism itself is not fundamentally flawed or in need of systemic 
constraints. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Confucianism is still able to 
“socialize children through the moral emotions of shame and guilt to ‘be good’” 
to the extent of reining in the worst misconduct of global capitalists even in 
East Asian societies.
South Korea is probably among the most likely candidates for the effec-
tiveness of Confucianism in such socialization, and yet the recent tragedy of 
the Sewol ferry sinking casts doubt on the ability of local traditions to check 
unscrupulous quests for profit that are endemic to capitalism. An investigation 
of the accident on April 16, 2014, with a death toll of nearly three hundred, 
mostly high school students, revealed that the ferry operator, who ignored 
repeated warnings about stability issues in the retrofitted vessel and, in order 
to cut costs, disregarded safety requirements by not properly securing cargo, 
overloaded the ferry more than three times the legal limit despite feedback from 
worried staff, who were mostly on term contracts or were temporary hires with 
little say in the operation.30 Ample evidence points to global capitalism eroding 
local traditions and the moral fabric of societies, instead of the latter effectively 
constraining the former.
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A Confucian critique of global capitalism cannot be limited to recom-
mending a personal virtue ethic to capitalists; even implementing it through 
comprehensive ethical education in schools or exhorting families to foster Con-
fucian virtues in their young members may not be enough. Such “moral educa-
tion” programs may not even be viable if global capitalism itself creates a perva-
sive environment that undermines the values that a Confucian ethics purports 
to inculcate. Instead we need to understand the problems of global capitalism 
from systemic perspectives. Capitalism is by nature expansionary and constantly 
seeks new sources of cheap labor, land, and raw materials, and new markets in 
order to survive and maximize profits. The spread of capitalism throughout the 
world predates what we call global capitalism today. Previously this worldwide 
expansion took the form of separate national economies becoming capitalist 
and then forming networks of international trade and finance. Global capital-
ism is the project of creating a single universal free market with “neoliberal” pol-
icies of liberalization, stabilization, and privatization—often referred to as “the 
Washington consensus”—that transnational organizations such as the World 
Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development have been prescribing for the last 
two decades.31
Today, the global economy is distinguished from the earlier “world econ-
omy” by transnational capital with mobility no longer being hampered by mate-
rial and political obstacles. The production processes themselves have become 
global, with decentralization and transnational integration around the world on 
an unprecedented scale through the use of new technologies and organizational 
innovations. The mobility of capital increases its ability to generate profit by tak-
ing advantage of low-cost materials and factors of production wherever they are 
located, including relatively less mobile labor. The mobility of unskilled labor in 
global capitalism results in an underclass of migrant workers in many rich devel-
oped countries, while a minority mobile professional-managerial class becomes 
incorporated into what William Robinson calls the “transnational capitalist 
class.” The globalization of the production process is accompanied by “unprec-
edented concentration and centralization of worldwide economic management, 
control and decision-making power in transnational capital and its agent.”32
The creation of the global free market aims to free economic life from 
social and political control on a global scale.33 It is not just an economic proj-
ect, but involves transformation of the very nature of human relationships. 
How do the new global capital-labor relation, business-consumer relation, 
 government-business relation, and other new forms of human interactions 
created in global capitalism fit into a Confucian worldview? Could they fit at 
all? Confucianism advocates a relational ethics centered in five basic relation-
ships: “love between father and son, duty between ruler and minister, distinc-
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tion between husband and wife, precedence between elder and younger broth-
ers, and faith between friends” (Mencius 3A4). Other human relationships are 
modeled on these, so that the more general political relationship between gov-
ernment and governed may be considered a combination of the parent-child 
relation and the ruler-minister relation so that the government has an ethical 
responsibility for the welfare of the people and for leading them in maintaining 
the security of the polity, seeking the prosperity and flourishing of the commu-
nity. Relations between fellow citizens may be seen as requiring friendship as 
well as functional differentiation in cooperation, combining the basic relation-
ships between friends and spouses.
Traditionally, the larger community is compared with the family in the 
Confucian understanding of human organizations in relational terms. One 
would expect the same analogy to hold in the case of business organizations—
CEOs should care for and lead other members of a company as a virtuous Con-
fucian ruler would relate to his minister, and functional differentiation, mutual 
respect, and support in spousal relations and trust between friends would serve 
as analogies for the cooperative working relationship among all members of the 
company. Insofar as seniority is considered, the “precedence between elder and 
younger brothers” would provide a model of how to show deference and the 
reciprocal demand on the senior to reciprocate by caring and setting an exam-
ple for the junior members of an organization. From this Confucian perspec-
tive, the relationship that comes closest to that between businesses and their 
customers is probably that of friends, requiring mutual benefit, good will, and 
trustworthiness.
Instead of merely providing a guide for how to be virtuous in the new eco-
nomic environment, the relational framework of Confucian ethics should gen-
erate a critique of global capitalist relations by questioning whether there are 
systemic obstacles to participants relating to one another virtuously in ways that 
would promote personal cultivation and nurture harmonious communities. If 
global capitalism is driven by relentless competition and the pursuit of profit, it 
would have no place for Confucian relational virtues. When labor is a commod-
ity, workers can bear no resemblance to family members. If maximizing profit 
is the only consideration, customers are not friends. For the sake of profit, if 
they can get away with it, businesses will sell inferior goods at high prices, using 
advertisements to persuade consumers to purchase commodities that not only 
do not benefit them but quite possibly will harm them. To describe such unscru-
pulous conduct as “unfriendly” is a gross understatement. In other words, suc-
cess in global capitalism drives one to relate to others by thinking of profit first 
and disregarding what is ethically appropriate to a particular relationship, the 
very opposite of Confucius’ admonition to “think of appropriate conduct ( yi 
義) on seeing a chance to profit” (Analects 14.12).
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When people fail to extend the virtuous quality of family relations to 
social relations outside the family in capitalist societies, the reverse dynamics 
take over, so that even family relations become infected with the obsession with 
material gains, as is evident in litigation among family members fighting over 
inheritances, and other similar cases. Relentless competition is not limited to 
the accumulation of capital but pervades the whole society—we see this even in 
competition for grades and limited university spaces in disciplines that are pop-
ular usually because they are “marketable.” Instead of personal cultivation, we 
find education turned into a means of making money.34 Even the much admired 
emphasis in East Asian societies on education that is attributed to Confucian 
influence becomes perverted: parents concerned over their children’s economic 
future put so much pressure on them to do well in the increasingly competitive 
economic environment that this undermines the family relationship and fails to 
cultivate a Confucian ethical character in their children.35
Cultivating virtuous Confucian relationships has never been easy, but there 
are forces in global capitalism that make it even more difficult, if not impossible. 
The most important human relationships in traditional societies are face-to-
face relationships of embodied interactions, but globalization connects people 
located in various parts of the world who often never meet in person, and deci-
sions and actions in one part of the world affect many in faraway places. The 
valued qualities of various human relationships in the Confucian understand-
ing are cultivated through everyday interaction at close quarters through ritual 
practice; such cultivation is not possible in the type of remote interactions that 
characterize many relationships in global capitalism. A Confucian sage-king’s 
virtue can embrace the whole world, at least in theory, but it is rooted in the 
humaneness (ren 仁) of person-to-person interaction, “establishing others in 
seeking to establish oneself, promoting others in seeking to promote oneself ” 
(Analects 6.30). And humaneness begins with filial and fraternal responsibil-
ity in the family (1.2). It is much more difficult to disregard the effect of one’s 
actions on those whom one encounters every day than on those who live half 
the world away; their humanity and the reality of harm to them and their suffer-
ing impinges less on one’s consciousness with increased physical distance. Even 
though new technologies give access to information about what is happening in 
other parts of the world, not everyone has equal access. For those with access, 
selectivity is necessary, and too many choose to ignore unpleasant information.
Unlike immediate experience, overexposure through the media can also 
breed indifference to people’s sufferings. Global capitalism allows investors to 
become wealthy without ever having to give a thought to whether the same eco-
nomic processes keep millions working for low wages in conditions injurious to 
their health, destroy local communities by putting people out of work when fac-
tories are moved overseas, or contribute to the degradation of the environment. 
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Those at the front lines of exploitative and other unethical practices—factory 
supervisors, middle management, or sales staff, for example—if they have any 
doubts about the ethics of the businesses they work for, salve their conscience by 
pushing the responsibility on to the decision makers higher up the chain. When 
questioned about their failure to protect their people (whether as workers or 
consumers) and the environment, governments cite the need to provide a “busi-
ness friendly” regulatory environment in the competition for transnational 
capital to promote economic growth. Global capitalism attests to the adage “If 
one’s aim is wealth, one cannot be humane” (Mencius 3A3).
According to the neoliberal ideology, market freedoms are natural and 
desirable and conducive to economic growth, while government intervention 
should be limited to maintaining macro-stability to facilitate the workings of 
the free market. Critics such as Polanyi and Gray point out that the free market 
is in fact an artificial creation of state power and is maintained by a collusion 
of economic and political interests.36 Neoliberal ideology has been challenged, 
and many East Asian societies have followed different development paths, 
with the government often playing a much more interventionist role than pre-
scribed by neoliberals. This has been interpreted as a Confucian legacy since 
the Confucian idea of a good government is one that takes care of the people’s 
livelihood, which in today’s world means reducing poverty by increasing GDP 
through various policies and state actions. The Confucian requirement that 
governments give priority to the worst off in society may also have resulted in 
policies that help reduce inequalities and ensure a more egalitarian distribution 
of economic growth, at least in the initial years of development. However, after 
a period of falling inequality, East Asian economies also began to display the 
pattern of increasing inequalities that dominates capitalist economies. Excessive 
inequalities are socially divisive and destabilizing. The worst excesses of capital-
ism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were curbed by the state 
stepping in to regulate the market and redistribute wealth and income, as well 
as to relieve poverty and promote social welfare through public spending. Con-
fucianism could provide justification for such policies, but this is unlikely to be 
enough to halt, let alone reverse, the trend of increasing inequalities even if gov-
ernments professed to be Confucian (and in reality few do so unequivocally).
Economic management has become the most important task for govern-
ments, in some cases determining a governing party’s ability to stay in power. 
Even without succumbing to neoliberal free market ideology, governments in 
the global capitalist environment have little leverage over transnational capital, 
and increasing the GDP often means “playing the game” of global capitalists, 
who are also able to use their wealth to lobby politicians of their home coun-
try to apply political pressure on developing countries that resist their entry or 
wish to restrict their freedoms. The prevalent relationship between economic 
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power and political power in global capitalism is incompatible with a Confu-
cian ethical worldview. Economic power and political power have been entan-
gled throughout human history. Political power has been used to amass wealth 
at all levels, and in order to serve their interests the rich who are not part of 
the ruling class have used wealth to influence those who hold political power. 
When the politically powerful were not also the wealthiest due to historical cir-
cumstances, occasionally economic power and political power held each other 
in check. Early Confucians were very conscious that avarice on the part of rul-
ers was often the cause of bad government, leading the rulers to enrich them-
selves at the expense of the people, or to engage in acquisitive conquests at the 
cost of their people’s lives. The Confucians objected strongly to socioeconomic 
inequalities that caused the people to suffer.37 Confucianism seeks to break the 
collusion of economic power and political power by insisting that it is the virtu-
ous who should rule, and the virtuous are those who, “on seeing the chance to 
profit, think of appropriate conduct” (Analects 14.2).
From a Confucian perspective, it is important that those who govern are 
not motivated by the desire for material gain, for fear that this would under-
mine virtue and government for the people. This is why I have questioned 
recent attempts to equate Confucian government with meritocracy, as an alter-
native to liberal democracy.38 The way meritocracy works in global capitalism is 
likely to result in treating government like any other profession that “purchases” 
talents and expertise. While this does not mean that every politician will then 
be motivated only by material gain, politics would attract more who are thus 
motivated and moreover legitimize such motivation. It might be argued that, 
even without “Confucian meritocracy,” many are already attracted to politics 
because of the potential for material gain through the use of political influence; 
Confucian meritocracy is certainly preferable to any corrupt political system 
that neither delivers competent government nor prevents those in power from 
enriching themselves at the expense of the people. However, without assurance 
that a meritocracy would rule with virtue, Confucians should worry more about 
the incentives and opportunities in global capitalism to generate profits for the 
few at the expense of the many—what is to prevent “meritorious” elites from 
appropriating the larger share of economic growth as reward for their “merit”?
Simply insisting on rule by the virtuous is not likely to solve any contem-
porary problems. There still exists no viable mechanism by which we could 
ensure that only the virtuous attain power, and attempts to reform existing 
governments the way Confucians tried to do with the rulers of their times are 
impractical. Confucians need to turn away from the historical elitist tendency 
of Confucianism to focus on reforming the ruling elite and learn from the prac-
tical experience of societies that have achieved some limited success curbing the 
polarizing excesses of capitalism. In mature capitalist societies, such as England 
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and the United States, state intervention to regulate the market and temper 
the social ills of capitalism came about mostly because of the extension of the 
democratic franchise. This is not surprising: as Aristotle pointed out, the poor 
in any society always constitute the many, and democracy gives power to them. 
The tendency of capitalism to increase socioeconomic inequality has to some 
extent been kept in check by the (albeit imperfect) political equality of democ-
racy, although the increasing infiltration of economic interests and power into 
the political process has been undermining democracy in many countries. Nev-
ertheless, reformist critiques of global capitalism focus on the need for more 
effective national as well as transnational governance, including some form of 
global democracy.39 Confucianism could contribute to such reformist critiques 
by offering a conception of Confucian global democracy that transforms the 
relationship of global economic transactions into cooperative interactions, 
imbuing them with the qualities of basic Confucian relationships.
Radical critics would insist that a capitalism that is not exploitative and 
dehumanizing is an oxymoron. If so, the Confucian alternative (whether con-
structed out of a modernized Confucianism itself or preferred by Confucians 
after comparing available alternatives) may end up replacing rather than reform-
ing capitalism. I do not foreclose the more radical outcome. However, the trans-
formation will not be achieved by a violent overthrow of the status quo jus-
tified by the belief in some utopia. Confucians would advocate transforming 
the existing human relationships in all domains from the bottom up, and, most 
importantly, subordinating the economic and political relationships to Confu-
cian ethical constraints.
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CHAPTER 2
Confucianism as an Antidote for Liberal 
Self-Centeredness
A Dialogue between Confucianism and Liberalism
LEE Seung-Hwan
Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern Conditions in Asia and  
the Need for a Confucian-Liberal Dialogue
Today’s Asian society is a dynamic melting pot in which premodern, modern, 
and postmodern elements coexist without having undergone any orderly pro-
cess. In the West, modernization has proceeded gradually over a span of three 
hundred years. But most Asian countries have rushed to catch up with the West 
in a mere few decades, and rapid cultural change has brought confusion over 
cultural values and social norms. Some parts of Asian society still harbor pre-
modern values such as patriarchal authority, family-centrism, and the prefer-
ence for male offspring, while other parts are increasingly embracing modern 
values such as equality, individualism, and liberalism. Not only do premodern 
and modern elements coexist, but postmodern voices are also appearing through 
various channels to speak up for the environment, nature, and community.
Amid this whirlwind of frenzied modernization, Asians have had no time 
for dispassionate reflection on their long-term social ideal, and this has ulti-
mately resulted in a confusion of values and a loss of cultural identity. This cur-
rent confusion of values that is felt among Asians can be attributed to two inter-
related processes. On the one hand, under the sweeping tide of modernization, 
traditional values have been altered, distorted, or applied to purely utilitarian 
ends. On the other hand, modern values introduced from the West have taken 
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root in unhealthy ways. For instance, the traditional Confucian value placed 
on community has been seriously distorted under the modernization process 
into the practices of nepotism and personal connections. Among the various 
values relating to tradition and modernity, Asian people have been driven to 
choose only those that were able to promote material profit and selfish desires, 
and have pursued them blindly without principled reflection. Accordingly, it is 
now important that Asian society leave behind its tangled strands of distorted 
tradition and modernity and be reborn through a creative fusion of strong ideas 
drawn from both tradition and modernity. Only through this kind of reflexive 
synthesis can Asian countries achieve modernity while preserving their cultural 
identity, and accept the benefits of Western civilization while overcoming the 
limits of modernity.
In this chapter, by employing the method of socio-philosophical compari-
son and mutual critique between the mainstay of the Asian traditional value 
system (especially Confucianism) and the central tenet of modern values (i.e., 
liberalism), I will try to formulate a blueprint for a new social ideal suited to 
the Asian society of the future. This kind of remapping project of social ideals 
not only will be helpful for Asian society itself, but also can shed light on other 
developing countries that face similar problems.
Positive Liberty and Negative Liberty
Needless to say, the most important social ideal pursued by the modern West is 
liberty. Liberty is the condition in which an individual is able to determine her/
his own actions autonomously without interference from others. In the liberal 
tradition, individual liberty is set above any other normative value, to the extent 
that laws and norms are founded upon the principle of noninterference. One 
can do anything one wants to do, as long as one does not interfere with the lib-
erty of others. The grounds for the imposition of limits upon the liberty of an 
individual by law are known as liberty-limiting principles. While radical liberals 
admit no such grounds except the harm principle,1 those liberals who are less 
radical (or moderate) hold that, in addition to the harm principle, an offense 
principle can also be a legitimate basis for limiting individual liberty.2
The ultimate goals of the pursuit of liberty are to free an individual from 
the unjust interference of others and to maximize the scope of autonomous 
choice. Thus, the liberty pursued by liberalism is not a positive liberty, but a 
negative one that seeks only to avoid external interference. In this context, as 
Charles Taylor defines it, the liberty sought by liberalism is an opportunity 
concept, in the sense that it promises increased opportunities for autonomous 
choice.3
Liberalism stresses individual liberty over other normative values. In this 
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respect, it can be clearly distinguished from perfectionism, which takes indi-
vidual self-perfection as its ultimate goal, and also from utilitarianism, where 
the highest goal is to maximize utility or efficiency. Liberals recognize the “pre-
sumption in favor of liberty,” which holds that unless there is a sufficient ratio-
nal basis for limiting the liberty of an individual, the law and the state should 
allow the individual to make a free choice. It is from this principle that liberals 
deduce the principle of noninterference.
John Stuart Mill considered individual liberty and autonomy so important 
that he believed that the only reason for the law or the state to limit individual 
liberty was to prevent individuals from harming each other. He argued that, 
even with the intention of producing better and happier individuals, the law 
and the state must not intervene against individuals without their consent:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the 
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. . . . Over himself, 
over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign.4
Unlike the negative liberty sought by liberalism, the liberty sought by 
Confucianism is a positive one. The Confucian utopia is not a society in which 
everyone is free from the interference of others, but one in which one’s inner 
moral sense is in perfect accord with the objective norms of the community 
without the slightest alienation between the two. Thus, in contrast to the nega-
tive liberty that liberalism emphasizes, Confucianism pursues what might be 
called positive liberty. In describing the attainment of perfect harmony between 
the inner moral sense and the objective norms of community, Confucius con-
fessed, “at seventy I followed my heart’s desire without overstepping the line.”5
The Confucian project of self-cultivation aims ultimately at master-
ing one’s own heart to bring it into line with the norms of community. This 
Confucian concern with positive liberty is aptly expressed in many texts. For 
instance, “I neither complain to Heaven nor blame my fellow people,”6 and “To 
return to the observance of the rites through overcoming the self constitutes 
benevolence (仁).”7
As Confucianism values positive over negative liberty, it focuses more on 
internal than external constraints when addressing the issue of removing the 
constraints that constitute barriers to individual freedom. For instance, Confu-
cius praised his follower Yan Hui for preserving a sense of inner peace despite 
the poverty of his housing, food, clothing, and other living conditions: “How 
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admirable Hui is! Living in a mean dwelling on a bowlful of rice and a ladleful 
of water is a hardship most men would find intolerable, but Hui does not allow 
this to affect his joy. How admirable Hui is!”8 Of course, Confucius here did 
not imply a rejection of the basic needs of life. Rather, he meant that the true 
sense of freedom was to be attained by liberating oneself from internal con-
straints, not merely from external ones. The Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean) 
illustrates this with an example from archery: “In archery we have something 
like the way of the superior man. When the archer misses the center of the tar-
get, he turns round and seeks for the cause of his failure in himself.”9
Thus, the ideal state of the individual sought by Confucianism is not a neg-
ative liberty attained when an individual is free from the interference of others, 
but a positive one that can be attained by overcoming one’s uncontrolled first-
order desires. From the standpoint of the Confucian theory of self-cultivation, 
liberalism’s ‘free from the interference of others’ does not guarantee a true sense 
of freedom. No matter how much an individual is free from external interfer-
ence, as long as one remains a slave to one’s inner desires, one is not truly free.
Conversely, from a Confucian perspective, one who correctly understands 
her/his own character and can manage her/his first-order desire is free regard-
less of external constraints. Mencius says,
Some parts of the body are noble, and some ignoble; some great, and 
some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for 
the ignoble. He who nourishes the little belonging to him is a little man, 
and he who nourishes the great is a great man.10
The “ignoble part” or “small part” of which Mencius speaks is a first-order 
desire unfiltered by “second-order reflection,” and to follow this kind of first-
order desire alone is to be reduced to being a slave to one’s own desires.
According to Confucianism, freedom in a genuine sense cannot be attained 
just on the condition of noninterference, but can be fully attained on the condi-
tion of unity without alienation between the inner and outer realms. This kind 
of condition can be achieved when one correctly understands one’s own inner 
nature and controls one’s first-order desires. From this we can see why, in the 
Confucian tradition, there has been less emphasis on individual rights than on 
such virtues as reciprocity, benevolence, and modesty.
Human Dignity, Rights, and Virtues
In the liberal tradition, every human being possesses equal dignity from birth. 
Kant spelled out our duty to respect the dignity of human beings in this way: 
“Do not suffer your rights to be trampled underfoot by others with impunity.”11 
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This notion of human dignity is founded on rational autonomy, the unique 
aspect of human beings to become, in Kant’s famous phrase, “free and ratio-
nal sovereigns in the kingdom of ends.” Like Kant, Alan Gewirth also finds the 
basis of human dignity in the rational and autonomous capacities of humans as 
goal-pursuing agents.12 Even in the utilitarian side of the liberal tradition, as set 
forth by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, the concept of human dignity is also 
closely related to the rational and autonomous ability of an individual as a goal-
seeking agent.13
In Confucianism, on the other hand, the basis of human dignity is not 
found in the autonomy of the human being, but in the potential of each indi-
vidual to become an authentic person through self-cultivation. Confucianism 
seeks to dissolve the status distinctions between high and low prevailing in 
the class-based society through the equal potential to become an authentic 
person. Confucius and Mencius replaced the class-based society’s hierarchical 
distinction between the noble and the humble with the axiological distinc-
tion between the virtuous and the un-virtuous. Mencius also taught that every-
one was equal in her/his inherent possession of the potential to achieve moral 
perfection.
In the liberal tradition, every human being is regarded as equal from birth, 
regardless of social or personal distinctions. According to liberalism, having a 
high or low character, an elevated or vulgar personality, is just a private matter in 
which no one has a right to interfere. Thus, a contemporary liberal philosopher 
like Joel Feinberg insists that if a couple chooses to have sex in a bar, or even 
commit incest (providing both parties are consenting and the act is not com-
mitted in public), unless their behavior violates the liberty of others there are 
no grounds for preventing it. If the state attempts to prevent their behavior, it is 
violating the rights of the individual.14
In contrast to liberalism’s non-moral equality, Confucianism tends to 
grant each individual a different degree of rights according to the quality of the 
person’s character. Just as a sword should not be put in the hand of a man of bad 
character, the moral weapon of rights should not be given to someone whose 
character is unworthy. Commenting on the ancient story of King Wu punishing 
the tyrant Zhou, Mencius supported Wu’s coup d’état, explaining, “Although I 
heard that King Wu had punished a wicked villain, I did not hear him to have 
assassinated his lord.” This meant that a tyrant like Zhou had little value as a 
man of character, and that he should not be granted an amount of rights equal 
to what others have received.
The difference between Confucianism and liberalism in their view of 
human dignity produces a concomitant difference in the assertion of the means 
by which human dignity is to be ensured. In the liberal tradition, the device for 
ensuring human dignity is “rights.” Only when all individuals respect each oth-
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er’s rights can human dignity be firmly guaranteed. As long as no one violates 
the rights of another, no state power or legal institution can restrict the right of 
the individual to act freely.
While liberalism relies on rights as a guarantor of human dignity, Confu-
cianism focuses on providing the conditions of welfare that make it possible for 
each individual to achieve moral perfection within the community to which 
s/ he belongs. Confucius clearly expressed this concern with welfare when he 
said that the privilege of education should be extended to everyone regardless 
of birth, and that the wealth of a state was less important than the equitable dis-
tribution of the wealth. Mencius also stated that only when the basic means of 
subsistence have been secured can morals and rites be taught.15 In other words, 
to promote character building and moral self-perfection, the basic conditions of 
welfare must first be satisfied.
In some cases, the Confucian concept of welfare appears in the form of 
paternalism. In many Confucian writings, a ruler’s concern for the welfare of 
his people is compared with parents’ love for their children. For instance, the 
Shujing (Book of Documents) states, “A ruler should always treat the people 
like a newborn baby.” This concept of welfare with its emphasis on care for the 
people is a positive expression of the rule of virtue, but when the people are 
compared with a baby incapable of autonomous judgment, there is the risk of 
losing all checks on the power of despotic rulers. When the people are treated 
as children, their free will is denied, and those in power may use virtues as a 
disguise for tyranny. Due to this danger, liberals hold that paternalism, no mat-
ter how benevolent its motivation is, cannot be justified unless accompanied 
by respect for the rights of the individual person. As Feinberg states, “If adults 
are treated as children they will come in time to be like children. Deprived of 
the right to choose for themselves, they will soon lose the power of rational 
self-decision.”16
Confucian welfarism, which finds the highest responsibility of the state in 
welfare and well-being founded on benevolence, stands in marked contrast to 
the liberal view of the state as responsible primarily for respecting the rights of 
the individual. From an impartial point of view, there are both good and bad 
aspects of liberalism’s exclusive stress on individual rights on the one hand and 
in Confucianism’s stress on paternalistic caring on the other. Liberalism’s exces-
sive emphasis on individual rights may have such undesirable consequences as 
economic disparity, rampant materialism, fetishism, and moral decay. Mean-
while, Confucianism’s emphasis on paternalistic caring may have an undue 
effect on an individual’s free will and capacity for autonomous decision making. 
From this perspective, a social ideal that respects nothing but individual liberty 
is liable to neglect the equitable distribution of wealth, while one that stresses 
the common good alone runs the risk of authoritarianism.17
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Self-interest and the Common Good
Even if liberalism cannot be directly equated with individualism, the condi-
tion in which liberalism is fostered and can flourish is surely to be a society 
in which individualism prevails. Society as imagined by liberals is a gathering 
of individuals autonomously and independently pursuing their own interests 
free from the interference of others. Thus, liberalism perceives human nature as 
fundamentally self-centered, interested solely in personal ends and indifferent 
to the welfare of others. Inevitably, in a society of individuals indifferent to each 
other and concerned only with their own self-interest, the ethical norms most in 
demand are fairness, procedural justice, noninterference, and respect for rights. 
John Locke argues that in order for these self-centered beings to live together 
without conflict, they establish and grant their provisional assent to the insti-
tution known as the state, using it to prevent clashes of interest or to provide 
compensation when such clashes do arise. Robert Nozick similarly insists that 
in a society in a state of nature, a proxy institution is necessary to prevent the 
violation of the rights of the weaker by the stronger, or to compensate for such 
a violation when it does occur. Thomas Hobbes goes even further than Locke 
in viewing society in a state of nature, considering it to be not just an assembly 
of selfish individuals but a battleground in which everyone is at war with every-
one else. John Rawls differs from the classical liberals in his emphasis on equi-
table distribution and the search for a solution to the problem of the cleavages 
between the wealthy and the poor, but still assumes a view of human nature and 
society little different from that of classical liberalism. For Rawls, the original 
condition of human beings in need of social justice is a gathering of rational 
individuals each pursuing his/her own self-interest without regard for others.
Following the spread of political and economic liberty, the pursuit of indi-
vidual self-interest ceased to be regarded as immoral and, on the contrary, came 
to be regarded as legitimate and proper. In particular, with the change of social 
conditions, the notion of negative liberty, which had served as a starting point 
for protecting the individual from the tyranny of feudal rulers (whether mon-
archs and aristocrats or clergy), gradually drifted away from communal con-
cerns such as the pursuit of a common good or the welfare of society as a whole.
In contrast to the atomistic view of the self and the individual as portrayed 
by liberalism, Confucianism envisages humans as relational beings inseparable 
from the community to which they belong. In Confucianism, the identity of 
an individual is not to be found by separating and isolating the self from others, 
but by understanding one’s position in relation to others. From the Confucian 
point of view, the abstract, atomistic, and solipsistic self imagined by modern 
Western philosophy (particularly in the Cartesian tradition) is a phantasmago-
ric being that could never exist in this real world. In the Confucian tradition, 
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an individual is always understood through human relationships as someone’s 
father, someone’s husband, or someone’s neighbor. The “rectification of names” 
that Confucius speaks of can also be more clearly understood in this context. 
Confucius said, “Let the ruler be a ruler, the subject a subject, the father a father, 
the son a son.”18 The standard by which the ruler acts as a ruler is not to be found 
in an abstract concept like Plato’s idea of the Good, but in a concrete reality 
such as the relationship between ruler and subject or father and son. Similarly, 
the “five basic human relationships” (wu-lun 五倫) that form the backbone of 
Confucian relationship-oriented morality derive their justificatory basis from 
the communitarian understanding of “the self in a context.”19 This relationship-
based view of humans within the Confucian tradition contrasts sharply with 
liberalism’s self-centered view of human beings.
Within the liberal social system with its atomistic view of human beings, it 
is accepted as proper that each individual pursues solely his own interest without 
regard to others. But in Confucianism, which discredits an individual existence 
isolated from the community to which an individual belongs, the exclusive pur-
suit of one’s own self-interest can hardly be justified. The ideal society sought by 
Confucianism is a community comprised of virtuous people who care for one 
another and support each other’s welfare. In Confucianism, a loving and well-
ordered family (which in ancient times referred to the extended relations of a 
clan society rather than the modern nuclear family) was regarded as the model 
for an ideal society, and the ideal state should be modeled on the family. The 
social gradation of “self-cultivation, loving family, well-ordered country, peace-
ful world” that appears in the Daxue (Great Learning) also supports the Confu-
cian concept of a communitarian society, which regards society as an expansion 
of caring relationships.
Mencius described the ideal society pursued by Confucianism as follows:
Farmers share the same well harmoniously, come and go to each other 
freely, pool their strength to ward off thieves or misfortunes, and when 
their neighbor is sick, they help and nurse each other kindly. Moreover, 
only after tilling the communal land dare they work in their private 
fields.20
In the ideal community described by Mencius, distinctions between yours and 
mine are not so clear-cut, and any behavior that deviates from the communal 
norms embraced by the community is unacceptable. In a communal society 
such as this, a man who pursues his own self-interest alone will become an 
object of blame, while someone who cares for another’s misery before asserting 
his own due and supports the welfare of others will be admired as a virtuous 
person. The distinction made by Confucius and Mencius between the virtu-
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ous (or great person) and the mean (or small person) can be understood from 
a socio-philosophical standpoint as a contrast between two human types: the 
person who pursues his interests but with consideration for the well-being of 
others, and the person who pursues his interests in order to satisfy his selfish 
desire alone. Confucius says, “Of neighborhoods benevolence is the most beau-
tiful. How can the man be wise who, when he has the choice, does not settle in 
benevolence?”21 A benevolent village is a community composed of people who 
are caring for each other. From a Confucian perspective, any individual engaged 
solely in the pursuit of self-interest without caring for others, or who sticks to 
his own way of living without regard for the common good of the community, 
is not an ideal human type.
The idea that one sometimes needs to restrain one’s own self-interest for 
the sake of the common good leads naturally to the view that an individual’s 
rights sometimes need to be waived for the sake of the common good, if neces-
sary. This community-based view of rights explains clearly why the excessive 
claim of individual rights has not taken root in Confucian soil. In the Confu-
cian tradition, which puts the common good above self-interest, when a conflict 
of interests arises it is not to be resolved through the aggressive claims of one’s 
rights, but through a yielding of self-interest by the parties concerned, for the 
sake of their reconciliation and the harmony of the community. Thus, in legal 
terms, the ideal of Confucian society was to make an effort to resolve conflict 
not through an in-court system of justice administered by trials but through an 
extra-court system of justice that was dependent on negotiation and mediation.
The Ethics of Harmony versus the Ethics of Self-assertion
According to Feinberg, rights are valid claims that an individual may make 
“against” others who have a duty to satisfy those claims.22 As the use of the 
word “against” suggests, rights claims would not arise unless two individuals or 
groups stand in confrontation. For instance, between a couple in love, as long 
as their love lasts there is no need for the assertion of rights. Only when they 
cease to love each other and compete for a limited pool of assets, or stand in 
confrontation over the cost of raising their children, does the discourse of rights 
become necessary.
Assertions of rights are necessarily founded on confrontation between 
two individuals or groups. In this context, Karl Marx was correct in saying that 
“rights-talk” is based on an antagonistic relationship in which each human being 
is alienated from the others. He attacked “rights” as the exclusive and selfish pos-
session of the bourgeoisie.23 To Marx, “rights” in capitalist society were nothing 
but a self-justification on the part of the “haves,” a necessary evil that is bound to 
exist within the capitalist social order. Marx criticized the liberal watchwords of 
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“rights” and “negative liberty” for reducing warm and concrete human relation-
ships to undifferentiated exchange values.24 By converting what should be warm 
relationships into economic exchange values, “rights-talk” committed the error 
of converting human character and personhood into monetary value. Finally, 
Marx condemned “rights-talk” for being based on a principle of isolation that 
seeks to separate people from each other instead of pursuing harmony.
The Confucian emphasis on placing the common good before self- interest, 
and communal harmony before individual rights, has much in common with 
Marx’s criticism of bourgeois “rights-talk.” The ideal of a loving community 
that Confucianism pursues advocates yielding and reconciliation as a way of 
resolving conflicts of interest, and takes a dim view of greedy demands for one’s 
own portion. The root of this Confucian strategy of conflict resolution through 
yielding and compromise can be traced back to the spirit of harmony empha-
sized throughout the history of Confucianism. Harmony is regarded as an 
important ideal to aspire to in every sphere of human life. Within each person, 
emphasis is put on harmony between one’s words and behavior, and between 
personal desires and communal norms. In family relationships, great importance 
is attached to harmony between parents and children, between husband and 
wife, and between siblings themselves. Beyond the family, harmony between 
neighbor and neighbor, and between the individual and the community, is seen 
as the key to creating a community of ren 仁. Even the relationship between 
human beings and Nature should be one of harmony and coexistence without 
the intrusion of excessive human chauvinism. Preoccupied with harmony, social 
ideals attributed to Confucian culture have regarded self-righteous rights claims 
as an obstacle to communal harmony, and have admired the virtues of modesty 
and yielding instead of self-assertion in the pursuit of self- interest. The disap-
proval of rapacious self-assertion was expressed by Confucius as follows:
A virtuous person, even when confronted by another, does not fight 
back.25
A virtuous person has strong self-respect but does not dispute; he lives 
harmoniously in his community but does not form factions.26
A virtuous person never squabbles.27
As we can see from these passages, the Confucian tradition disapproves of 
aggressive self-righteous claims. In contrast to the Confucian attitude, the rep-
resentative twentieth-century liberal philosopher Feinberg says, “Not to claim 
in the appropriate circumstances that one has a right is to be spiritless or fool-
ish,” and again, “Having rights enables us to stand up like a man.”28 While the 
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liberal camp, to which Feinberg belongs, sees individual rights as a minimum 
condition for securing human dignity, Confucianism holds that in some cir-
cumstances it is better that the assertion of rights be restrained for the sake of 
harmony in the community.
Toward a Reconciliation of Liberalism and Confucianism
The foregoing comparison between the social ideals of Confucianism and lib-
eralism can be summarized as follows. First, while liberalism aims to secure a 
space for autonomous choice through mutual noninterference, Confucianism 
emphasizes the achievement of harmonious accord by individuals for the com-
mon good of the community through the overcoming of self-centeredness. As 
a result, Confucianism accentuates positive rather than negative liberty, and 
embraces a communitarian ethic that is more concerned with caring and har-
mony than with exclusive claims to one’s own rights. Second, the liberal concep-
tion of human dignity is founded on the rational capacity of human beings as 
autonomous and independent individuals, in contrast to the Confucian view 
of human beings as relationship-based, interdependent, and mutually caring. 
In terms of ethical norms, the Confucian belief in the ability of human beings 
to become more virtuous by overcoming selfishness leads to an emphasis on 
self-cultivation and self-restraint rather than antagonistic rights claims. Accord-
ingly, it is the cultivation of virtues that is considered essential in the pursuit 
of authentic personhood and harmonious coexistence within the community. 
Third, the Confucian ideal of harmony leads naturally to a virtue-centered 
morality that emphasizes caring and modesty rather than self-righteous claims.
While liberalism seeks to secure the maximum scope for autonomous 
choice through providing a normative shield of noninterference, Confucian-
ism seeks to achieve an ideal community through the overcoming of selfishness 
and the cultivation of virtues. Each social ideal has its own historical and cul-
tural background. Within the traditional context of patriarchal family structure, 
agricultural mode of production, and monarchical system, Confucianism held 
its position in politics as a double-edged sword that served both to uphold the 
existing order and to restrain the monarchical power of the ruling class. Admit-
tedly, criticisms of Confucianism as a government-patronized state ideology that 
served the interest of the ruling class are not without foundation from a macro-
historical standpoint, but the contribution of Confucian literati in their persis-
tent effort to remonstrate and restrain the ruling class should not be neglected 
either. The historical significance of Confucianism can be found in its effort to 
prevent the abuse of power and the excessive pursuit of self-interest by presenting 
the ruling class with a blueprint for achieving an authentic personhood.
The society in which we live today no longer replicates the historical 
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condition in which Confucianism once prevailed. The transition from a pre-
dominantly extended family to a nuclear family structure, from an agricultural 
economy to industrial capitalism, and from an absolute monarchy to a liberal 
democracy has created a wide gulf between tradition and modernity. Conspicu-
ous among the phenomena that arose as a result of these changes is the advent of 
individualism, the justification of self-interest, and the assertion of autonomy, 
liberty, and rights. These new values often clash with the traditional values that 
Asians have inherited from the past, creating serious confusion and conflict. 
The current situation in Asia, especially in Korea, is reminiscent of the times 
of turmoil and disorder when liberalism arose in the West. As human liberty 
and autonomy came to be valued, people abandoned their faith in the beliefs 
(whether moral, customary, religious, or political) that they had inherited from 
the past, and, under the banner of “rights,” individuals secured their own space, 
free from interference. The historical achievement of liberalism was the freeing 
of people from religious constraints, political oppression, and the chains of feu-
dal morality. However, by taking the notion of self-centeredness as its theoreti-
cal foundation, liberalism left itself ill equipped to deal with issues such as social 
welfare, the pursuit of the common good, and the elevation of human character.
In the case of contemporary Korea, where liberalism and capitalism have 
been grafted onto a five-hundred-year-old tradition of Confucianism, con-
trasting values are jumbled together in confusion: virtue and rights, individual 
and community, self-interest and the common good, et cetera. Koreans now 
seem to be faced with a choice between two paths. Their dilemma is whether 
to choose the liberal (and neoliberal) path with its disproportionate stress on 
individual rights, or to revive the Confucian virtue ethic with its focus on caring 
and harmony.
Or might there not be a third way that avoids both extremes? We have 
already seen that both social ideals have their strong and weak points. If we 
opt for negative liberty alone, we can secure an autonomous sphere free from 
interference, but we are liable to neglect the welfare of those in need and the 
establishment of a desirable community. On the other hand, if we put too much 
emphasis on positive liberty, we can pursue the improvement of our character 
and the harmony of community, but we run the risk of lapsing into totalitarian-
ism. If we insist on rights alone, we are apt to become overnight millionaires full 
of selfishness and lacking humaneness, while if we emphasize virtues alone we 
can easily sink into spineless compliance and obedient slavery. Is there no way to 
discard the weak points in both value systems and combine their strong points 
into a new system of values?
Liberty, in an ideal sense, must be a total freedom comprising both positive 
and negative liberty. No matter how free an individual may be from external 
interference, so long as one remains a slave to one’s internal desires, one is not 
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truly free. Conversely, no matter how well one may control one’s internal desires, 
so long as one is bound by chains or suffers from suppression and oppression, 
one is not actually free. Thus, freedom in a total sense means a state in which 
an individual is free not only from external interference but also from internal 
restraints. When we define the ideal sense of freedom in this way, we are one 
step closer to relieving the anomie of values that currently envelops Korea and 
other Asian countries. Just as freedom in a total sense requires both positive and 
negative liberty, true human liberation means not only economic and political 
liberation, but also moral and spiritual liberation to deliver us from unbridled 
internal desires and inward constraints.
The ideal of total freedom cannot be attained solely through the insistence 
on negative liberty or individual rights. Rights surely perform a necessary social 
function, protecting innocent people from unjust power and ensuring their 
just share. But at times, rights can also become a powerful self-defensive mea-
sure bolstering the greedy claim of possession for the “haves.” Rights serve as a 
normative device for defining the minimal morality by coercively extracting a 
minimum of duty from an opponent. But minimal morality is not enough to 
achieve an authentic personhood and harmony in the society. We need liberty 
and rights to protect us from unjust power, while at the same time we also need 
the virtues of caring and benevolence for the harmony of the society. We need 
both rights and virtues, liberty and caring, justice and benevolence. Finally, we 
need a reconciliation of liberalism and Confucianism. In this sense, I believe 
that Confucius’ old teaching of self-cultivation, authentic personhood, and a 
community of ren 仁 can function as a new antidote for the cultural illness of 
liberal self-centeredness.
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CHAPTER 3
Toward Religious Harmony
A Confucian Contribution
Peter Y. J. WONG
Let  m e  b egi n  by appropriating John Dewey’s distinction regarding three 
forms of the term “religion”:
There is a difference between religion, a religion, and the religious; 
between anything that may be denoted by a noun substantive and the 
quality of experience that is designated by an adjective.1
Despite Dewey’s dismissal of the use of the singular “religion” in view of the 
diversity of religions that one encounters, I would like to retain the term, and 
suggest we use it in the upper case—that is, Religion2—as it involves a sense that 
goes well beyond the objective sense of the term. On the most obvious level, 
“Religion” and “a religion” differ according to the perspective one adopts, and 
according to the presence or absence of allegiance to particular religions. For 
the committed adherent, the path one follows is always “Religion,” while, in 
contrast, those paths that are significantly different from one’s own we may call 
“religions” (or “a religion”). Religion, in the uppercase, is not to be understood 
as a reified, absolute entity but as an all-embracing framework that mediates 
one’s access to the world. As such, one’s religious sentiment is understood as 
a feeling that is borne within Religion. A similar parallel can be drawn with 
regard to language, in that one’s access to concepts is always mediated by Lan-
guage, and there is a qualitative difference between the language that one speaks 
and those languages of which one speaks.3 There was a time, and it may still 
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exist in some circles (such as the philosophy of religion in Western analytic phi-
losophy), when one’s field of study almost always operated under the auspices of 
Religion4 and was not concerned about the religions, such that other religions 
and religious traditions were not the proper subject of study.5 We note that for 
at least a millennium in the West, Religion has been identified with Christianity 
or monotheism.
Yet, is Religion necessarily to be identified with a religion? Could Religion 
be sufficiently broad such that it supports a variety of religions, include both 
theistic and non-theistic religions, and accommodate religious experiences that 
are not based on an affiliation to particular religions? For surely we need Reli-
gion to be broad in order that religious sentiments and experiences be shareable 
across the divide of religions.
For there to be Religion that is accommodating, the common understand-
ing of religions in terms of belief is inadequate. It is no wonder that Dewey 
sought to do away with religion altogether and emancipate the “religious.”6 This 
chapter does not go as far as Dewey, but takes the view that we can’t divorce 
descriptions of Religion and religions from the religious. But we take the les-
son from Dewey that key to our understanding of religion is the religious in its 
adjectival sense, and not belief.
A possible elaboration on the difference between “religions” and “reli-
gious” could be found in the writings of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, regarding 
which he draws a distinction between a public and institutional aspect, one that 
Smith calls “cumulative traditions” (religions), and a personal but not individu-
alist aspect, called “faith” (religious). As the latter aspect is closely related to the 
phenomena of religious experiences, he—like Dewey—takes this to be the more 
primary aspect of religion. It is a point that we will return to later. To anticipate, 
we will claim that “religion” and “religious” cannot be so neatly separated. And 
while a proper account of religion needs to include the religious, the reverse is 
also true.
According to Smith, to the extent that a tradition could be called “reli-
gion,” a certain degree of self-consciousness is needed. Thus, Smith thinks that 
many indigenous traditions and practices ought not to be called “religion,” pre-
cisely because they are not self-reflexive about their own practices as practices, 
and they have not self-consciously sought to systematize or formalize the reli-
gious aspect of their way of life.7 For the foregoing reasons, he calls into ques-
tion the use of reified terms in reference to certain traditions such as “Daoism” 
or “Confucianism.”8 Accordingly, we also take Smith to imply that such tradi-
tions ought not to be called “religions.”
That is not all. Smith goes on to question the very meaningfulness of the 
term “religion,” including “Christianity,” “Judaism,” and “Islam”: although they 
are reified terms, in reality they do not refer to any identifiable, abstractable 
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essence.9 For Smith, when we take a closer look at “religion,” or for that matter 
“Christianity,” “Islam,” or “Judaism,” we find only the institutional “cumulative 
traditions” and personal “faiths.”10
The question is, should we forgo the use of the term “religion” and instead 
speak only of “traditions”?
Smith’s argument with forgoing the use of the term “religion” is not so 
straightforward. It seems that there is a confusion on Smith’s part over the real-
ity of religion that relies on an essentialistic approach to settle the issue. While 
religion, and we agree, does not correspond to any isolable entity, this does not 
mean that religions do not exist. Religions exist as complexes and are dependent 
upon the contexts of human activity. Currency and economy, for instance, do 
not fully identify with specific things in the world, yet we normally agree that 
they exist; that is, they exist within the context of human society, which recog-
nizes, among other things, property and the practices of human commerce, but 
not in the sense of an entity or that they are metaphysically real.11
A large part of the problem regarding the term “religion” seems to be the 
objectification of alien others, whose means of showing reverence and piety is 
not shared by the observer.12 In the current literature on the study of religions, 
there is the objection that “religion” is a colonial imposition, used as a means to 
control colonies.13 Thus, perhaps the term “religion” ought to be abandoned or 
restricted to the Western context. While it is the case that “religion” as a category 
is modern, originating in the West,14 and susceptible to becoming an instrument 
of domination, the alternative of refraining from identifying certain traditions 
and practices with “religion,” or as “religious,” would also be susceptible to other 
kinds of discriminations: for example, the perverse view that cultures different 
from the West do not have practices or traditions worthy of the term “religion.” 
It seems that the politics of proprietorship of the term “religion” is an issue that 
we need to be vigilant about, yet seeking to do away with the term “religion” is 
not necessarily a remedy either.
In view of the various critiques, perhaps our understanding of “religion” 
could be rehabilitated and modified to accommodate non-theistic sensibilities. 
We begin with the Chinese case of referring to religions as zong jiao, a transla-
tion that is borrowed from the Japanese.15 While the term is intended to be a 
translation of the Western term “religion,” it nevertheless represents an attempt 
to express the meaning of “religion” from within the resources available to 
Sino-Japanese culture. Therefore, the original uses of the term that have been 
recruited for the translation are not irrelevant details.
The term zong jiao 宗教, as a bound compound, made its first appearance 
in Chinese Buddhist writings and refers to Buddhist teachings in general; that 
is, the teachings of the Buddha called jiao, and those of his followers called 
zong.16 However, unlike its current usage, which tends to suggest “theistic reli-
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gion,” it was still closely associated with the traditional usage of the term jiao 
教, which is commonly rendered as “teaching.” In addition, Wu Rujun 吳汝鈞 
locates the term in other writings of Chinese Buddhism, in which zong refers to 
the schools or sects of Buddhism, and jiao to the dissemination of their teach-
ings. Furthermore, Wu also identifies other usages, in which zong refers to that 
which cannot be spoken ( prasiddhi); and jiao as the attempts at communicating 
the unsayable.17
Even within the non-Buddhist Chinese world, the use of the term jiao 
seems to overlap with the modern use of zong jiao. Reference to the Confucian 
tradition in conjunction with the term jiao occurred as early as the beginning 
of the Han 漢 dynasty, in Sima Qian’s 司馬遷 epic work on Chinese history, 
the Shiji 史記.18 Possibly as early as after the end of the Han (the Tang at the 
latest), Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism were already jointly referred 
to as the three teachings (sanjiao 三教).19 In this case, the term sanjiao implies 
established traditions and lineages that are authoritative and state-sanctioned; 
it is also interesting to note that they are ranked in terms of their eminence, 
which comes close to Smith’s notion of self-conscious organization as a mark 
of religion.
However, the appellation of jiao is not strictly limited to such identifiable 
schools or movements. The work Jing jie 經解, collected in the Book of Rites 
(Liji 禮記), when referring to different aspects of Confucian teaching, speaks 
also of the teaching of the rituals (Lijiao 禮教), the teaching of the songs (Shi-
jiao 詩教), and the teaching of music (Yuejiao 樂教).
In common Chinese usage, jiao 教 literally means “to teach.” According 
to the Analects, Confucius is said to have taught four things: culture, conduct, 
doing one’s utmost, and making good on one’s words.20 From this, we see that 
what is implied is not only the idea of the straightforward imparting of knowl-
edge ( jiaoshou 教授), but also transformative teaching ( jiaohua 教化). For 
example, the Jing jie refers to the transformative influence of the rites as jiaohua:
The transformative teaching of li (禮之教化) is subtle. Its curbing of bad 
actions takes place before the event. And it is capable of influencing peo-
ple to become good and stay away from wrongdoing without their being 
aware of it.21
Jiao also connotes jiaoyu 教育, usually translated as “education.” However, the 
term can also be translated as “teaching and nurturing.”22 Thus, education is 
concerned not only with the transmission of knowledge but also the formation 
of the person in all aspects—social, cultural, and interpersonal. Finally, as indi-
cated by its radical, pu 攴, jiao is also authoritative in connotation; therefore, 
it is associated with various terms that mean both teaching and actions typi-
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cally associated with authoritative conduct: to give guidance ( jiaodao 教導), to 
admonish ( jiaohui 教誨), and to instruct or to reprimand ( jiaoxun 教訓), all of 
which are reflected in the teaching activities of Confucius.
The foregoing considerations suggest that there may be resources within 
the Chinese tradition for coming to a different understanding of religion. Cai 
Renhou 蔡仁厚, in his work on the Mohist School (墨家), initially takes his 
understanding of religion from a Western theistic perspective. In this work, 
he sought to assess the Mohist sense of religiousness in theistic terms centered 
on the Mohist understanding of the heavens (or perhaps “Heaven”) (tian 天), 
demon ( gui 鬼), and divine (shen 神). He concluded that while there is an 
understanding of a transcendent and benevolent deity that is associated with 
the Mohist view of tian, the Mohist School ought not to be viewed as a religion 
because it lacks a certain sensibility that problematizes existence (as is found in 
notions such as sin or suffering in other traditions), nor is there a view about the 
helplessness of the human condition, nor a sense of the mystical— characteristics 
he takes to be essential marks of a religion.23 By the same yardstick, we may 
conclude that Confucianism—because of a much vaguer sense of tian—is even 
farther away from a theistic construal of religion.
Interestingly, Cai Renhou apparently changed his mind regarding the 
notion of religiousness that is operative in Chinese traditions. In remarks later 
appended to his discussions just mentioned, rather than a religiousness charac-
terized as a belief in a deity, he offers an alternative understanding of religion 
based on functional terms, as follows:
A religion (zong jiao 宗教) must be the inspirational source of cultural life 
and creativity. First, it must lay down for the people “a path for their daily 
living,” and second, it must open up “a way for their spiritual life.” . . . Peo-
ple of today take any talk about the Confucian Religion (Rujiao 儒教) to 
be a taboo subject.24 This is because of the current fashion that uncon-
sciously adopts Western religion as the standard. They do not under-
stand the East, especially the significance of the term “jiao” (教) for the 
Chinese. I wonder how many people in this age have considered that the 
Chinese cultural system also constitutes another standard.25
In the alternative that Cai Renhou adumbrates—in contrast to the efforts of 
Kang Youwei and others—he avoids the theistic construal of religion. The sug-
gestion seems to be that rather than being dictated by a theistic understanding 
of religiousness, which tends to distort our understanding of the meaning of 
the term jiao in Confucian teaching, we should seek to re-describe it from the 
Chinese perspective.
In view of the foregoing considerations, “religion,” when construed broadly 
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in terms of jiao, can be thought of as an authoritative way (dao 道) that imparts 
wisdom, facilitates transformation, and nurtures the formation of the total 
person. This is in good agreement with the Zhongyong, which states, “Practic-
ing the way is called jiao” (修道之謂教). And we can add to this Cai Renhou’s 
notion of the way as one that provides meaning for daily living and guidance for 
the spiritual life.
Yet, such characterizations of a religion will always remain unsatisfactory to 
those who hold allegiance to specific traditions, for whom an almost unbridge-
able gap exists between the objective “a religion,” even when construed as jiao, 
and the all-involving “Religion.” And the difference between the two may be 
located in the term “religious.” J. L. Schellenberg, drawing upon Smith, speaks 
of the latter term as the personal aspect of religion that includes religiousness, 
piety, and spirituality.26 One thinks of Religion as providing the space within 
which one makes sense of the world. For example, my colleague Patrick Hutch-
ings writes, “Why should I be, and why should I be in such a world? My adher-
ence to the Christian faith suggests an answer. . . . Why should you be in the 
world? If it was good enough for the Son of God, then it’s good enough for the 
likes of you.”27 In such responses, one can’t help but be personal, and the lan-
guage of one’s religion features ineluctably in the articulation of one’s religious 
sentiments.
The foregoing involves the aspect that Smith calls “faith.” While Smith 
clearly takes the holding of specific beliefs to be an aspect of faith, he also has a 
broader understanding of it that includes art and music. Despite Smith’s broader 
interpretation, he still describes the religious in terms of transcendence.28 
Smith’s understanding of transcendence as that which is greater than oneself 29 
draws inspiration from the theistic religions. And as such, Smith’s description 
of “faith” tends to exclude non-theistic traditions, such as the majority of Bud-
dhist and Confucian teachings.30 While the failure is partly due to the limita-
tion of Smith’s conception of faith, one understands that he could not remain 
silent—he needed to say something about what it means to be religious. The 
question is how do we find a way of discussing the religious aspect of experience 
without falling into sectarian particularity? Or, rather, how do we come to some 
agreement about the religious aspect of experience despite our diverging articu-
lations of such? I would suggest that even “secular” people cannot escape this 
difficulty, as they would still need to resort to some kind of particular articula-
tion in order to differentiate the religious experience from that of the superfi-
cial sort. It would seem that a functional description of religion might be more 
promising. And Confucianism in the Chinese world can offer an example for 
our consideration.
Rather than a notion of “religious” that is understood with reference to a 
transcendent deity, the Zhongyong speaks of the possibility of achieving sublime 
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action for the person who walks the path according to Confucian teaching. In 
the Zhongyong, jiao is also described as the process of leading a person from 
“understanding” or “clarity” (ming 明) to “authenticity,” “integrity,” or “whole-
hearted engagement” (cheng 誠).31 Ultimately, the culmination of such a process 
allows the person who is fully human to participate in, and realize the transfor-
mative and nurturing work of, the heavens and the earth (the paired imageries 
that evoke the natural world) expressed in the following manner:
Only those who are wholeheartedly engaged (cheng 誠) to the utmost . . . can 
participate in the transforming and nurturing action of heaven (tian 天) 
and earth. . . . [Only then] can they form a triad together with heaven and 
earth.32
Here we see the breadth and depth of jiao expressed in Confucian terms; it 
begins with teachings that invite practice, promote understanding (ming), 
sincerity of purpose (cheng), luminosity (ming) in conduct,33 and authentic 
engagement. Moreover, the teachings facilitate creative realizations that shape 
entire communities and beyond. To be, and become, fully human in the Confu-
cian tradition is then a religious project, one that begins within the simple and 
ordinary circumstances of inherited traits and familial relationships, gradually 
expanding and developing such connections and circumstances to the point of 
becoming influential, and eventually arriving at the tremendous deeds of trans-
forming and enhancing one’s world, to match—and to collaborate—with the 
works of the natural world.34 The vision is to realize a humanized world that 
improves upon the natural world in a way that facilitates the growth and trans-
formation of everything within it.35
Thus, from the perspective of the Confucian tradition, to think of jiao 
simply in terms of the modern usage of teaching, as the imparting of knowl-
edge, would be reductionistic. At the same time, we note how the discussion 
has proceeded seamlessly from the understanding that “cultivating the way is 
called jiao” to “leading one from clarity to wholehearted engagement is called 
jiao.” Regarding the term jiao, the former phrase corresponds to the aspect of 
“religion” in Smith, and the latter to that of “religious” in Dewey. We might say 
that for the Zhongyong’s understanding of jiao, the “religious” and “religion” are 
intimately bound together.
Even Smith’s articulation of the public aspect of religion as “cumulative 
traditions” necessarily involves saying what these traditions are cumulative 
of—namely experiences having to do with transcendence. It would seem that 
attempts to strictly separate the religious from religion might be difficult if not 
impossible. Similarly, when Dewey attempts to emancipate religious experi-
ences while at the same time he eschews religions, he wishes to retain the possi-
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bility that religious experience be understood as one that brings about a “better, 
deeper enduring adjustment in life.”36 Yet, how would one recognize experi-
ence to be religious without further elaboration as to what counts as better and 
deeper?
For similar reasons, it is problematic with societies that seek to maintain 
religious harmony by attempting to apply to religions a secular framework—its 
sheer neutrality leaves out an account of the religious dimension of the tradi-
tions it seeks to accommodate, which therefore diminishes those very traditions 
and renders them impotent and irrelevant. It is not surprising that religions 
tend to resist such attempts; even a non-theistic tradition such as Confucian-
ism, which seems to be closest to a secular perspective, requires that “religion,” 
understood as jiao, be expressive of particular values.
It seems that attempts at reconciling religions in terms of beliefs are 
doomed to failure because of competing and mutually exclusive claims that are 
irreconcilable. Moreover, as discussed, mere description of “belief ” is insuffi-
cient to reveal the religious character of Religion. We suggest that a functional 
approach offers the best chance of success.
When Religion is understood in functional terms, then the borders 
between religions can become more permeable. The Chinese notion that “the 
three jiao are continuous” (sanjiao heyi 三教合一) realizes the possibility of 
moving from one tradition to another without insurmountable differences and 
barriers.37 It allows one to find new ways of being religious when circumstances 
change. (Does this understanding require the confessional religions to alter 
their claim of exclusiveness? One supposes it must.) When our understanding 
of Religion expands beyond identification with a particular religion, then we 
can begin to explore the kind of religiousness of the ordinary that Dewey so 
desired. Perhaps what we are looking for is the development of a religious cul-
ture that is accommodating enough to include most religions, which are them-
selves in turn open enough. The Chinese experience shows that such a change 
can be done without damaging the integrity of the respective traditions, and it 
need not lead to confusion or chaos.
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CHAPTER 4
The Special District of Confucian Culture,  
the Amish Community, and the Confucian  
Pre-Qin Political Heritage
ZHANG Xianglong
I t  s eems  co m mo n  s en s e  to a Western mind that a theory of the state 
should present a potentially optimal mode of political design. Correspondingly, 
Plato, Aristotle, and modern philosophers propose various political doctrines, 
each of which takes one type of state as the best. In political reality, every politi-
cal party, insofar as its political power allows, wants to establish its own ideal 
state and dismiss all others. It rarely, if ever, occurs to such parties that the best 
political structure may go beyond one mode of state or be composed of various 
types of states.
Several years ago when I proposed the notion of a protective district, a Spe-
cial District of Confucian Culture or SDC,1 my main objective was not to set 
up an ideal mode of ruling but to deal with the predicament faced by Confu-
cians that, on the one hand, the revival of Confucianism requires an authen-
tic experience of community life based on family and lineage, but that, on the 
other hand, the globalized as well as individualized factuality of a ruling soci-
ety denies such a life. This set of circumstances strongly urges, therefore, that 
we build a binary structure consisting of both the current political-economic-
technological system and the other system, that is, the Confucian one. Without 
the current one, the other one cannot possess an actual footing; without the 
other one, the current one finds no way to have a feasible future or to be moral 
in an integrated sense. This chapter will try to outline a possible “other one” by 
explaining the concept of the SDC and, moreover, by making comparisons of 
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it with the Amish in order to state some concrete arguments for its necessity 
and feasibility. Finally, it will attempt to identify an even further reason for the 
establishment of the SDC that relates to a pre-Qin Confucian political heri-
tage. Gongyang 公羊 Confucians refer to this as “opening up three traditions” 
(tong santong 通三统, discussed below).
Why a Special District of Confucian Culture?
We all know the reasons for setting up a nature reserve: maintaining biodiver-
sity, protecting the original environment and rare species, maintaining ecologi-
cal balance, and so forth. Almost all of these can also apply to a cultural reserve 
or protected cultural district to a certain degree, if the “bio” is altered to “cul-
tural.” However, a special cultural district is inhabited by human beings with 
cultural traditions, and so there must be additional considerations involved in 
its establishment.
Confucianism has its roots in the family, especially in the parent-child rela-
tion. To extend this relation into communities, states, and “land under heaven” 
through an education in the arts and its exemplars is one of the primary func-
tions of a Confucian authority. Due to these two features—its family orientation 
and its transformation of human society through education— Confucianism 
did not feel the need to form itself into a religion with an independent and clear 
organization. Consequently, when the great tide of Westernization came—the 
so-called “dramatic change never seen in three thousand years”—the old family-
education-society system was destroyed or seriously damaged, and Confucian-
ism found no refuge in churches and temples as had other non-Western reli-
gions such as Buddhism and Daoism. That was one reason for the sharp and 
radical decline in the twentieth century of this once so successful cultural body. 
Up until about fifteen years ago, therefore, we saw no authentic Confucian liv-
ing experience in almost any major aspect of life in mainland China, and in this 
sense Confucianism had become a “wandering soul without a body.”
In the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in Confucian-
ism in Chinese academic circles and among Confucian sympathizers and even 
some young people. However, this phenomenon looks to belong chiefly to a cul-
tural nostalgia movement and has not penetrated into the mainstream, whether 
political, economic, educational, or technological. The anti-Confucian ideology 
fostered by the May Fourth “New Culture” movement and further fueled by the 
Cultural Revolution still prevails. One of its manifestations was the withdraw-
ing of the statue of Confucius from the side quadrant of Tiananmen Square in 
April of 2011, following the combined efforts of both the political left and right. 
Although the Chinese government has set up quite a few “Confucius Institutes” 
in foreign countries, these institutes seem to be Confucian in name only.
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In this unfavorable environment, Confucians have offered two notable 
responses. One is from the rightist side, represented by Mou Zongsan, which 
claims that in modern times Confucianism must “be self-restricted” to its moral 
base so as to let its own political and cognitive traditions be superseded by West-
ern democracy and science, for these are the “universal truth” and the “com-
mon ideal.”2 The other is the leftist position advocated most famously by Jiang 
Qing, which insists that Confucianism must sustain its political dimension in 
the contemporary era, and that, therefore, a Confucian religion in the strict 
sense should be formed with the goal of becoming the state religion of China.3
The rightist line undermines the vitality of Confucianism by forcing it to 
adopt a Westernized political and cognitive framework. The leftist line in con-
trast tries to reform Confucianism into a church-like national religion. In an 
anti-Confucian atmosphere, however, it risks leaving Confucianism hanging in 
the air and losing its vitality as well. Both lines pay little attention to the impor-
tance to Confucianism of family and community, or to the Confucian focus 
on xiaodao 孝道 (the Way of family reverence, or filial piety). Admittedly, it is 
extremely difficult in this era of globalization to revive the traditional family 
and display its advantages. But this does not mean that the Confucian struggle 
for survival today can afford to neglect its family-xiaodao keystone. Without it, 
no form of Confucianism can be genuine and alive.
For these reasons, the establishment of an SDC makes very good sense, 
insofar as it enables Confucianism to seek a new way of maintaining its vital-
ity today. It meets the requirements of both compromising with contemporary 
globalization and regenerating Confucianism. The SDC is marginal, and will 
therefore not negatively affect what is going on in mainstream society. Because 
it permits a small but authentic Confucian community to exist, it satisfies the 
need to sustain a true Confucian life-world in an environment of adversity.
What Is an SDC?4
An SDC is a small autonomous region in which Confucian communities pre-
vail. More specifically, it is grounded in the family and guided by a renewal of 
the traditional Confucian arts and principles. This kind of region requires a 
land grant for the establishment of limited self-governing communities that 
only an authoritative institution such as the state can provide. As much as pos-
sible the land should be geographically marginal or isolated, for two reasons: 
the effort to set up an SDC should not interfere with anyone’s livelihood, and 
the district should be secluded from the ruling society so that it can maintain 
the necessary space for a free and independent existence. After the initial wave 
of settlers makes improvements to the environment, the land should be made 
ready for farming and habitation by a small community.
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Without question, this community must be grounded in a family- or 
 lineage-based social structure. Therefore, what directs its establishment is nei-
ther liberal nor autocratic principles, but rather the familial rudiments enhanced 
by the Confucian arts. The family on various levels supplies the organic struc-
ture of the small society, in which many problems are dealt with, such as con-
struction and repair, agricultural production, insurance, public welfare, conflict 
resolution, and basic education. Accordingly, one of the major tasks of an SDC 
is, on the one hand, to improve family structure by retrieving both a familial 
prototype and the traditional Confucian refinement of this prototype and, on 
the other hand, learning as well as creating new family structures. The fam-
ily should provide a meaning-generating context for human life rather than a 
rigid hierarchical system that diminishes the natural free spaces of the living. 
In this respect, the thought of the peasant thinker Wang Fengyi (1864–1937) 
may be quite illuminating.5 He criticized the dogmatic and corrupt aspects of 
the family culture of his time: for instance, the discrimination against women, 
the overemphasis on the material aspects of marriage (such as claiming a bride-
price), and the insufficient care provided by families to their elders. But unlike 
the May Fourth radicals, he wanted to preserve and revitalize the inner life of 
the family, in particular the family ethics that takes xiao, family reverence or 
filial piety, as the foremost virtue. The numerous schools he created for the edu-
cation of women, for instance, were not intend to reshape the females of society 
into no-family-care individuals, but to emphasize the “roots of the family” (家
之本)—the mother and daughter-in-law, who help the whole family to achieve 
harmony, moral rectitude, and prosperity.
The political edifice of the SDC would not be a hereditary system like 
that of a monarchy, for such a system would not be the best concretization of 
 family-configured morality. The ideal of Confucian politics is “to make the 
world harmonious” (平天下), which depends on “regulating the state,” “coor-
dinating the family,” and “cultivating oneself.”6 Its superb manifestation is the 
Yao-Shun model of transferring authority according to virtue and wisdom, 
rather than through a hereditary system within one family. In other words, the 
family and its “role ethics”7 are deeper than the political system. It can serve as 
the latter’s origin and spiritual guide, but its makeup cannot be fully objectified 
into an inherited form of politics. Therefore, the SDC’s authority should come 
from and be curbed by the common people (baixing 百姓) grounded in the tra-
ditional family and in a Confucian wisdom that surpasses that of a monarchical 
system.
There may be two houses or congresses: a baixing house (百姓院) and a 
Confucian house (通儒院). The representatives of the baixing house are elected 
by family-based baixing or common people. Everyone in the SDC can vote for 
the representatives, but the votes coming from the family as a whole hold greater 
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weight than those from individuals. In this way, family formation acquires cer-
tain advantages, but individuals are also allowed to speak out. To avoid the 
monopoly of big family lineages, there should be a regulatory system to enforce 
the division of lineages over a certain size. The Confucian house should be 
composed of esteemed and tested Confucians. The administrative leader of the 
SDC, the director of the district, would be nominated by the bai xing house and 
approved by the Confucian house. The civil-service examination system (科举
制) would be revived for the selection of officers and promising Confucians. 
The procedure and content of the examination should be adapted according to 
what the SDC’s long-term existence requires.
The primary form of economic production should be agriculture, for it is 
the form most agreeable to family health, but family-based industry and com-
merce would be permitted. In brief, this is a natural, family-centered, human-
istic economy. It guarantees the basic needs of every family and individual, but 
also encourages as well as assists everyone to display their own talents, and to 
conduct their own life with happiness and decency. In this society, the “lowest” 
people in terms of wealth or social status should be guaranteed a life that allows 
them to maintain themselves, as well as a hopeful outlook. On the other hand, 
the “higher” the people rise in wealth or status, the more their contributions to 
the district should be substantially larger. There is no rigid economic or social 
stratification. Privileged status is not admitted except that which comes from 
embodying morality and wisdom.
The district will use clean and family-friendly technologies only. That 
means it will reapply the traditional technologies but at same time improve 
them, and will try its best to learn and invent smarter green technologies. Fos-
sil fuels for driving engines are to be prohibited, and electricity—especially 
public-grid electricity—is with a few exceptions banned in general. Traditional 
medicine such as Chinese medicine will be the cornerstone of healthcare, but 
the “green” parts of Western and other types of medicine are to be absorbed. 
Laodong 劳动 (work/labor in a wholesome sense) with the aid of such tech-
nology will allow labor to regain dignity through craftsmanship in a spirit of 
joyfulness.
Education will help secure a sustainable and comfortable future for the 
community by “going back to the past and renewing the present.” The Con-
fucian classics and arts are essential, but certain techniques and approaches to 
thinking developed by Western and other societies beyond China must be taken 
in, particularly those related to green living and technology. In other words, 
exchanges between the Confucian and other traditions are encouraged as far 
as the preconditions that they be clean and sustainable are met. Institutions of 
higher learning should be introduced for the pursuit of advanced knowledge. 
The SDC will be a place where a youthful enthusiasm for learning and new 
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discovery can flourish. Here the moral philosophy of the family will be both 
conservative and creative, since it will emphasize both continuity of tradition 
and the capacity to deal with unforeseen changes.
The SDC naturally will take Confucianism as its basic belief system and 
keep it alive through the program described above. However, due to its depen-
dence on a natural family ethics, rather than on dogmatic creeds, the SDC will 
have the confidence to leave room for other beliefs as far as they are in harmony 
with the fundamental principles and rules of this society.
What will the SDC look like? One passage from The Peach Blossom Spring 
by Tao Yuanming 陶渊明 (365–427) may give us a sense of its outlook:
The fisherman left his boat and entered the cave, which at first was 
extremely narrow, barely admitting his body; after a few dozen steps it 
suddenly opened out onto a broad and level plain where well-built houses 
were surrounded by rich fields and pretty ponds. Mulberry, bamboos and 
other trees and plants grew there, and criss-cross paths skirted the fields. 
The sounds of cocks crowing and dogs barking could be heard from one 
courtyard to the next. Men and women were coming and going about 
their work in the fields. The clothes they wore were like those of ordinary 
people. Old men and boys were carefree and happy.8
The spirit of an SDC community will be poetic in the sense of the harmony 
realized in “poem, song, music, and temperament” (诗, 歌, 声, 律), as rendered 
by the “Yaodian” 尧典 section of The Book of History (Shujing 书经).9 And the 
lifestyle depicted there also shares remarkable similarities with the Amish com-
munity in the United States.10
A Comparison with the Amish Community
The Amish are a special Anabaptist Protestant Christian group that formed in 
the middle of the seventeenth century in Europe. Persecuted heavily there, the 
Amish emigrated to North America between the 1730s and 1850s, and they 
now live in the United States and Canada.11 They believe that true Christians 
should in every way separate themselves from an immoral world in the pursuit 
of power. Thus, the Amish have resisted uniformity and control over their rural 
communities by any alien institution, whether that institution is in the form of 
a united church system, a state authority, mandatory education, modern tech-
nology, or modern rational thought. What the Amish cherish most are a sincere 
religious faith, a healthy family, and a vital and active community. For these 
reasons, some significant comparisons may be drawn between the Amish and 
the proposed SDC.
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First, both pay strong attention to family and combine religious beliefs 
with family morality. For both groups, love of deity essentially cannot be dis-
connected from love of family members. The Amish resist such code expres-
sions as “eternal salvation,” and prefer to speak of a “living hope” that demands 
their ethical practice.12 “[I]t makes no sense to them to separate ethics from 
salvation or to speak of one dimension and not the other.”13 The “ethics” here 
relates to the conviction that family morality comes first. So they reject a for-
mal bureaucratic church and hold church services in their homes every other 
Sunday:
The district’s twenty to forty families live near each other. A single 
four-letter word, Gmay—a [German] dialect shorthand for Gemeinde 
 (community)—refers to this local church-community, both its members 
and its worship services.14
These families are to a great extent related to each other and “provide care, 
support, and wisdom for all stages of life.”15 Therefore, “[t]he family [rather 
than the individual or an institution] is the primary social unit in Amish soci-
ety. . . . The family is the church in microcosm. . . . It is difficult to exaggerate the 
importance of the extended family in Amish society.”16 It is the family orienta-
tion of their community and Christian faith that distinguish the Amish from 
other Christian groups and allows a closer comparison to the Confucian com-
munity in the SDC.
Consequently, we find that xiaodao or filial piety, which features strongly 
in Confucian culture, is also encouraged and practiced to a certain degree in 
Amish society: “The words of the fifth commandment, ‘Honor thy father and 
thy mother,’ are heard frequently in Amish circles.”17 When parents become old, 
they move to an apartment adjacent to the house of one of their married chil-
dren where they receive care from their children when needed.18 As a result, 
among the Amish one hardly hears of anyone applying to live in a retirement 
center or nursing home.
In order to sustain their family-based religious beliefs in the midst of a hos-
tile environment, both find it necessary to uphold some level of separation from 
the mainstream society. In 1954 an Amish man named Levi living in Pennsyl-
vania was arrested and imprisoned five times within four months because he 
refused to send his fourteen-year-old son to the ninth grade of middle school.19 
The same thing happened around that time to one hundred other Amish people 
who, together with Levi, insisted that it was their own community that should 
take responsibility for their youngsters’ education and that their children 
should stop their school education by the eighth grade. Such efforts at keeping 
a substantial distance from the mainstream have characterized the entire history 
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of the Amish. Since the twentieth century, the Amish have striven to hold on to 
“the right not to be modern”20 and to continue their “Ordnung” (divine order 
of life tested by tradition)21 in all aspects of their lives. They well understand 
that the outcome of this non-modernization struggle will decide the destiny 
of their community. “Within two generations, the progress-seeking churches 
would surrender their distinctive Amish identity and merge with neighboring 
Mennonites.”22 As already mentioned, the SDC community will be aware of the 
unconditional requirement for isolation from modern society under the pres-
ent circumstances, and therefore will much appreciate the valuable knowledge 
gained from the Amish experience. The Amish have shown that without this 
kind of separation—or “Absonderung” in Amish German—no authentic and 
energetic Confucian community is possible today. In spite of some obvious dif-
ferences between China and the United States, the two groups are similar in 
their antipathy to modernity, advanced technology, and “the will to power.”
Furthermore, both sides are composed of small communities with “a high-
context culture” (Edward T. Hall’s term) “in which people are deeply involved 
with one another . . . [and] are integrated, for members are skilled in thinking 
comprehensively according to a system of the common good. Loyalties are con-
crete and individuals work together to settle their problems.”23 Finding effective 
ways to attract young people of the next generation—and to persuade them to 
choose to stay in the “backward” community—is the key to Amish survival. 
This requires a high level of social intimacy, and a corresponding low level of 
mobility:
By limiting mobility, horse-drawn transportation supports this small-
scale, face-to-face community. In addition, a horse-based culture requires 
rural environs and keeps Amish communities outside urban areas, which 
threaten Amish sensibilities.24
“Old Order [the conservative Ordnung] authority rested on informal oral tra-
dition in each local community.”25 Therefore, “[i]n general, the more conserva-
tive the Ordnung, the higher the retention [of young people].”26 Contrary to 
quite a few pessimistic predictions made by researchers, the Amish population 
had increased from six thousand in 1900 to 275,000 by 2012.
In order to sustain their faith, family, and community, both the Amish and 
SDC consider it imperative to resist the overwhelming domination of mod-
ern technology and to choose technology appropriate to their way of life. They 
clearly know that the actual consequences of technology are not unrelated to 
moral standards and their way of thinking. An Amish leader says: “The moral 
decay of these last days has gone hand in hand with lifestyle changes made pos-
sible by modern technology.”27 When we use technology to achieve what we 
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want, technology in turn uses our lives to realize its own goal and thus trans-
form us to fit its flattening framework. The Amish people “recognized the 
way mechanization displaced family and local communities in favor of distant 
sources of production and influence.”28 You may use your cell phone to call your 
parents, but by using the mobile phone system you are actually being put into 
a situation where family members are distancing themselves from each other 
and community interaction is no longer face-to-face. You may bring your high-
tech harvest machine to help your neighbor, but when almost everyone has a 
machine, mutual assistance becomes an unusual phenomenon. Within the web 
of modern technology, where even individualized service can be essentially uni-
form, a community is reduced to single families, families to individuals, and 
individuals to manipulated desires. The result of all this is that we need com-
mercial media and state institutions to form any kind of group consciousness, 
and we require crises, enemies, or sometimes even war to provoke in us a sense 
of solidarity.
That is why the Amish, especially the Old Order Amish, have been resist-
ing the universal impact of modern technology. Some progressive Amish com-
munities have tried to accept certain new technologies in order to adapt to a 
changing world. But, “Diversity has its limits.” If they did not “negotiate” with 
the technology by following the rules of the Old Order, the result was a disaster. 
“Although Beachy Amish members have continued to dress somewhat plainly 
and even retained the Pennsylvania Dutch dialect for a generation or so, their 
embrace of the car, along with other technological and doctrinal innovations, 
put them outside the Old Order fence.”29 One of the reasons for rejecting car 
ownership, according to one Amish leader, is that “they bring moral decay as 
people work and live away from their families,” and one Amish publication 
gives as the reason the fact that “the car pulls families apart, increases the temp-
tation to travel into cities, and detaches families from their local churches.”30 
From these statements, we can observe what kinds of morals are treasured by the 
Amish and why they consider cars, telephones, television, grid-supplied elec-
tricity, and so forth to be serious threats.
To maintain family, faith, and community, the most suitable profession for 
both the Amish and SDC is agriculture. “Over the generations, the Amish have 
developed a strong conviction that the small family farm is the best place to raise 
children in the faith.”31 However, since the 1950s, especially during the latter 
part of the twentieth century, Amish farming has encountered significant dif-
ficulties, and the households engaged in farming have decreased considerably. 
Some farmers have adopted relatively high-technology equipment such as vac-
uum milkers and bulk cooling tanks for milk production.32 Fortunately, early in 
the twenty-first century, in addition to the traditional way of farming, which 
is still practiced by the most conservative groups, a number of new agricultural 
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practices, such as cheese making, the auctioning of produce, organic farming, 
intensive grazing, and the use of greenhouses, have emerged, or in some ways 
have been revived, in Amish communities.33 The Amish experience seems to 
show that the prosperity of the family and community is largely affected by the 
technology that is used. The SDC needs to make agriculture and traditional 
green technology its foundation.
With heartfelt admiration for the Amish people and their culture as 
described above, it is proper here to reflect on some lessons that SDC thinkers 
can learn from the Amish.
First, although the Amish have been astute enough to recognize the moral 
consequences of adopting modern technology, and have engaged in resistance 
to it and chosen to accept only parts of it and negotiate with it cautiously, their 
approach to dealing with the issue of technology in general may at times seem 
to be too passive. There is no organized, long-term practice to establish an indig-
enous system for appropriating technology that can satisfy the overall needs of 
the Amish today and in the future. For example, it is a smart negotiation or 
compromise to adapt a commercial computer run by grid electricity so that a 
battery-powered word processor can be used—and as long as “e-mail, Inter-
net access, video games, or other interactive media” are disabled.34 However, it 
would be much better and safer for the Amish to develop their own processor 
(on the model, say, of an improved suanpan 算盘 or traditional Chinese aba-
cus). The Amish strategies of dealing with modern technology up to now have 
been partially successful, but new dangers have appeared in some communities 
such as the acceptance of cell phones and solar electricity,35 which may become 
more insidious threats. So the future success of the Amish in their attempt to 
tame modern technology is seen as “uncertain.”36
Second, the Amish need to develop their own advanced education and 
research projects so that they may achieve the capacity to create and sustain 
their own technology network. Historically, Confucianism had its own effec-
tive education and examination system, but these did not cover practical tech-
nology relating to farming and industry, a gap that the SDC must fill.
Third and most fundamentally, it will be necessary to establish a clearer 
boundary between the Amish and SDC communities and their respective sur-
rounding mainstream societies so that the principle of separation can be fully 
realized. This means that the Amish and the SDC should each have their own 
special district where their own lifestyles prevail exclusively. Although the Amish 
have tried to interpret this separation in terms of the dichotomy between reli-
gious life and the worldly life, or between church and state,37 they are neverthe-
less living in the world and hence must constantly confront the politics of the 
worldly life, if only because it heavily influences the quality of the separation. 
In other words, they should live on the land run autonomously by them, so that 
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they can have independent forms of social organization, economy, and technol-
ogy networks. While it is good to avoid the alienating influence of bureaucratic 
institutions, they badly need institutions of their own that are not alienated 
from their family- and community-oriented lifestyles, while at the same time 
they can organize the dispersed Amish communities into a self-ruling body. It is 
not a state, but rather a self-run community in the same sense that Hong Kong 
is (that is, if the Special District’s leader is actually selected by its people).
This would allow the Amish people to avoid directly facing the outside 
world as single-family units or as individuals, and to avoid the economic pres-
sure to modernize their technology. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, state 
health regulations requiring that Grade A milk be distinguished from Grade 
B milk pushed some Amish farms to accept mechanical milkers and cooling 
tanks.38 In 2002 “Some farmers complained that an inflexible farming Ordnung 
was actually pushing young families into nonfarm employment and suggested 
that, if church leaders wanted to save the family farm, the Ordnung would need 
to be relaxed.”39 Why did the Ordnung hinder Amish agriculture at this point 
when it had not done so before? Because the external economic environment 
had changed: “Escalating prices for hybrid seeds, fertilizer, equipment, and vet-
erinary bills all conspired to make farming an expensive enterprise, even on a 
small scale.”40 Considering the mutual reinforcement between the modern 
economy and modern technology, if the Amish want to resist, by separation, 
the moral-decay brought on by modern technology, the separation should also 
extend to economic life—and therefore to political life. From this perspective, 
establishing an autonomous SDC or SDA (i.e., a Special District for Amish 
Culture) would seem necessary.
How Is the SDC Different from a Reserve?
One difference between the SDC and a nature reserve is that the SDC is less a 
place for protecting rare species and more a way to preserve a potential way of 
life for future humanity. It is, in fact, a way, or perhaps even the way, of engender-
ing the full essence or possibilities of Confucianism, thereby making it “become 
itself ” in the future.
Confucianism’s forte lies not in the building of a power structure or a 
church system with a prominent form, whether that form be individualistic, 
governmental, or religious, but in constituting an attractive lifestyle that is 
characterized by humaneness, harmony, artistic creativity, spontaneity, and 
durability. This lifestyle must have its primary grounding in a sound family 
and community structure that takes xiaodao 孝道 (loving, serving, respect-
ing, and honoring the memory of one’s parents) as its foundation and extends 
it through the Confucian arts to the whole community. The family relation 
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and the practice of xiaodao, however, have been established in the temporal 
existence of peoples down through the generations, as I have described else-
where.41 Due to the fact that, for Confucianism, all political entities such as the 
state have their roots in the family and its rituals, this temporality is necessarily 
embodied in Confucian political philosophy, and therefore makes it different 
from the Platonic way of seeking the best state in an Ideal that is independent 
of time.
Because tiandao 天道, or the Way of Heaven, is ever changing, no actual 
political regime, however it may be shaped according to some Ideal, can avoid 
ultimate deterioration and decline. New regimes must emerge to replace the 
present one to fulfill the demands of tiandao. Here the key to political “replace-
ment” is the actualization of timely virtue rather than a resort to violence, trick-
ery, or some absolutist ideology. This is what distinguishes a legitimate replace-
ment or ge 革 (revolution) from an illegitimate one or cuan 篡 (usurpation). 
The Book of Changes states:
Heaven and earth effectuate four seasons by revolutions. The revolutions 
of Tang [the first king of the Xia dynasty] and Wu [the first king of the 
Zhou dynasty] complied with heaven and were responsive to the will of 
the people (顺乎天而应乎人). How great was the timeliness of the revo-
lution [hexagram] (革之时大矣哉)!42
Alternatively:
Heaven and earth bring about revolution, and the four seasons complete 
themselves thereby.
Tang and Wu brought about political revolutions because they were 
submissive toward heaven and in accord with men. The time of revolu-
tion is truly great.43
The legitimization of the revolutions of Tang and Wu, and indeed the evidence 
of their complementarity with both Heaven and humanity, lie in their timely 
way of replacing the preceding dynasty, similar to the way Spring replaces Win-
ter. It is a natural way of following the dao and of opportunely fulfilling the 
needs of Heaven and humanity.
A Confucian revolution is therefore necessary for Confucianism to achieve 
its political objectives. In addition, to prove itself to be a revolution rather than 
a usurpation is to show how it complies with heaven and is responsive to the will 
of the people. “Showing” cannot, however, be limited to presenting arguments, 
apologies, or even facts, all of which are subject to interpretations and can be 
potentially attacked by critics, but instead must demand a real community life 
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that demonstrates how a self-evident and morally glamorous Confucian life-
world can actually function. This community life, however, first requires a grant 
of land to sustain itself.
Before the Qin (221–207 B.C.E.), there were quite a few autonomous 
lands in the empire ruled by nobles, which sometimes provided the necessary 
material basis for such “showing.” Confucius said: “The Zhou’s Wen and Wu 
arose from the small districts of Feng and Hao, but finally achieved the great 
kingship” (周文武起丰镐而王).44 Here, “Wen” refers to King Wen, who was 
then the duke of Zhou, and after his death received the posthumous title of 
Wen Wang or King Wen. He was the father of “Wu” in this quotation (or King 
Wu). Wen set up the small district of Feng, where he led Zhou’s people in build-
ing a fabulous “SDC”; and the same thing happened to Wu in Hao. In this way 
they were able to show the virtuousness of their politics and won over the hearts 
of most of the people at the fall of the Shang empire. Thus, even before the brief 
war against the cruel Shang emperor, the Zhou had gained the new legitimacy 
of heaven by demonstrating their timely morality. This is the very meaning of 
“kingship” (wang 王)—obtaining and sustaining rule by lively virtue rather 
than by power.
The Amish experience demonstrates how a small minority community 
through its vitality and humanity can exert a substantial sociocultural influence 
on mainstream society over time. Before the middle of the twentieth century, 
the social mainstream did not have a very positive view of the Amish. “A queer 
religious sect,” “drab,” “odd in many ways: they are a strange people” were the 
usual comments.45 Since the 1960s, however, their image in the public mind 
has seen a steady improvement, despite some minor setbacks, and they “now 
have become objects of public interest and admiration.”46 “One of the greatest 
ironies of Amish life is that a people committed to remaining separate from 
the world have attracted so much attention from it.”47 The more curious thing 
is that, although the Amish reject most of the things that typical Americans 
cherish—individualism, science, modern technology, and freedom of personal 
choice—many Americans still feel attracted to the Amish way of life. “Why are 
we so intrigued by the Amish?” it is asked.48 Eventually, the answer is found in 
the high quality of the Amish lifestyle, which bears certain similarities to how 
Sima Qian described the district of Feng, where King Wen ruled:
Widows and orphans, the destitute and the disabled, receive respect and 
care within their community. . . . [V]iolent crime is virtually nil. Divorce 
is unheard of, and the elderly grow old within a caring circle of family 
and friends. . . . Work pulses with meaning, human dignity, and a delight 
in artisanship. Extended family networks provide care throughout the 
life cycle.49
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“[A]ll things considered, Amish quality-of-life indicators are remarkably 
robust. . . . It seems that in some uncanny way the Amish may have outwitted 
us—or perhaps even outwitted modernity itself.”50 It is apparent from the 
Amish example that living the community life itself is more persuasive and self-
evident than any prevailing values and standards, because it is the direct mani-
festation of tiandao or the Way of Heaven.
According to Confucian political philosophy, if someone receives his life’s 
calling from tiandao and touches the deepest parts of the people’s hearts, that 
person will win the kingship. In the terms of the “SDC” built by Wen and Wu, 
the Zhou achieved such a calling. This did not mean, however, that the Zhou 
could claim either legitimacy or kingship forever. Sooner or later, a new dynasty 
would be born in another small place that had been cultivated with virtue, and 
in due time it would go on to replace the Zhou. Moreover, this does not mean 
that the dynasty replaced by the Zhou would forever lose its legitimacy. Like the 
seasons, dynasties complete the circle at least in a formal sense, constituting the 
political tiandao, or Way of Heaven. Therefore, Confucians proposed the idea 
of tong santong 通三统 or “connecting three systems,” which holds that when a 
new kingship or political system comes to power, it should retain the cultural 
and political system of its predecessors in a measured way. A specific example: 
the new ruler must assign a piece of land to each of the remaining inhabitants 
of the previous two dynasties and permit them to keep their cultures and tradi-
tions on the land. Moreover, compared to other feudal subjects, the owners of 
these lands would carry additional privileges, such as being able to come before 
the ruler holding the status of guests rather than subjects.51 In this way, the three 
systems are “connected” in a circle, implying that, one by one, the old will return 
in the future.
The current SDC can be seen as the manifestation of a preceding system, 
and is part of the “circle.” Moving beyond the current PRC government and 
the Republican government in Taiwan, the SDC stands for the old dynasties, 
which took Confucianism as their dominant cultural and political direction. 
It therefore points to the past but also embraces the future in the circle of the 
“three connecting systems.” More crucially, its existence will make the tong san-
tong truly possible today, and allow the current political structure to move from 
a dependence on power to a dependence on virtue. In the United States—if 
a speculative comparison is allowed here—there could be an interconnected 
three-part system there as well: it would be composed of the current U.S. gov-
ernment; the way of life in the nineteenth-century, now represented by the 
Amish (if they can establish themselves in a special district); and the way of the 
Indian people, whose ancestors were the masters of the land before the arrival 
of the European colonists.
As argued above, no fixed political system can forever lay claim to political 
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virtue, morality, or tiandao. Tiandao can only be realized in the dynamic and 
rotating pattern of the three interconnected systems. In comparison, political 
virtue and legitimacy can only be constituted in a timely fashion between or 
among cyclic systems, instead of being locked within one system. No political 
system is good or virtuous by itself, but must instead demonstrate its good-
ness through opportune relations and tensions with others. For this reason, 
an SDC, in a broader sense, is essential for the manifestation of tiandao in this 
world.
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CHAPTER 5
Why Speak of “East Asian Confucianisms”?
Chun-chieh HUANG
P r i o r  to  t h e  t u r n  of the twenty-first century, very little research had 
been conducted on “East Asian Confucianisms” in Chinese academia.1 How-
ever, in 2000, a team from National Taiwan University initiated the “Research 
Project on the Interpretation of Confucian Classics in Early Modern East Asia,” 
which served as the first stage of research until 2004. This East Asian research 
project has been developing in stages, and since 2011 it has been conducted as 
the “Program of East Asian Confucianisms” and was set to continue until 2019. 
This initiative has ushered into the field a steadily growing number of scholars. 
Meanwhile, National Taiwan University Press had begun publishing a number 
of series of books on East Asian Confucianisms and East Asian culture, most 
notably Studies in East Asian Confucianisms, Research Materials in East Asian 
Confucianisms, and Studies in East Asian Civilizations. Nearly two hundred 
books have been published by National Taiwan University Press, and many 
have been reprinted in simplified-character editions in the People’s Republic 
of China. Japanese and Korean scholars have also begun to conduct studies on 
Confucianism from a regional East Asian perspective, and even some mainland 
Chinese scholars are beginning to write books on East Asian Confucianisms.2
The theoretical foundations and future prospects of this new field of East 
Asian Confucianisms still await deep and extensive scholarly deliberations. In 
2003, the methodological problems that would form the initial dialogue for 
these deliberations were examined in my article “How Is East Asian Confucian-
isms Possible [as a Field of Study]?”3 The present essay examines the related 
question “Why Is East Asian Confucianisms Necessary?” The next section dis-
cusses the special features of East Asian Confucianisms, and the subsequent sec-
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tion considers the prospects of East Asian Confucianisms as a new field in the 
present academic world, providing the foundation for a new humanistic spirit 
for the twenty-first-century age of globalization. The final section concludes 
the study.
What Is “East Asian Confucianisms?”
The content and special features of “East Asian Confucianisms” can be viewed 
from a variety of perspectives, the most significant of which are: (1) the interac-
tion between part and whole, and (2) the contrast between form and content.
With regard to the interaction between part and whole, the term “East 
Asian Confucianisms” is intended to stress that within the rich diversity of the 
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese cultures and traditions, and within 
their differing Confucianisms, lies a common core of shared intellectual and 
ethical factors. This special feature of East Asian Confucianisms has several 
dimensions.
First, “East Asian Confucianisms” refers to the impact of Confucian val-
ues as manifested in indigenous thought and culture. The diversity of localized 
formations of Confucian thought and culture across East Asia is not a mere 
mosaic of these localized manifestations. As a matter of fact, the Confucianisms 
of the countries of East Asia have influenced one another through exchanges 
and interactions for centuries. Just as “Christendom,” featuring a plethora of dis-
tinctive localized forms, was formed through religious and cultural exchanges 
and interactions across Western Europe, a similar sort of “Confuciandom” took 
shape across East Asia. The use of the term “Confuciandom” underscores the 
fact that despite the rich variety of localized manifestations of East Asian Con-
fucianisms, there is a distinctive regional wholeness of intellectual and ethical 
factors that are held in common.
Next, the regional wholeness of East Asian Confucianisms does not exist 
as an abstraction over and above the concrete exchanges and interactions going 
on among the Confucian traditions of the East Asian countries. Rather, it 
exists—while growing and developing—right in the midst of these exchanges 
and interactions among these diverse East Asian Confucian traditions. The 
watchword here is “in the midst of.” Again, this wholeness is not to be regarded 
as something “over and above.”
Furthermore, since East Asian Confucianisms exist in the midst of, and 
not over and above, the cultural exchanges and interactions among the coun-
tries of East Asia, it cannot be regarded as a single, fixed, and unchanging intel-
lectual form that originated and was rigidly defined over 2,600 years ago on the 
Shandong Peninsula in China. Rather, we must appreciate that it has under-
gone a continuous and ongoing process of development for over two thousand 
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years across East Asia. Not only have East Asian Confucianisms progressed over 
time; they have adapted to suit each different locale they have encountered so 
that the manifestations of Confucian tradition in each locale seamlessly reflect 
the special features of that place while still instilling the central core values of 
Confucianism.
As mentioned above, the special feature, the wholeness, of East Asian 
Confucianisms exists in the midst of and not over and above the cultural and 
intellectual exchange activities among the respective East Asian countries. Con-
sequently, they must be regarded as a sort of continuously evolving family of 
intellectual traditions. Although this sort of temporal and continuously evolv-
ing family has historical roots in the pre-Qin Confucian school, as soon as the 
downward and outward flow of Confucianism encountered different cultures 
and societies of other times and places, distinctive Confucian trademarks of 
each place were formed and set. We must appreciate that while Zhu Xi learning 
is very different from the humanist school of Neo-Confucianism, the difference 
between Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Zhu Xi learning is even greater. There-
fore, research in East Asian Confucianisms cannot countenance such theoreti-
cal presuppositions as “orthodox versus heterodox” or “center versus periphery.” 
It absolutely cannot be assumed that Chinese Confucianism is the highest form 
of Confucianism, which should serve as the vital standard for assessing the cor-
rectness of the various manifestations of Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese 
Confucianisms. Such an assumption would turn Chinese Confucianism into 
the Procrustean bed of ancient Greek myth—such that the other East Asian 
Confucian traditions would have to be forcibly stretched or trimmed in order 
to fit the standards everyone conforms to. On the contrary, we should endeavor 
to grasp the history of the Confucian traditions of each East Asian country 
as part of the unfolding of its respective national cultural subjectivity. Simply 
stated, one must understand that the so-called “single thread” of East Asian 
Confucianisms exists and develops only as a burgeoning tapestry through the 
ongoing manifold developments going on in this rich diversity of peoples and 
cultures in order to grasp its creativity and emotional knowledge.4
As to the contrast between form and content, the modes of Confucian 
intellectual and cultural transmission across East Asia were not at all uniform; 
they were highly diverse. For example, while the transmitters of Confucian val-
ues in China were scholars or scholar-officials, in Tokugawa Japan they were 
commoner intellectuals, and in Joseon Korea (1392–1910) they were the yang-
ban (feudal power holders). The transmitters of Confucian values in these three 
countries occupied very different positions in society and had highly different 
relations to political power.5 However, despite these differences, commonalities 
remained among the Confucian traditions of China, Japan, and Korea. To wit, 
despite the different levels and scopes of Confucian transmitters (the form) in 
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the politics and societies of these three countries, they all shared the same core 
Confucian values (the content).
The core Confucian values shared by Confucians in the various East Asian 
countries include, at the very least, the following two. First, Confucians in 
all of the East Asian countries firmly believe that the foundation and starting 
point of Confucianism lay in a self-cultivation process that involves extending 
 sympathy—proceeding along a continuum from self, to family, to society, to 
state, then on to world. East Asian Confucians all hold, in effect, that the trans-
formation of self is the starting point of transforming the world. Consequently, 
East Asian Confucian masters all passionately devote themselves to developing 
deeply profound theories of self-cultivation. Fundamentally, East Asian Con-
fucian philosophies are constituted as practical philosophies of self-cultivation 
approaches and family ethics. Because the movement in cultivation from the 
self to family, society, state, and world is not sporadic and ruptured but rather 
forms a continuum, the practical philosophies of East Asian Confucian tradi-
tions all offer responses to the core problem in political philosophy concern-
ing the possibility of getting from individual humane heartedness to general 
humane governance.
The second core value shared in common by the Confucians of each East 
Asian country and tradition is Confucius’ teaching of ren 仁, rendered variously 
in English as “humanity,” “humaneness,” “humane heartedness,” “benevolence,” 
and “authoritative personhood.” The term ren appears 105 times in fifty-eight 
chapters of Confucius’ Analects (Lunyu 論語). Taking ren as the core value on 
which to arrange and construct the empire, the early Confucian masters and 
students dreamed of realizing a Confucian utopia. Han dynasty Confucians 
continued along the tracks laid down by the pre-Qin Confucian schools. For 
example, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (ca. 179–104 B.C.E.) said, “The ren approach 
lies in loving others, not in just loving oneself.”6 In the Tang dynasty, Han Yu 韓
愈 (768–824) (also known as Han Tuizhi 韓退之) said, “Broad [encompassing] 
love is called ren.”7 In other words, they explained ren directly in terms of love.
In the Northern Song, Zhang Zi 張載 (1020–1077) composed the West-
ern Inscription (Ximing 西銘),8 which implicitly presents ren at a lofty, cos-
mic level. Next, the Southern Song Neo-Confucian synthesizer Zhu Xi 朱熹 
(1130–1200) (also known as Huian 晦庵) composed the masterpiece, Treatise 
on Humanity (Renshuo 仁說), which gives ren a metaphysical foundation as 
well as a cosmological function, thereby enhancing ren’s cosmic loftiness in the 
subsequent tradition. After Zhu Xi’s new account of ren was transmitted north-
east to Japan, it stirred up a hornet’s nest of discussions and disputes among Zhu 
Xi’s supporters and critics there, with his critics in the majority, as metaphysics 
did not sit well with the pragmatically minded Japanese. Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋 
(1627–1705),9 Ōta Kinjo 大田錦城 (1765–1825),10 Toshima Hōshū 豐島豐洲 
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(1737–1814),11 and Asami Keisai 淺見絅齋 (1652–1711)12 all wrote original 
essays of their own on the meaning and significance of ren and the cultivation of 
ren. It was not only the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians who paid special atten-
tion to ren as a core value of Confucianism; Joseon Korean lords and ministers 
always discussed problems related to humane governance (renzheng 仁政). As 
Yang Rubin (1956–) points out, “The development of the concept of ren in 
East Asia is just like the unfolding grand epic of a heroic righteous war.”13 The 
East Asian Confucians were all bards of this grand heroic historical epic.
In general, from the seventeenth century, Confucians all over East Asia 
shared the core Confucian values. We could say that the East Asian Confu-
cian community had quietly taken shape by the seventeenth century. Examples 
of this sort of common Confucian consciousness appeared in every East Asian 
country. It was manifested in Edo Japan in 1600 when Fujiwara Seika 藤原惺窩 
(1561–1619), an early follower of Zhu Xi, called on Tokugawa Ieyasu 德川家康 
(1543–1616), who ruled as Shōgun from 1603 to 1605. It was also manifested 
in the seventeenth century when another Korean follower of Zhu Xi, Yi Hwang 
李滉 (1502–1571) (also known as Toegye 退溪) compiled Zhu Xi’s Essential 
Writings (朱子書節要) for the edification of his students. It became even more 
apparent in nineteenth-century Japan during the popular general education 
explosion in society when many scholars enthusiastically began to offer public 
lectures on the Analects of Confucius.
Why Is “East Asian Confucianisms” Necessary?
We are now in a position to consider the fundamental question, “Why is ‘East 
Asian Confucianisms’ necessary?” This question can be approached from two 
angles.
First, we can view the rise of the field of East Asian Confucianisms on the 
new stage of scholarship in the twenty-first century as a reaction to the form of 
Confucian studies conducted in the Chinese-language academia of the twenti-
eth century. For example, twentieth-century Chinese New Confucian philoso-
phers tended to view Confucianism narrowly as a segment of their national and 
ethnic identity, especially as bound up with the vast and far-reaching histori-
cal traumas and transformations of the early twentieth century. With regard to 
methodology, they tended to be highly critical of programmatic May Fourth 
scientism and narrow-minded Qing dynasty empirical studies. Culturally, they 
staunchly supported cultural ethnocentrism and turned Confucian studies into 
a sort of mission to renew and recharge the national spirit. In a word, twentieth-
century Chinese New Confucians took the promotion of a Chinese cultural 
renaissance as their existential responsibility.
In the twentieth century, through a series of important writings, the New 
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Confucians extended traditional Confucianism’s spiritual resources as their 
raison d’être. Under the adverse conditions of twentieth-century China, these 
devoted scholars carried on with their studies and reflections, and made truly 
great contributions to Confucian culture and scholarship. However, since they 
accepted the limitations of a rigid national ethnocentrism, twentieth-century 
Chinese Confucian writings today come across largely as part of a national eth-
nic discourse. In fact, Japanese Confucian studies were also deeply imbued with 
cultural nationalism; as Yoshikawa Kōjirō 吉川幸次郎 (1904–1980) pointed 
out, the fundamental mission of Tokugawa era (1603–1868) Japanese Confu-
cian scholarship was to “Japanize” Chinese Confucianism. Well into the twenti-
eth century this scholarship was highly charged with nationalism.14 During the 
1930s, the early stage of World War II, Japanese scholars even reinterpreted the 
first chapter of Confucius’ Analects on “learning and practicing what one has 
learned” in terms of the Japanese emperor’s imperial edict directing education.15
Against this twentieth-century background, an important function of the 
new field of East Asian Confucianisms is that it involves actively purging Con-
fucian studies of the limitations—and prejudices—of ethnocentrism to ensure 
that Confucian studies will never again be confined within state-centrism. This 
results in freeing Confucianism to be more broadly conceived and extending its 
spiritual mission to new heights in the twenty-first-century age of globalization. 
As the Doctrine of the Mean, chapter 28, anticipates:
致廣大而盡精微，極高明而道中庸。
[The superior man is] penetrating the furthest reaches while exhausting 
the most subtle essentials; attaining utmost loftiness and perspicacity 
while practicing the utmost propriety.
Freed of the twentieth-century nationalism and ethnocentrism that has char-
acterized each East Asian country, scholars who actively pursue studies on East 
Asian Confucianisms will be able to debunk the limiting binaries of “center and 
periphery” and “orthodoxy and heterodoxy.” Moreover, they will be freed from 
examining classical texts solely in the light of the history of their single country. 
Furthermore, scholars in East Asian Confucian studies will be able to undertake 
open-minded analyses of the interactions and fusions of Confucianism, and the 
societal and cultural traditions of each host country and locale around East 
Asia. Indeed, the developmental vantage of Confucianism in each East Asian 
country could be said to be a seamless reflection of the developmental process 
of cultural subjectivity in each of these countries.
Second, the necessity of advocating “East Asian Confucianisms” as a 
distinct field is a proactive intellectual response to the predilection of those 
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 twentieth-century East Asian academcians who have interpreted the East 
according to the West. In this sense, East Asian Confucianisms manifests the 
vital mission to revisit the Confucian core values as the mainstream of East 
Asian cultures that might be expanded to provide the foundation of a new 
Humanism for the age of globalization.
On the heels of the development of globalization and the rise of Asia, intel-
lectuals worldwide are more and more starting to feel that the Humanism that 
arose out of the Enlightenment of eighteenth-century Europe is too strongly col-
ored by special European sources and characteristics, which make it ill equipped 
to respond to the needs of the multifaceted demands of the twenty-first-century 
age of globalization. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake reviews, as well as to 
research and develop the alternative “other” humanistic resources contained in 
the treasures of non-European cultural traditions.16 In the process of establish-
ing a new Humanism in this age of inter-civilizational dialogue, the reinterpre-
tation of the lost treasures of East Asian Confucian culture would indeed be a 
most worthwhile academic mission to undertake.
Can Confucianism Transcend the East Asian Sphere?
“East Asian Confucianisms” is constructed from the terms “East Asia” and 
“Confucianisms.” However, once these terms have been combined to form “East 
Asian Confucianisms,” two considerations immediately arise. First, during the 
twentieth century, the people of East Asia, including the Japanese, wrote East 
Asian history with their own blood, sweat, and tears. The expression “East Asia” 
in the term “East Asian Confucianisms” genuinely carries too many sad and 
horrific twentieth-century memories of imperialism. For example, the memory 
of imperial Japan’s announcement of its ambition to establish a “Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in 1933,17 now understood as Japan’s pretext for 
invading East Asia, causes deep, gut-wrenching pain to the peoples of East Asia, 
particularly in China and Korea. Consequently, down to the present, the term 
“East Asia” is heavily burdened with historical baggage.18 With the rise of China 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century, memories of the historical Chi-
nese empire have begun to engage the attention of the academic world.19 It is 
a historical fact that “East Asian Confucianisms” arose on the Shandong Pen-
insula some 2,500 years ago, and some scholars suspect that if China develops 
into a superpower in the twenty-first century then the advocacy of the values of 
“East Asian Confucianisms” in China would simply lead to an atavistic revival 
of “national” Chinese learning and culture in the twenty-first century. For this 
reason, the term “East Asia” that appears in the expression “East Asian Con-
fucianisms” should be understood as a methodology rather than as a reality, 
in order to avoid its being subverted into an illicit new-imperialist discourse.20
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Second, since the term “East Asian Confucianisms” presents Confucian-
isms on the platform of East Asia, we might wonder whether and how Con-
fucianism could transcend this platform of East Asia and become a source of 
universal values for the age of globalization.
The two above-mentioned considerations touch upon two problems that 
warrant deeper discussion: (1) the problem of the conflict between political 
and cultural identity faced by Confucians in all of the East Asian countries, 
and (2) the problem of how the cultural subjectivity of Confucians in each East 
Asian country can manifest itself in shared universal values.
The core of the first problem lies in whether Confucian studies can tran-
scend the confines of the state. The answer to this question is twofold. Viewed 
from the perspective of political identity, since the seventeenth century, after the 
rise of a regional East Asian national identity, Confucian scholars have found it 
extremely difficult to escape from the nationalistic platform of their respective 
countries. During the seventeenth century, from the time when Yamazaki Ansai 
山崎闇齋 (1618–1682) posed the hypothetical question to his students, “What 
if Confucius and Mencius were to lead a mounted army of several ten thou-
sands to attack our realm,”21 until the Tokugawa Confucian scholars Yamaga 
Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622–1685), Asami Keisai 淺見絅齋 (1652–1711), Kōtsuki 
Sen’an 上月專庵 (1704–1752), Sakuma Taika 佐久間太華 (d. 1783), and Satō 
Issai 佐藤一齋 (1772–1859) reinterpreted Zhongguo 中國 as a political term,22 
they all manifested a national political identity, and it would have been difficult 
for them to transcend it. However, from the perspective of cultural identity, 
Confucians in each of the East Asian countries also shared the Confucian core 
values of ren and self-cultivation. Hence, these Confucian common core values 
ultimately transcended national boundaries and can be regarded as values that 
might be shared by all of humankind.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we may argue that, at root, Con-
fucianism is a unique theory of self-cultivation, and it is also a collection of val-
ues of cultural identity. In this sense, Confucianism certainly could transcend the 
nationalistic confines of each country in East Asia. As these countries enter the 
twenty-first century, memories of past wars and other horrors are gradually fading 
away. However, both postwar economic competition and recent struggles in the 
East China Sea and the South China Sea are driving the continuing ethnocen-
trism of the East Asian people, and war clouds are beginning to form overhead. 
In light of this situation, the widespread adoption of the cultural identity of East 
Asian Confucianisms should be regarded as a matter of paramount importance.
Again, many of the doubts concerning the term “East Asia” in the expres-
sion “East Asian Confucianisms” arise because of the historical burden carried 
by imperial Japan from the 1930s and 1940s. Facing this problem, we are in 
complete agreement with the opinion of Wu Zhen 吳震, who said,
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The “East Asia discourse” of imperial Japan is a relic of history. It is a 
matter that Japanese scholars in particular are responsible to investigate. 
Likewise, however, it is not suitable for Chinese scholars to treat East 
Asian Confucian studies as a linear or monolithic body of discourse. At 
the same time, it must be admitted that the Japanese scholars’ troubled 
consciousness regarding that era and [the need to develop a] critical con-
sciousness certainly merits our close attention. Their critical suggestions 
regarding the problem of the term “East Asia” certainly should inspire 
our deep reflection.23
Finally, the question remains: Can Confucianism shed its regional “East 
Asian” platform to provide truly universal values to be accepted by humanity 
around the world in this age of globalization? I consider the answer to this ques-
tion to be in the affirmative.
The “universal values” of today, such as democracy, freedom, liberty, and 
human rights, all arose during the past 250 years in Europe and North America. 
Ironically, the Western powers were controlling and ruthlessly exploiting colo-
nies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere at the very time that they 
were developing and promulgating such “universal” values. The Confucian tra-
ditions that arose and developed over time in East Asia, with their loftiness, 
breadth, and depth, naturally can be reinterpreted through “interpretive, bridg-
ing, and normative”24 approaches and will certainly emerge as the source of truly 
universal values for the twenty-first-century age of globalization, most notably 
their shared core values of ren, self-cultivation, and the kingly way (wangdao 
王道). In the civilizational dialogue of the new age, these values can offer new 
inspiration and new meaning.
This essay has explored several problems regarding East Asian Confucianisms 
as a new field of study. The second section explored how the Confucian tra-
ditions that arose in various East Asian countries—China, Japan, Korea, and 
Vietnam—shared a common thread, or tapestry, of core values in the midst of 
the exchanges and interactions among Confucian scholars in these different 
countries, but certainly not as a definite and fixed consciousness over and above 
each country’s Confucianism. For this reason, as an ideology East Asian Con-
fucianisms has advanced and diversified in accordance with the times, and has 
constantly adapted to suit local intellectual traditions and trends. Although the 
Confucians of each country in East Asia definitely hold different specific values 
and have widely differing attitudes and practices, they continue to share several 
fundamental core values, such as ren and self-cultivation.
In the third section above it was pointed out that the field of East Asian 
Confucianisms provides a relatively broad intellectual prospect. It involves the 
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commitment to shed the confines of the narrow nationalistic ethnocentrism 
advocated in the twentieth century by each of the East Asian countries, and 
moreover to adopt its broad purview to observe the development process of cul-
tural subjectivity in each East Asian country and locale. The very idea of a field 
of East Asian Confucianisms should stir scholars to rectify the “reflexive Orien-
talism” of twentieth-century scholars in each East Asian country and anticipate 
that scholars in the twenty-first century will reexamine this East Asian cultural 
mainstream and its core values.
The political identity of Confucians in each East Asian country should 
completely remove the limitations of their nationalistic ethnocentrism, and 
cause each to bear in mind that the Confucian world of thought is an even more 
fundamental cultural homeland. In the twenty-first-century age of globaliza-
tion, the field of East Asian Confucianisms and its common core values, which 
originated and developed in East Asia, hold tremendous potential for offering 
a platform on which to host cross-civilizational dialogue in the new century.
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CHAPTER 6
The Formation and Limitations of Modern  
Japanese Confucianism
Confucianism for the Nation and Confucianism for the People
NAKAJIMA Takahiro
I n  co n s i d er i n g  t h e  f o r m at i o n  and development of modern Con-
fucianism in Japan, it would be useful here to keep two key concepts in mind. 
The first is “Confucianism for the nation,” a school of thought that existed for 
the purpose of creating the Japanese nation; the second is “Confucianism for 
the people,” another body of teachings, rooted in commoner society, that was 
separate from and transcended the bounds of nation-making. The modernized 
teachings of Wang Yangming (hereafter referred to as Yōmei-gaku, as it is des-
ignated in Japanese) are what allowed these two Confucianisms to take shape 
in tandem. It must be noted that this modern Yōmei-gaku was an exceedingly 
unique interpretation of the Ming dynasty teachings that it referenced. It was 
greatly informed by the experiences of early modern and modern Japan—that 
is, from the end of the eighteenth century to the start of the Meiji period and 
after.
This chapter synthesizes prior research and details the process by which 
these two Confucianisms emerged as twins. Furthermore, it examines one 
aspect of the thought of Ishizaki Tōgoku, who established the academic society 
called the Osaka Yōmei Gakkai, as an important example of Confucianism for 
the people. Following that, it seeks to uncover a potential path toward another 
set of universalities within Confucianism for the people that are different from 
those sought after by Confucianism for the nation.
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The Popularization of Confucianism in Early Modern Japan
Zhu Xi (1130–1200) was a philosopher of the Song dynasty who revitalized 
Confucianism in the wake of the pervading influence of Buddhism. By intro-
ducing li 理 (principle), and qi 氣 (vital force), he renewed the possibility of 
fully explaining this world without referring to some transcendent deity like the 
Buddha. Wang Yangming (1472–1529) followed Zhu Xi with a critical atti-
tude toward the latter’s teachings. He criticized Zhu’s investigation of li as often 
resulting in a reading of the canons that was too complicated and separated 
from human practical experience. Instead Wang emphasized the importance of 
the unification of knowledge and action. His philosophy influenced the then-
rising middle class, which included rich merchants and farmers.
After the Kansei Edict was issued in 1790 in Japan, Zhuzixue 朱子学 (Zhu 
Xi’s philosophy) began to spread throughout the country. It became an ideol-
ogy in support of the system for recruiting civil servants. Along with Zhuzixue, 
Yangmingxue 陽明学 (Wang Yangming’s philosophy) was also taught. Japanese 
Confucianists in the Edo period learned both at the same time, but Zhuzixue 
was of much greater importance.
In the Meiji period, when Japan started its program of modernization, 
Yangmingxue was regarded as a guiding ideology of modernized Confucianism. 
It contributed to the creating of a modern notion of interiority in the individual 
through its emphasis on xin 心 (heart/mind).
As a part of the modernization that began during the Meiji period, Confu-
cianism contributed greatly to the making of the Japanese nation. What made 
this possible was the popularizing of Confucianism, which progressively spread 
to the various regions of Japan from the end of the eighteenth century. Miyagi 
Kimiko describes it thus:
During the Bakumatsu period [the last period of the Tokugawa sho-
gunate], the Kansei Edict enriched the Confucian temple [Seidō] and 
simultaneously facilitated an increase in the establishment of domainal 
schools in each domain, which led to the implementation of the gakumon 
ginmi system as a means of clearing the way for the employment of lower-
level samurai; with these elements, a feverish enthusiasm for Confucian 
education gestated across the land. It spread to commoners who were 
wealthy peasants and merchants, who studied Confucianism with an eye 
toward acquiring warrior rank, and thus was Confucian learning pop-
ularized. In other words, the learning undertaken by warriors of lower 
rank and commoners under the old shogunate government was Confu-
cian learning; regardless of one’s status or family background, it was the 
one narrow road that had to be trod in order for one to establish oneself. 
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As such, Confucianism for these commoners did not constitute learning 
chosen of their own free will. Instead it was something they learned as 
a historical given, a decision prone to becoming part of an unconscious 
structural paradigm.
Moreover, the Meiji government that eventually confronted them 
used this popularized Confucian learning as a tool of national education 
on the one hand, but aspired to European-style modernization flying the 
flag of “civilization and enlightenment” [on the other]. Under a Meiji 
government thus engaged, these men faced the destiny of having to take 
on the various problems of Japan’s modernization in their capacity as 
intellectuals trained in Confucianism. While they were living out this 
destiny, what they inherited from the previous era undoubtedly formed 
the locus of opposition to the Meiji government.1
The Kansei Edict was a statute issued in the fifth month of 1790 by the rōjū 
(senior councilor) Matsudaira Sadanobu to Hayashi Nobutaka, the daigaku-no-
kami who served as head of education at the shogunate. The disciples of the 
Hayashi family prohibited the learning of alternate Confucianisms exemplified 
by the Kobunji-gaku and Kogaku (Ancient Learning) of Itō Jinsai and Ogyū 
Sorai, respectively, and attempted an enforced conversion to the teachings of 
Zhu Xi (hereafter Shushi-gaku 朱子学). But this all begs the question of what 
the purpose of this reform was. According to Miyagi, Matsudaira was worried 
that Confucian teachings had become mere academic debates between scholars, 
making this knowledge irrelevant to political affairs. The reform was, thus, in 
order to promote a so-called “‘unity of governance and education,’ to realize a 
situation where government officials were also Confucianists.”2 Given this situ-
ation, how, then, was this “unity of government and education” to be enacted? 
The answer was to enlist fresh talent equipped with Confucian education into 
the government. This led, in the ninth month of 1792, to the promulgation of 
the gakumon ginmi, a system modeled on the Chinese civil-service examina-
tions by which men of merit were appointed to political office. These examina-
tions utilized the commentaries of Zhu Xi, a practice that resulted in the pre-
dominance of Shushi-gaku.3
The crucial point here is that in this way the system of recruiting talented 
men to office in the shogunate government spread to the various domains, caus-
ing an increase in domainal schools, where the practice of appointing officials 
by examinations was implemented. Thus, the enthusiasm for Confucian educa-
tion spread even further to the commoners; a growing number of rural schools 
and private academies were opened, and these became the basic infrastructure 
of Confucian learning in commoner society. Miyagi terms this phenomenon 
“the popularization of Confucianism.”4 Moreover, as striking examples of “rich 
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peasants and merchants [who came] from [among] the commoners” who suc-
cessfully gained autonomy through studying Confucian teachings, Miyagi lists, 
among others, Bitō Jishū, Rai Shunsui, Fujita Yūkoku, and Yamada Hōkoku.5
Within this group, the most attention has been given to Yamada Hōkoku 
(1805–1877). Hōkoku was a peasant in the Bitchū-Matsuyama domain, an area 
now known as Okayama Prefecture, who plied his trade in the plant-oil extrac-
tion industry. When he was five years old, he entered a private academy run by 
one Marukawa Shōin located in the neighboring Niimi domain. Shōin had stud-
ied Shushi-gaku at the famous Kaitokudō in Osaka, and had been sounded out 
by Matsudaira Sadanobu himself as a candidate for the post of official instructor 
to the Confucian temple. Hōkoku later studied in Kyoto, and also went to Edo 
to become a pupil of Satō Issai, head instructor of the Shōheikō, the official acad-
emy of the bakufu. Between his stints in these two places, he studied Yōmei-gaku 
in addition to Shushi-gaku, and ended up being so favorably disposed toward the 
former that he began criticizing the latter. However, just as Satō Issai adopted a 
stance of “Zhu in public, Wang in private”—a position also called “The yang of 
Zhu and the yin of Wang”—Hōkoku, as the official Confucianist of the Matsu-
yama domain, based his pedagogy on Shushi-gaku at the domainal school, while 
treading carefully with teaching Yōmei-gaku. In addition, though Yōmei-gaku 
actually constituted the true ideal for Hōkoku, he himself possessed even stron-
ger views that went beyond the Yōmei school of learning.6
In this way, within the “popularization of Confucianism” that followed the 
Kansei Edict’s ban of heterodox Confucianism, Shushi-gaku was not the only 
school of learning that was valued; it is certain that Yōmei-gaku also exerted 
influence at the same time. But this is not to say that Yōmei-gaku was directly 
involved with the Meiji Restoration.7 Nonetheless, during the formation of 
modern Yōmei-gaku, a discourse circulated that it was Yōmei-gaku that actually 
constituted the real spirit of the Restoration.
Forming Modern Yōmei-gaku: Connections from the Bakumatsu  
to Meiji Eras
The interpretation of Yōmei-gaku as the true spirit of the Meiji Restoration 
spread widely, and this became the understanding shared even by modern Chi-
nese intellectuals. Ogyū Shigehiro sums it up in the following manner:
After Japan’s war with Qing China [in 1894–1895], the Qing imperial 
government, in imitation of the Meiji Restoration, enacted policies of 
modernization, and many Chinese exchange students traveled to Japan. 
Moreover, exiled officials and revolutionaries also made Japan a base 
for their activities. Liang Qichao, Zhang Binglin, and even Sun Wen 
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[Zhongshan/Yat-sen] were examples of such figures. They “discovered” 
the Yōmei-gaku then popular in Japan at the time, and carried [with them 
back to China] the understanding that Yōmei-gaku constituted the moti-
vating force of the Restoration.8
Moreover, Ogyū casts the Yōmei-gaku of modern Japan that the Chinese 
exchange students “discovered” in terms of a political discourse that is pro-
foundly nationalistic, saying that “it was a ‘modern’ Japanese thought started 
anew in the midst of modern Japanese nationalism in the second decade of the 
Meiji era, a growing flourish of resistance to the governmental policies of Euro-
peanization since the founding year of Meiji. Furthermore, it was a political 
discourse intentionally constructed to comprise the contemporary assertions of 
the Meiji era.”9
Following this assessment, Japan’s modern Yōmei-gaku can be seen as rep-
resented by two works published in the same year: Tokutomi Sohō’s Yoshida 
Shōin (Minyūsha, 1893) and Miyake Setsurei’s Ō Yōmei (Wang Yangming) 
(Seikyōsha, 1893). In addition, there was the magazine published by the Tekka 
Shoin company in 1896 called Yōmei-gaku (discontinued in 1900) and its suc-
cessor serials, the Ō-gaku zasshi (Meizen Gakusha, 1906–1908) and the Yōmei-
gaku (Meizen Gakusha and Yōmei Gakkai [from issue 2], 1908–1928). Each 
of these publications positioned Yōmei-gaku as the foundation of “national 
morality.”10
One of the most important works was Inoue Tetsujirō’s Nihon Yōmei-
gakuha no tetsugaku ( Japanese philosophy of the Yangming school) (Fuzambō, 
1900), followed by Nihon Kogakuha no tetsugaku ( Japanese philosophy of the 
Kogaku [Classical Study] school) (Fuzambō, 1902) and Nihon Shushi-gakuha 
no tetsugaku ( Japanese philosophy of the Zhuzi school) (Fuzambō, 1905)— 
a trilogy of books that examined Edo-period Confucianism. The first of his 
works in this series, as mentioned above, was the treatise on Yōmei-gaku. In this 
volume, Inoue delineates a genealogy of Japanese Yōmei-gaku scholars, start-
ing with Nakae Tōju and Kumazawa Banzan, moving on to Satō Issai, Ōshio 
Chūsai [Heihachirō], Yamada Hōkoku, and Kasuga Sen’an, and concluding 
with Saigō Takamori, Yoshida Shōin, and Takasugi Shinsaku. It is of deep inter-
est that Katsu Kaishū of the shogunate camp is the final personage that Inoue 
presents at the end of this genealogy. In short, Inoue attempts to connect the 
Bakumatsu-era Yōmei-gaku with the Meiji Restoration by giving this idea an 
erudite lineage.
Inoue’s understanding of Japanese Yōmei-gaku as official learning was 
shared not only by Chinese intellectuals who studied in Japan; in fact, even 
men of a stance foreign to Inoue’s who challenged his outlook were part of that 
same paradigm.
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Christianity and Yōmei-gaku: Uchimura Kanzō and Nitobe Inazō
For example, let’s consider the Christian scholar Uchimura Kanzō. During the 
ceremonial reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1891 at the First 
Higher School, Uchimura had refused to make the expected deep bow and 
received the label of being “disrespectful.” Inoue Tetsujirō critiqued this inci-
dent as a “clash between education and religion.” This same Uchimura penned a 
tract titled Representative Men of Japan in 1908, beginning it with an analysis of 
Saigō Takamori and ending with one of Nichiren, and lauding Saigō—a central 
figure in the Meiji Restoration—as the bearer of a Yōmei-gaku kind of spirit. 
Uchimura described Saigō as follows: “only for the lack of Puritanism, he was 
not a Puritan.”11 Yet this comparison of Saigō, a scholar of Yōmei-gaku, with a 
Christian believer suggests another possible avenue for understanding Yōmei-
gaku, one that differs from Inoue’s vision of it as a bastion of official learning:
His [Saigō’s] attention was early called to the writings of Wang Yang 
Ming, who of all Chinese philosophers, came nearest to that most august 
faith, also of Asiatic origin, in his great doctrines of conscience and benign 
but inexorable heavenly laws. Our hero’s subsequent writings show this 
influence to a very marked degree, all the Christianly sentiments therein 
contained testifying to the majestic simplicity of the great Chinese, as 
well as to the greatness of the nature that could take in all that, and weave 
out a character so practical as his. . . .
. . . So unlike the conservative Chu philosophy fostered by the old 
government for its own preservation, it (Yang Ming philosophy) was 
progressive, prospective, and full of promise. Its similarity to Christianity 
has been recognized more than once, and it was practically interdicted in 
the country on that and other accounts. “This resembles Yang-Ming-ism; 
disintegration of the empire will begin with this.” So exclaimed Takasugi 
Shinsaku, a Chōshu strategist of Revolutionary fame, when he first exam-
ined the Christian Bible in Nagasaki. That something like Christianity 
was a component force in the reconstruction of Japan is a singular fact in 
this part of its history.12
On reading this passage, it becomes clear that Uchimura was trying to con-
nect Christianity to Japan via Yōmei-gaku by means of his reading of Saigō as 
a Christian-like adherent of Yōmei-gaku. But even so, it must be remembered 
that this reading was undertaken in Inoue’s paradigm of Yōmei-gaku as a moti-
vating force of the Meiji Restoration. It then follows that even Uchimura’s deep 
understanding of Christian teachings cannot overturn the framing of Yōmei-
gaku as official learning.
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Kojima Tsuyoshi offers a concrete example of this that involves the rela-
tionship between Inoue and Nitobe Inazō, who was a Christian scholar and a 
close friend of Uchimura. The stage for this episode occurred at a meeting of 
the Yōmei Gakkai, an academic society, and it was hosted by the publishers of 
the aforementioned serial, the Yōmei-gaku (Meizen Gakusha and Yōmei Gakkai 
[from issue 2], 1908–1928). The Yōmei Gakkai’s first lecture event was held 
on March 21, 1909; both Inoue Tetsujirō and Nitobe Inazō attended and co-
lectured on the topic of “A Nonprofessional View of Yōmei-gaku”:
Nitobe actually ascended to the same lectern as Inoue Tetsujirō. At the 
time, Nitobe had already assumed the post of principal of the First Higher 
School [its official appellation from 1894 onwards, which he held from 
1906 to 1913]. The same school that had ousted Uchimura for “disrespect” 
ended up appointing his close friend and fellow Christian as its head. The 
previous year, Nitobe’s Bushidō had been translated into Japanese by Saku-
rai Ōson, and it is thought that this was why he had been invited to speak 
at this lecture event. It is unclear when he joined the Society, but it is certain 
that he was a member in good standing of the Yōmei Gakkai.13
After the Russo-Japanese War, Christianity became incorporated into the reli-
gious policies of the Meiji government, and Inoue, perhaps softening his own 
stance toward Christian thought, did not take Nitobe’s lecture to be a critique 
of Yōmei-gaku as official learning.14
Assuming that was indeed the case, distinctions like the ones drawn by 
Yamashita Ryūji in the following excerpt are not necessarily admissible:
This same Inoue used Yōmei-gaku in the manner of an explanatory 
manual for the Imperial Rescript on Education. He praised the notion 
of “national morality,” offering the view that Yōmei-gaku’s practical 
approach could be useful for the purpose of controlling the influence of 
various kinds of European-style philosophies and ideologies and guiding 
the nation toward “moral practices.” This carried the premise that stat-
ist ethics allowed no criticism, and resulted in Yōmei-gaku’s inherently 
anti-authoritarian and anti-official tendencies to be abstracted away. 
The face-off between Inoue and Uchimura over the Imperial Rescript on 
Education was also a contest over how to interpret Yōmei-gaku. It was a 
contest between a statist ethical perspective and an individualist ethical 
perspective, a contest between the ethical interpretation and the religious 
interpretation, and also a contest between Japanism and cosmopolitan-
ism. And it goes without saying that Inoue’s stance became the orthodoxy 
in the Yōmei-gaku research that followed thereafter.15
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Yamashita saw what he terms “Yōmei-gaku’s inherently anti-authoritarian and 
anti-official tendencies” in Uchimura Kanzō, and considered these tendencies to 
have been oppressed by Inoue Tetsujirō’s “statist ethics”—a conclusion that man-
ages to ignore how Uchimura, in fact, shared the paradigm of Inoue’s thought. 
Moreover, the situation gets even more complicated, because Inoue himself actu-
ally read “anti-authoritarian and anti-official tendencies” into Yōmei-gaku.
Confucianism for the Nation and Confucianism  
for the People as Twins
On the one hand, Inoue positioned Yōmei-gaku as Confucianism for the nation, 
which existed in order to create the nation of Japan; on the other, he thought 
that Yōmei-gaku stemmed from commoner society. Let us look at the preface to 
his Nihon Yōmei-gakuha no tetsugaku:
If one desires to understand what the national morality of our country 
is like, he must reach comprehension of the spirit of the moral teaching 
[Confucianism] that has smelted and fired our national mentality. Thus, 
since this treatise is a place to describe the philosophy of Japan’s Yōmei-
gaku, it also tries to contribute to that end. If one would certify the mani-
festation of our national morality by realities occurring before our eyes, 
they only have to observe the actions of our army in China. What indeed 
is that which, amidst the united forces of the various nations, radiates so 
conspicuously? That which refrains from arbitrary plunder, from wanton 
violence, keeping strict observance of military discipline, and [is] never 
motivated by the desire for private gain—what indeed is it, if not the 
manifestation of our national morality?16
This preface is inscribed with the date of September 24, 1900. Here Inoue 
argued that Japan’s Yōmei-gaku was in fact what had forged modern Japan’s 
“national morality,” and spoke proudly of how it was clearly displayed by the 
actions of the Japanese army, fighting in the Eight-Nation Alliance, to suppress 
the Boxer Rebellion that had taken place in June of the same year. Furthermore, 
the preface closes with the statement that “our national morality is nothing but 
the universal virtue of mind, and the universal virtue of mind can be said to be 
precisely the essence of Oriental morality.”17 For Inoue, Japan’s Yōmei-gaku pos-
sessed universality through having a character for the nation.
Nonetheless, at the same time Inoue could also say that Yōmei-gaku dif-
fered from Shushi-gaku in that it was something wielded by “commoner schol-
ars,” and that it was “for the most part a doctrine for the commoners [平民主
義].” Moreover, this work proclaimed its intention to “break the gloom” that 
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had shrouded Yōmei-gaku’s two hundred and fifty years of existence, and that 
its existence constituted “an excellent thing”:
Because Shushi-gaku was the educational ideology of the government, 
Yōmei-gaku was primarily promoted by commoner scholars; it produced 
a distinction between official and commoner learning, and made Yōmei-
gaku for the most part a doctrine for the commoners. The teachings of 
Zhu and Wang were originally different in their ideas, constituting differ-
ent standpoints between official and commoner spheres. This distinction 
could not be stopped in the discord between them. Facts demonstrate 
why this should be so. Yōmei-gaku was ostracized by government author-
ity, and thus fell into a state of gloom where it could not expand its hori-
zons. Now we have forged ahead into a world of free thinking. In this age, 
it is an excellent thing for the scholarly world to research the historical 
development of Yōmei-gaku, and to break the gloom that has shrouded it 
for two hundred and fifty years.18
Here, the important point in Inoue’s thinking—as if to tear apart the distinc-
tion that Yamashita attempted to make—is that Inoue saw the “doctrine for 
the commoners” that Yōmei-gaku constituted as Confucianism for the people 
was potentially shifting toward Confucianism for the nation. Confucianism for 
the nation and Confucianism for the people were born as twins. That is pre-
cisely why, right after Kōtoku Shūsui had been executed in January 1911 for 
his involvement in the Great Treason Incident of 1910, Inoue had been able to 
speak of how Yōmei-gaku was connected to socialism.19
In one sense, this was only to be expected: if, like Inoue, one affirmed the 
revolution enacted by the Meiji Restoration and saw Yōmei-gaku as its philo-
sophical pillar, then Yōmei-gaku could only be viewed as a revolutionary ideol-
ogy. The problem here is that this view deviates from the trajectory of the nation 
created in the age of Meiji, and cannot be contained in the conceptual scope 
of “national morality.” Within modern Japanese Yōmei-gaku, the potential 
for Confucianism for the people to transcend the bounds of nation-making is 
found elsewhere—in the Osaka Yōmei Gakkai established by Ishizaki Tōgoku.
The Osaka Yōmei Gakkai and the “Popular Foundation”
Ishizaki Tōgoku (1873–1931) established an academic society in June of 1907 
under the official name of the Senshindō Gakkai (after the private academy 
set up by Ōshio Chūsai [Heihachirō]), before changing its name to the Osaka 
Yōmei Gakkai in December 1908. Its flagship magazine, Yōmei, was serialized 
from July 1910 and its name changed to Yōmei-shugi in 1919.20
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The December 5, 1911 issue of Yōmei commemorated Nakae Chōmin, 
and carried a photo of him on its cover along with a citation from chapter 6 of 
his Minyaku yakkai (a translation of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract); 
the comment honoring him ran as follows:
It has been a full ten years since the passing of Master Nakae Chōmin, the 
Meiji scholar of Yōmei-gaku, who for fifty-five years fought so well for 
society and humanity. December 13 of this year marks the anniversary of 
his death. Our association cannot help but admire the master’s character, 
particularly from the vantage point of today’s society, and we have thus 
put together this commemorative volume.21
From the start, it had never been intended for this 1911 issue simply to com-
memorate the tenth anniversary of Nakae Chōmin’s death (December 13, 
1901). During the Great Treason Incident of the previous year (1910), Kōtoku 
Shūsui and Okunomiya Kenshi (the son of Okunomiya Zōsai, with whom 
Chōmin had studied) had been hauled off to prison; regarding this, Tōgoku 
had written about Chōmin saying, “this desolation is unbearable” ( July 29, 
1910), which was regarded by Inoue Tetsujirō as a dangerous idea.22 Moreover, 
two full pages of the Shinmin sekai, a tract written by Chōmin from the posi-
tion of being a “new commoner [shinmin],” the Meiji name for those born into 
outcaste communities (hisabetsu burakumin), were carried in this issue. Tōgoku 
stridently asserted that the Yōmei-gaku that he believed in belonged to the 
genealogy established by Chōmin.23
Ogyū Shigehiro offers the following synthesis of the situation:
The same Society (the Osaka Yōmei Gakkai), from its inception, had 
been labeled by Inoue Tetsujirō as a “dangerous ideology” that “osten-
sibly assumed to attend the conscience while covertly promoting social-
ism”; instead, it began vending its flagship magazine externally on the 
occasion of the Great Treason Incident, and while on the one hand it 
cast Nakae Chōmin and Kōtoku Shūsui in the genealogy of Meiji-era 
Yōmei-gaku, it criticized the Yōmei-gaku of Inoue and his ilk as [leaning 
toward] “government education” and “official learning,” which deviated 
from the essence of Yōmei-gaku, conducting its activities while struggling 
upstream against the tide of the times.24
Ogyū draws out the possibility for the Osaka Yōmei Gakkai to be understood 
as Confucianism for the people. He says, “It took the ‘problems of life’ of the 
masses as its foundation, and cast it in the logic of an international pacific soli-
darity that transcended the nation-state, reviving itself in modern fashion.”25 
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Quite apart from the universality sought after by Inoue Tetsujirō, it revealed the 
other universality based on a “popular foundation”:26
In closing, although he declared that he was cutting ties with the move-
ment to revive Chinese learning [Kan-gaku 漢学: a government- 
sanctioned movement aimed at molding the morality of the nation], I 
wish to ascertain whether Tōgoku continued to value the spiritual con-
nection with the Confucianism of the Edo period. Along with his com-
panions in the Osaka Yōmei Gakkai, modern heterodox thinkers such 
as Iwano Hōmei, Matsumura Kaiseki, and Miyatake Gaikotsu, he sup-
ported regional scholars who partook of Bakumatsu-style Confucian 
learning. And it is especially interesting that the most left-wing member 
of the Osaka society, who positioned himself as stridently against Chi-
nese learning and caused the society to be divided over his criticisms of 
Takase Takejirō, was none other than Ikeda Shisei, the step-grandchild of 
Ikeda Sōan, the  Bakumatsu-era Yōmei scholar also known as the “sage of 
Tajima.” Against the new forces of modern Yōmei-gaku espoused by men 
like Inoue [Tetsujirō] and Takase, who had been educated in the intel-
lectual vein of the modern West, traditional learning was brought into the 
modern Yōmei-gaku of the people, suggesting a kind of “universal” char-
acteristic that runs to this present day.27
In other words, the Osaka Yōmei-gaku inherited the mantle of a “populariza-
tion of Confucianism” from the Bakumatsu period; unlike the universality 
of Confucianism for the nation, which was based in the nation-state, it can 
be said to have aimed for a kind of earthly universality based on a popular 
foundation.
Earthly Universality
Let us review, from a different angle, the potential in Ishizaki Tōgoku for a 
Confucianism for the people that transcends the bounds of nation-making. In 
his Yōmei-gakuha no jinbutsu (1912), Tōgoku’s very first chapter is titled “Mas-
ter Yangming and Master Nichiren.” This means he was attempting to interpret 
Nichiren as Japan’s Wang Yangming.
Upon reading Tōgoku’s autobiography, The Path by Which I Entered Wang 
Yangming Studies (Yo no Ō-gaku ni irishi keiro), it seems that he encountered 
Buddhism when he traveled to Takamatsu at the age of twenty-six:
If pressed to explain the change in my thoughts, it was here in this origin 
point of Kōbō Daishi [Kūkai] that I made some acquaintance with reli-
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gion; however, I became a follower of Nichiren’s Hokke rather than of 
Kōbō Daishi’s Shingon.28
It is deeply interesting that Tōgoku mentions his decision to convert to Nichi-
ren Buddhism instead of Kūkai’s Shingon Buddhism. Tōgoku, in “Master Yang-
ming and Master Nichiren,” saw an overlap between Wang Yangming, who suc-
ceeded Lu Xiangshan instead of Zhu Xi, and Nichiren, who succeeded Saichō 
instead of Kūkai.29 Based on this, in contrast to how Zhu Xi and Kūkai “simply 
figured out how to appeal to vulgarity and built up a fleeting popularity in their 
times,” Yangming and Nichiren “spurned vulgarity and presented [themselves] 
as beneficial role models who contributed greatly to the improvement of soci-
ety and the human heart-mind.”30 Tōgoku evaluated Yōmei-gaku and Nichi-
ren Buddhism in tandem because he felt that both schools of thought had fre-
quently intervened in social problems.
This is clearly borne out in Tōgoku’s autobiography. On this note, he 
moved from Takamatsu to Osaka, and Ōshio Heihachirō’s Yōmei-gaku and 
Nichiren were connected along with the “new commoners”:
Religion surfaced when there was an insight that social problems could 
not be solved by material things alone. The religion that appeared for me 
was Nichiren, which I had encountered during my time in Takamatsu. 
As if by chance, the fifth Exhibition [the fifth National Industrial Exhi-
bition of 1903] was held in Osaka, which was also the home of the new 
commoners, and a fraternization event called the Congress of New Com-
moners was also organized in the same year [in 1903 they formed the 
Dai Nihon Dōhō Yūwa Kai in Osaka]; I devoted myself to this congress 
and offered all kinds of assistance to it. As a result, while researching the 
new commoners, it came to me that Nichiren had been a new commoner 
himself as well as a religious reformer, and that Ōshio had helped the new 
commoners to raise an army against all odds.31
For Tōgoku, Yōmei-gaku amounted to a religion that could solve “social prob-
lems.” His later crystallization of the concept of a “Yōmei sect” (Yōmei-shū) 
stems from this interest in the religious dimension.
At this juncture it is probably necessary to say a few words about the rela-
tionship of Yōmei-gaku with Nichirenism in modern Japan. As we have already 
seen, Uchimura Kanzō, in his Representative Men of Japan, mentioned Nichiren 
as one of the five great figures. He also concluded his text by declaring that 
“Nichiren minus his combativeness is our ideal religious man.”32
Regarding this I wish to make just one observation. It is well known that 
Miyazawa Kenji (1896–1933) converted from Pure Land Buddhism to Nichi-
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ren Buddhism, then in 1920 joined the Kokuchūkai—a lay association of 
Nichiren headed by Tanaka Chigaku—and then later left it. According to Pul-
lattu Abraham George, it was the teachings of the Lotus Sutra that enabled the 
reincarnation into Paradise through one’s own chanting of the Buddha’s name, 
while the salvation of every being was guaranteed by the practice and effort of 
the individual in this world.33
On the one hand, the Nichirenism of modern Japan actively intervened in 
and lent a helping hand to alleviate the social problems in this world, rather than 
in the afterlife; on the other hand, it thereby fell into a tendency toward statism 
such as found in the Kokuchūkai. Tōgoku, too, had periods during which he 
failed to gauge his own distance from the state.34 However, both Tōgoku and 
Kenji ultimately turned toward the people.
After Kenji left the Kokuchūkai and returned to Iwate, he established an 
association called the Rasu Earthly Men Association (Rasu Chijin Kyōkai) in 
1926 in the city of Hanamaki. “Earthly Men” (chijin) denotes farmers, but in a 
broader sense it might also refer to people who live on the earth. This activism did 
not last long, but Kenji attempted to lecture these “earthly men” on science and 
the arts. Part of his efforts included trying to teach Esperanto. In fact, Tōgoku 
also tried to publish the Osaka Yōmei-gakkai flagship magazine in Esperanto, but 
failed. Even so, both Kenji and Tōgoku, via Nichirenism and Esperanto, tried to 
aim for what I have called here an earthly universality rooted in the people.
Confucianism for the nation and Confucianism for the people as conceived in 
modern Japan were nourished from the same roots, but their aims stood in con-
trast to each other. Should Confucianism look to the nation-state? Or should 
it look to the people? This chapter has examined one part of that complicated 
process. However, when Confucianism itself was erased from social experience 
in Japan after the Second World War, it might seem as if studying these debates 
over Confucianism holds little meaning. Yet even so, insofar as modern Yōmei-
gaku in Japan was deeply involved in the formation of Japan’s modernity, failing 
to examine it critically presents the risk of falling into the same trap of historical 
understanding. Moreover, we would overlook the potential once held by Japan’s 
modernity. Ultimately, the question is how we can talk about “earthly universal-
ity” today—an issue that we have surely been tasked to engage.
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CHAPTER 7
Historical and Cultural Features of Confucianism  
in East Asia
CHEN Lai
A lt h o u gh  i t  o r i gi nat ed in China, Confucianism has spread far 
and wide across the East Asian Sinosphere. In the long process of its historical 
and cultural development, due to different geographical, historical, and social 
conditions, and to the different dispositions of each country, Confucianism in 
China, Japan, and Korea has formed its respective features. Generally speaking, 
compared to Chinese Confucianism, Korean Confucianism in theory is more 
internal and abstract (e.g., in the distinction of the Four Sprouts [siduan 四端] 
and the Seven Emotions [qiqing 七情]), while Japanese Confucianism shows 
more external and concrete features.1 However, what I am concerned with in 
this chapter are the following questions: What, respectively, was the ethos of 
Confucianism in China, Japan, and Korea before the nineteenth century? And 
connected with this, what were their respective axiologies? Or, what are the 
value principles that predominated in each of these Confucianisms?
Among the comparative Asian cultural studies in recent years, especially 
those on East Asian Confucianism, the research of Mizoguchi Yūzō demands 
our special attention. Not only was he familiar with the contemporary thought 
of both Chinese and Japanese, but his writings also evidence broad views and 
deep insights in his own thinking. His thought shows a universal axiological 
concern that greatly enlightens those of us in comparative Confucian studies.2 
The main arguments of the present chapter are, briefly, as follows. Among the 
virtues that are advocated by Confucianism, viewed from the value orientation 
of social life, we can say that Chinese Confucianism emphasizes consummate 
persons/conduct (ren 仁), while it is appropriateness (or yi 义) that is empha-
Historical & Cultural Features of Confucianism 103
sized in Korean Confucianism and doing one’s utmost or showing loyalty (zhong 
忠) in Japanese Confucianism. Or, taking a closer look, we can say that Chinese 
Confucianism emphasizes putting oneself in the other’s place (ren and shu 恕), 
while it is appropriateness and temperance ( jie 节) in Korean Confucianism 
and loyalty (zhong 忠) and bravery ( yong 勇) in Japanese Confucianism. These 
differences in emphasis in the different countries are not only axiological but 
also cultural. The conclusions we might draw in East Asian cultural compara-
tive studies not only emerge at the level of canonical literature and philosophy, 
but also from studies in sociology and anthropology.
I
The idea of renai 仁爱 (“consummate persons/conduct” or “benevolence and 
love”) lies at the core of ancient Chinese Confucian cultural ideals. It can be 
traced back to the early idea of “protecting the people” in China. The Shangshu 
says, “Deal with them [the people] as if you were protecting your own infants, 
and the people will be tranquil and well.”3 Not only is this a political idea, but it 
also has ethical and axiological import. The Shangshu especially attaches great 
importance to protecting the old, the weak, the orphaned, and the young. It is 
said in the Shangshu, “Do not despise the old and experienced, and do not make 
light of the helpless and young.”4 Also it is said that one should “not dare to treat 
with contempt widowers and widows.”5 This special concern for old widows 
and widowers, and orphans as well, is the initial expression of a Chinese human-
ism. Actually, the true meaning of filial piety (xiao 孝) should be understood 
from this perspective. Filial piety is the cherishing of, and repaying of affection 
to, one’s parents. It is the root not only of ren but also of its practice. This is why 
Cheng Yi 程頤 (Yichuan 伊川) says, “To practice ren one should start with xiao 
孝 and ti 悌 [‘filial piety’ and ‘love of one’s elder brothers’]. Xiaoti is one impor-
tant event (shi 事) in the practice of ren.”6
For Confucius, the most significant meanings of ren are expressed as fol-
lows: “Loving people”; “consummate persons wishing to be established them-
selves seek also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged themselves they seek 
also to enlarge others”; and also “Do not do to others what one would not wish 
done to oneself.”7 For Confucius, ren has become a universal ethical principle. 
Hence, the Spring and Autumn Annals reports that Confucius values ren, and 
Mozi values undiscriminating love.8 Confucius takes ren as the highest ideal 
principle while Mozi takes undiscriminating love as the highest principle. Even 
Laozi raised similar ideas. He states, “I have three precious things that I prize 
and hold fast. And the first of these is ci 慈.”9 Ci means compassion and love. 
In this sense we can say that these three important early Chinese thinkers all 
affirmed the significance of renai in different ways.
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In the Warring States period, Mencius proposed the idea of loving the 
people and things (renmin aiwu 仁民爱物). Zhuangzi’s Huizi went further and 
evoked the idea of “overflowing in love for the ten thousand things, and becom-
ing one body with the heavens and earth,”10 an idea that has had a great influ-
ence on later Confucianism. This is why ren has risen to the most important 
position in Confucianism since the Tang dynasty. Han Yu 韩愈 said, “Broad 
love is ren”;11 Zhangzai 張載 stated that “the people are my siblings and things 
are my friends”;12 and Cheng Hao 程顥 claimed that “consummate persons are 
one with the heavens and the earth and the ten thousand things.”13 Cheng Yi 
once pointed out that “The primordial source of the four virtues is the ren of 
the five constant virtues (wuchang 五常). Specifically, wuchang refers to the vir-
tue of ren itself; generally speaking, ren can include the other four virtues.”14 
Zhu Xi also maintained that the ren of the four virtues (ren 仁, yi 义, li 礼, and 
zhi 智) can “include everything,” and that “the heart-mind of compassion runs 
through everything.”15 These are all explicit examples that ren has been taken as 
the predominant principle of Confucianism. Even in the 1980s Li Zehou still 
used “studies of ren” (renxue 仁學) to reference Confucianism.16
As we have seen above, the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming 
dynasties used ren to unify and designate the four virtues. In fact, in Chinese 
Confucianism, ren has a special connection with the values of love (ai 爱), 
harmony (he 和), generosity (shu 恕), and impartiality ( gong 公), which taken 
together constitute the dominating axiology of Chinese Confucianism. These 
values have formed a dynamic correlation with the social regime in history, and 
are embodied in the everyday conduct of the people.
In his significant sociological work titled Essentials of Chinese Culture, 
Liang Shuming points out that ren is an ethical sentiment whereby people 
express concern for others, while with desires there is only concern for oneself. 
He states, “In short, what an ethical society values is respect for others. . . . Moral 
relations are deontological relations, in which one seems not to exist for oneself 
but rather for one another.”17 Liang therefore summarizes Confucian ethics as 
“valuing one another.” This is a conclusion that emanates from his social prac-
tice of rural reconstruction. It can also be viewed as a development of the Qing 
Confucian Ruan Yuan’s interpretation of ren as respect for each other (xiang/
renou 相人偶). According to Liang, after the Duke of Zhou and Confucius pro-
posed the moral ideal of ren, China was gradually transformed from a feudal 
society into an “ethical society.”
This change can be illustrated by the following example. Consider two 
brothers growing up following their natural sentiments in one family with the 
same parents. One might wonder what would be the difference in their rights to 
inheritance. In feudal society, however, once they grew up and came to inherit 
the property of their parents, they would each face a different treatment. The 
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elder brother would inherit both the official titles and the property while the 
younger brother would get nothing.
With respect to the origins of primogeniture, Henry Sumner Maine once 
pointed out a principle in his work Ancient Law that whenever the inheritance 
system has to do with the political system, primogeniture necessarily emerges.18 
Generally speaking, feudal structure and patriarchal order are established 
according to the political and economic needs of the time. Yet the community 
life of a super-family has such great power in suppressing family affections that 
even when it is unnecessary to hold on to primogeniture it nonetheless exists as 
before within the tradition. Before World War II, I went to visit some Japanese 
villages and saw something called “primogen-school.” Puzzled, I asked the local 
people and was told that the rural fields are inherited only by the first son, and 
no one else can claim them. The other sons usually go to the urban centers to 
make a living, while the first sons stay in the countryside, giving rise to differ-
ent educational needs. This phenomenon shows that their culture is not far 
removed from the feudal society and that the old customs still prevail. In fact, 
this custom was also preserved in European countries up until modern times.
Only China is different. In China, the inheritance was evenly split among 
all sons. According to Liang Qichao’s History of Chinese Culture, the fact that 
this inheritance system lasted for almost two thousand years is not a minor mat-
ter, nor was it merely accidental. Its consequence was to dissolve the unnatural 
feudal order by bringing out the natural emotions and sensibilities of the human 
being. This is a salient example of morality replacing feudality.19
Seen from Liang Shuming’s perspective, the emergence of ren represents 
the “reasonable early maturity” of Chinese culture. The reason I talk about this 
here is that it is similar to Max Weber’s “axiological rationality.” Not only has 
it greatly influenced China’s social regime but it has also helped to direct the 
overall trajectory of Chinese history.
II
The anthropologist Ruth Benedict, famous for her studies in Japanese culture 
and axiology, held that ren never gained the high position in Japan that it has 
had in China. In her studies of the idea of gratitude (baoen 报恩) toward the 
emperor and one’s parents, she points out that this gratitude is an infinite, 
unconditional obligation, and that it is more absolute compared to the Chinese 
idea of duty to one’s country and filial piety to one’s parents. Although both 
ideas of loyalty (zhong 忠) and filial piety (xiao 孝) come from China, they are 
not unconditional in China: “A virtue dominating all others is established in 
Chinese thinking. That is ren.”20 She remarks that the rulers in China have to 
practice ren or else they legitimate rebellion against the throne. However, “This 
106 Different Confucianisms
Chinese moral idea has never been accepted by the Japanese. In fact, in Japan 
ren has been excluded from the ethical system, holding no lofty position as it 
does in China.”21
Robert Bellah believes that in premodern Japan the idea of loyalty to one’s 
superior has dominated all other moral ideas and was viewed as the core value 
and first virtue during the Edo period:22
As we see, in Japan the idea of loyalty has permeated the whole society 
and become the ideal of all classes, although in China it is even difficult 
for it to be applied to the scholar class (shi 士). It only applies to the offi-
cials.23
According to this theory, the dominant value and principle in premodern Japa-
nese Confucianism and Japanese culture was loyalty (zhong 忠), under which a 
person’s commitment to some specific system or group trumped his or her com-
mitment to universal values (e.g., justice, expansive love, and so on).
Actually, what needs to be stressed here is that this value orientation that 
was formed during the Edo period was tightly connected with the social struc-
ture of Japan at that time. The most important two points are as follows. First, 
Japan during the Edo period was a feudal society, similar to China’s Spring and 
Autumn Period, when loyalty was the ethical embodiment of this type of soci-
ety. Second, the Samurai class was the social foundation during the Edo period. 
This was completely different from the Chinese and Korean political structure 
with the literati (shi 士) as the social foundation. Although the Samurai class 
was the ruling class during the Edo period, Samurai nonetheless had no land 
of their own. So it was crucial for them to be loyal to their lord. While practic-
ing Confucianism, the Samurai class formed the Confucian value orientation 
unique to the Japanese.
Because his research centered on sociology and history, Mizoguchi Yūzō 
was not interested in pure philosophical analysis. Mizoguchi had deep insights 
into the axiological principles of China and Japan. As he points out, Darwin’s 
theory of evolution and Spencer’s theory of social evolution in the West have 
been developed into Yan Fu’s Tian yanlun 天演论 (theory of evolution) in 
China, generating a strong impact on modern Chinese intellectuals, for whom 
the competition for existence, “the survival of the fittest,” “natural selection,” 
and “the law of the jungle” are the principles of progress. However, China has 
had to undergo a fundamental change in its worldview in order to accept this 
“law of the jungle.” This is because the world of ren (benevolence), yi (appro-
priateness), li (rituality), and zhi (wisdom) has been viewed as the world of 
humanity in China ever since the Song dynasty, while the “law of the jungle” 
is viewed as representative of the world of animals. In ancient China, property 
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is evenly distributed, vocations are not inherited, the communal fields ( yitian 
义田), and communal villages ( yizhuang 义庄) are everywhere, and communal 
life is viewed as virtuous. Accordingly, the established principles that dominate 
both the ethics and social structure of China are anathema to the “law of the 
jungle.”24
Mizoguchi also underlines the fact that there is a big difference between 
Japan and China. Japan during the Edo period was a hierarchical society based 
on the right of primogeniture. For this reason the sense of private property and 
class consciousness were developed at that time and became the ground for 
adopting the principles of competition. On the other hand, when Confucian-
ism was adopted by the Samurai class during the Edo period, bravery ( yong 勇) 
was already accepted as an important virtue on a par with ren. Yet at the same 
time in China, both Chen Chun’s Beixi ziyi and Dai Zhen’s Commentaries on 
Mencius did not mention the virtue of bravery ( yong), while in Ogyū Sorai’s 
Distinguishing Names the virtues of bravery ( yong), valor (wu), firmness ( gang), 
strength (qiang), and fortitude ( yi) were listed. This, Mizoguchi thinks, is why
Japan has fertile ground for accepting the law of the jungle concerning its 
philosophical and ethical tradition. On the contrary, China not only has 
no such ground but rather has a contrary ground of principles.25
Indeed, loyalty, valor, and fortitude were significant virtues for the Samurai 
Confucians in Japan, which reflects the characteristics of the social structure 
and the needs of the Edo period. Even though there were scholars such as 
Yamazaki Ansai 山崎暗斋 and Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斋 who underscored ren, they 
nevertheless emphasized only personal moral practice, and denied ren as a uni-
versal principle and thus its transcendental nature. For this reason, concerning 
their respective orientation of values, it is a simple fact that Japanese Confucian-
ism cannot be summarized as the study of ren as it is in China.26
III
The ethos of Korean Confucianism is closely connected with the develop-
ment of Korean history. The constant literati purges of the Joseon dynasty had 
great influence on the morale of Korean Confucians. These purges (in 1498, 
1504, 1519, and 1545) led to great political persecution and the slaughter 
of  Confucians—a rare phenomenon in other East Asian countries. The shi-
lin school formed by the Confucians called for social reform and advocated 
social justice, and had thereby fallen into conflict with the jiuxun school, 
which represented the interests of the nobility. However, the tragic deaths of 
these famous Confucians subsequently served to fire the unyielding daoyi 道
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义 spirit of Korean Confucianism. In the words of Zhao Guangzu, “Without 
regard for personal danger, dedicated to the public enterprise, this is the spirit 
of true literati.” Thus, we can say that “righteousness” or “appropriateness” ( yi 
义) is the basis for the spirit and principle behind Korean Confucianism. As 
Liu Chengqiang has pointed out, “the daoxue school’s spirit of justice ( yi) illu-
minated through the literati purges and sacrifices reveals the specific feature of 
Korean Confucianism.”27
Yi is the persistence of moral convictions. Confucianism in the Joseon 
dynasty strictly distinguished appropriateness ( yi) from inappropriateness 
(buyi 不义), and appropriateness from selfish interests (li 利),28 and this has a 
lot to do with Korea’s history of constantly being invaded by other countries. 
For example, during the Goryeo era Korea was invaded by the Khitans and the 
Mongolians, and during the Joseon dynasty by the Japanese and then by the 
Manchus. In 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi attacked Korea. With the Confucians 
as their moral center, Koreans organized military volunteers, and this further 
inspired a spirit of loyalty (chunghyo jeongsin 忠孝精神) among the Korean 
people. In the course of this national battle many Confucians sacrificed their 
lives for their country, demonstrating a strong spirit of loyalty and righteous-
ness (zhongyi 忠义) and patriotism, and thus earned the praise of the people. 
In 1636, Emperor Huang Taiji led a large army in an attack on Korea, and the 
latter was forced to sign a treaty surrendering to the Qing dynasty and breaking 
off with the Ming. Korean Confucians opposed to the surrender were executed. 
This opposition exemplifies how invasions from other countries have aroused 
the spirit of justice among Korean Confucians.
In this way the emphasis on justice and loyalty has set the tone for Korean 
Confucianism. Concerning its intellectual resources, Korean Confucianism 
was able to take the idea in the Spring and Autumn Annals of “distinguishing 
the great yi” and develop it into a national spirit of rebellion against injustice 
and resistance to aggression. This spirit of Korean Confucianism has become 
the main characteristic of the Korean national spirit. Here we need to bear in 
mind that Zhuxi studies, which was the leading ideological foundation of the 
Joseon dynasty, had undoubtedly fostered this strong and at times dogmatic 
cultural ethos. The Zhuxi school has to a large degree formed the basis of the 
cultural identity of the Korean literati for over five hundred years.
Professor Jin Zhonglie from Korea University, who for many years studied 
those places where the Chinese language was of great importance, offers the 
following observation:
Before the impact of Western culture, China, Korea, Japan, and Viet-
nam were all part of the Sinosphere; all used Chinese characters, stud-
ied ancient Chinese canons like the Four Books and the Five Classics, and 
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were educated in Confucian morals such as ren (benevolence), ai (love), 
xiao (filial piety), ti (respect for elder brothers), zhong (loyalty), and xin 
(keeping promises). In this sense we can say that these countries used the 
same language. Despite their different natural environments and minor 
differences in lifestyle, the ideas formed by Confucianism—for example 
in cosmology, view of life, and cultural view—were roughly the same. 
However, although equally Confucian, the aims pursued by the respec-
tive countries as well as their social customs could be very different. The 
people cultivated by [the educational system in] these countries differed 
greatly in their ideologies, politics, and life views, largely due to differing 
national aims.
Jin also notes,
Generally speaking, Chinese Confucianism emphasizes the personal 
moral life. Filial piety and respect for elders define what one should do. 
There is a strong atmosphere of modesty and generosity. But the sense 
of loyalty and patriotism is not very strong. There has always been some 
distance between the individual and the nation. As for Korean Confu-
cians, they firmly believe that the three principles (三纲) are the root of 
heaven, earth, and human conduct. Korean Confucianism focuses on 
filial piety, and only regards one’s own family’s interests [as important]; 
thus there is a lack of public morality, even [to the extent of ] bearing 
the foul [taint] of exclusiveness. . . . Japan, as we have said above, . . . holds 
national aims and national interests above all else, and lays all the moral 
values on the foundation of loyalty to the monarch and patriotism. Dili-
gence [in devotion] to [their] organization, loyalty to their monarch and 
nation, [oblivious] of their own and others’ lives, they pursue only their 
national aims and interests. The so-called Japanese spirit is the very prod-
uct of monarchism, which requires that people abandon personal inter-
ests, concentrating [their] efforts on yielding to the state.29
According to Confucian texts, this discourse is not a mere philosophical analy-
sis; rather it has both sociological and anthropological significance. Due to the 
fact that he was reflecting on his own nation, Jin Zhonglie did not underline or 
praise the patriotism of Koreans, although his insights into the society are of 
great value for us.
The Confucian values represented by the five constant virtues are advo-
cated by the Confucianisms found across China, Japan, and Korea. Restricted 
by their respective socio-historical traditions, not only are the Confucian dis-
positions different, but each society’s value orientation and dominant principles 
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are different as well, causing a different ethos to develop within each nation’s 
form of Confucianism. Although appropriateness ( yi) and loyalty (zhong) are 
also advocated by Chinese Confucianism, it is the way of putting oneself in 
another’s position (ren and shu) that is emphasized. In the case of Japanese Con-
fucianism, although ren and yi are also encouraged, it is loyalty (zhong) that is 
stressed. As for Korean Confucianism, although the five constant virtues are all 
advocated in theory, it is appropriateness ( yi) that is highlighted.
Now these differences are also reflected in the modernization process of 
each country. Chinese Confucianism, taking ren and shu as its principle, is apt 
to confirm a kind of universal value in its principles. However, it has cast much 
doubt on modern Western civilization. Facing the colonialism and imperialism 
of the modern West, it has been difficult for Chinese Confucianism to admit its 
backwardness, and this has resulted in the slow pace of modernization in China. 
Although the emphasis of Japanese Confucianism on loyalty (zhong) and brav-
ery ( yong) is limited by its exceptionalism, it encountered fewer impediments 
while accepting modernization. It stepped rapidly into modernity—but payed 
the price for its exceptionalist ethics. Korean Confucianism, imbued with the 
spirit of justice ( yijie), has given rise to the strong national subjectivity of Korean 
culture. Although it holds on to some of the cultural values from the past, it 
has nevertheless fostered the development of Korea as a modern national state. 
Now the principle of harmony included in ren, the principle of justice embod-
ied by yi, and the principle of order demonstrated by zhong are all necessary for 
the continued vitality of each modern East Asian country. In the twenty-first 
century, the three countries should try to understand one another, learn from 
one another, and unite to establish a harmonious future.
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CHAPTER 8
Animism and Spiritualism
The Two Origins of Life in Confucianism
OGURA Kizo
T h e  Ja pa n es e  h av e  m a i n ta i n ed  a profound interest in the teach-
ings of Confucius, especially the Analects (論語—Rongo in Japanese and Lunyu 
in Chinese). The popularity of the Analects has never withered, whether in the 
“modern” times of imperialistic aggression and postwar economic recovery, or 
in the “postmodern” times when the nation was captured by manga cartoons 
and animation products. If we think of other great Asian classical teachings 
such as the Mencius, the extraordinary popularity of the Analects in Japan leads 
us to an inquiry into the deep-seated issues and problems in the study of Con-
fucianism in Japan.
In this chapter, I approach this subject by analyzing a core concept of Con-
fucian thinking: life, or anima in Latin. My central argument is that the essen-
tial understanding of life in the thought of Confucius is animistic while that of 
Mencius is spiritualistic. I think that these two divergent understandings render 
“two origins” of conceptualizing “life” in the East Asian philosophical tradition.
In Japanese tradition, especially during the Tokugawa period, there were 
many “deconstructive” interpretations of the philosophy of Confucianism—for 
example from Ogyū Sorai, Itō Jinsai, Dazai Shundai, Motoori Norinaga, and 
Hirata Atsutane. I think this is because scholars in Tokugawa Japan tended to 
have non-moralistic and non-universalistic worldviews. Therefore, in Japanese 
tradition there were many interpretations that were unorthodox and deviant 
from the orthodox Neo-Confucian point of view, and they tended to criticize 
orthodox Neo-Confucianism. I am not a follower of the former; rather I would 
like to think through another path into the Confucian tradition.
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Animism and Spiritualism
The Analects has been read by numerous scholars and followers in East Asia, 
producing numerous definitions and interpretations of the same Confucian 
terms in Confucian thinking. Thus, after thriving for twenty centuries, the 
Analects still remains in the realm of ambiguity, and this ambiguity has given 
life to a multitude of philological and philosophical variants and schools.
What explains this ambiguity? The answer can be diverse and complex. 
Yet I find a main reason in the very way in which we conceive of Confucius 
himself. In other words, in China, Japan, and Korea we might be still mistaken 
about the true identity of Confucius after all these centuries.
Who, then, was the true Confucius? I believe that he was a thinker who 
represented one of the two fundamental views on the interpretation of life. One 
is animism, and the other is spiritualism. And Confucius stood for the former, 
not the latter.
In order to understand animism properly, let me define spiritualism as the 
antonym of animism.1 Here, I define spiritualism as a worldview according to 
which one spirit pervades the entire universe. Spinoza’s pantheism can be inter-
preted as a typical example of spiritualism in our context. It carries conceptual ele-
ments similar to the view concerning qi 氣 in East Asian philosophical thought. 
Qi here does not merely mean “matter” or “material”; it means “spiritual matter,” 
which connotes the substance of life. As such, we can approach the conceptual-
ization of qi in Daoism as well as Confucianism in the context of spiritualism.
Animism and Shamanism
Now let me turn to animism. Among the scholars of Asian philosophy, there 
has been a robust view that the life of Confucius and the notion of the ru 儒 
(the original term for Confucian scholar) in his times were deeply related to 
shamanism. This view is based on the observation that Confucius’ mother was 
a shaman herself and that the Chinese character for ru 儒 originally referred 
to the rain-calling ritual of the ancient agrarian society of which the lead per-
former was the shaman.
I refute this view for analytical reasons. It is important to note that the life 
and thought of Confucius as a philosopher was in this regard unrelated to his 
mother’s calling. His views and conceptions were close to animism, not sha-
manism. The widespread misunderstanding of this relationship stems from the 
superficial similarity between shamanism and animism. Yet a close examination 
reveals that they are entirely different.
Shamanism is rooted in a worldview that believes in the transcendent being 
known as Heaven. All essential values exist only in Heaven, and Heaven exer-
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cises dominion over all the world by imparting its essential values to the Earth. 
In this epistemological system, the shaman, who mediates between Heaven and 
Earth, resides in a position of rulership over the Earth. As the representative of 
Heaven, the shaman therefore has absolute authority and embodies the ultimate 
values of the universe on behalf of Heaven.
Confucius indeed criticized this shaman-centered worldview in several 
places in the Analects. For instance, there is the following statement:
子曰、君子上達、小人下達. (14.23)
Kanaya Osamu, one of the leading researchers in the field in Japan, translates 
this phrase into Japanese as follows:
君子は高尚なことに通ずるが、小人は下賤なことに通ずる。
The gentleman is good at refined matters; the small man is good at trivial 
matters.2
I believe this is one example of the misguided interpretations of Confucian 
thinking. “The gentleman” ( junzi 君子) here refers to a learned man who 
possesses an animistic epistemology and belief system, while “the small man” 
(xiaoren 小人) is the one who has a shamanistic worldview. The small man 
deduces everything from the universal value of Heaven and tries to apply it to 
the secular world. In other words, he believes the value of Heaven to be univer-
sal and transmits it down to Earth, aggressively and authoritatively. This kind 
of deductive epistemology is referred to as “transmitting it down” (xiada 下達), 
which implies a vertical vector from up above to down below.
The Confucian gentleman is not consumed by a blind belief in universal, 
transcendent values. On the contrary, he searches for the true meaning of every 
worldly thing and fact around him. By doing so, he induces their validity as a 
way of reaching toward an understanding of the Order of Heaven. The very 
phrase “proceeding from below to above” (shangda 上達) implies this inductive 
epistemological methodology. Confucius’ scholarly endeavor of over fifty years 
to reach the Order of Heaven was nothing but a tireless process of inductive 
reasoning, not research into shamanism.
Now, why is this inductive epistemology of “proceeding from below to 
above” of the Confucian gentleman animistic? In order to have a valid under-
standing, we need to clarify the true meaning of animism.
Animism is generally interpreted as a worldview that everything in the 
world has life (or anima in Latin). According to this view, a natural thing such 
as tree or rock has anima, often personified. But is this true?
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Let us take the example of animism in Japanese parlance. The teachings of 
Japanese Shintoism say there exist eight million gods ( yaoyorozu no kami 八百
萬の神). And the term “eight million gods” can be mistaken to imply “every-
thing in the world.” Yet a true meaning of the term is the notion of the innumer-
ability of kami (gods) in the world. Therefore, each and every “thing” in the 
world cannot be identified as a kami in the worldview of Japanese Shintoism.
There are a myriad stones on earth. Some can be worshipped as kami, and 
others can at the same time be kicked aside as worthless things. Both are stones, 
but the former is kami, while the latter is not kami. In the Japanese animistic 
worldview, there could be more than eight million kami. The point is that we 
should not be falsely bound by the face value of the terms of “eight million” and 
“kami.” In this regard, this animistic worldview is not compatible with panthe-
ism, spiritualism, or shamanism.
Then what is kami and what is not kami? The determining factor is not 
the transcendence itself of Heaven. If many members of a human community, 
be it a village or a country, perceive some indication of life or anima in a stone, it 
can be called kami, not because the stone’s godly validity descends from Heaven 
but because the people recognize its kami-ness on the grounds that they share 
certain subjective but common feelings or an acknowledgment of the inductive 
recognition of Heaven, that is, “from below to above.” This type of worldview 
is identified as the very notion of animism, which I emphasize throughout this 
chapter in order to distinguish it from the general usage of the term.
The Gentleman and the Small Man
We can assume that Confucius inherited some degree of shamanistic worldview 
from his mother. Nevertheless, what was more important for him was the phi-
losophy that had sustained the ruling system of the Zhou dynasty. He was born 
in the state of Lu, which had inherited the glory of the Zhou, while his family 
lineage can be traced back to the Yin dynasty.
For this reason, Confucius thought that li 禮 (ritual) was the most impor-
tant factor in the Zhou dynasty’s political and social order. Li was a system of 
customs, rules, and cultures through which men in the traditional clan society 
managed their life properly. Confucius believed that li was not formed deduc-
tively from transcendent or metaphysical values. On the contrary, li was formed 
inductively, little by little, within the constraints of indigenous environments 
and conditions over the long history of the community. In Confucius’ view, a 
man can only elevate the status and quality of his being within his community 
to the highest level as he acts in perfect accord with li.
However, the culture of the Zhou dynasty had already deteriorated in 
the mundane world of Confucius’ times. Instead, the hegemony-seeking social 
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groups that upheld universally applicable values were coming to dominate the 
world. They adopted universal values, among other things, in an attempt to 
eradicate all conventional values that had been accepted in the traditional soci-
eties. And it was the “small man” (xiaoren 小人) that had played the key role in 
this process of destruction and re-orientation.
The gentleman, then, was the one who took the opposite position against 
the new, universal worldview pursued by the small man. He attempted to guard 
the animistic worldview that adhered to the proper ways of living in the society 
of the ancient clan. His thinking in this regard was expressed in the following 
famous sentence:
子曰、君子和而不同、小人同而不和。
The Master said: The true gentleman is conciliatory but not accommodat-
ing. Common people are accommodating but not conciliatory.3 (13.23)
The gentleman, the sentence reads, is capable of maintaining harmony in 
defending the animistic li of the traditional society, yet not of equating all 
things to universal values. In contrast, the small man equates all things to uni-
versal values and therefore does not seek harmony and tends to struggle against 
conservative opponents.
Confucius, rooted in a belief in animism, was very sensitive in perceiving 
and absorbing facial expressions, demeanor, appearance, and the atmosphere 
around human beings as well as figures, colors, and the sounds of natural 
objects. There is one instance where we are allowed to peek into Confucius’ 
attachment to animism. He married his daughter off to Gong Ye Chang 公冶
長, who was said to be able to communicate with birds. This discussion leads to 
another famous passage:
子曰、巧言令色、鮮矣仁。
The Master said, “Clever talk and a pretentious manner” are seldom 
found in the Good.4 (1.3 and 17.17)
This passage says that a globalist person who embodies universal values and has 
an exquisite ability to conduct deductive communication with a pretentious 
face is seldom compatible with ren 仁 (the life of between-ness), which is inher-
ently a central value of the local clan society. This small man is able to update 
his knowing of “truth” or value promptly from globalist groups and bring them 
to the community; he then applies them in the vertical way, that is, from above 
to down below (xiada 下達) as the shaman always does.
The knowledge of the small man was oriented toward the narrow end of 
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constructing a global empire, and hence, to that end, he had the power to con-
vince people to obey. As such, the small man was equipped with an excellent 
intellectual capability and efficient solutions, all of which proved valuable for 
the person who was in a position to exercise global power. But the nature of his 
knowledge was only strategic or tactical, after all. The gentleman was remote 
from the small man in terms of mundane knowledge.
Confucius was obviously aware of this knowledge gap and feared that the 
tremendous power of the small man would destroy the old values of the animistic 
clan community. His vocal and consistent criticism of the small man stems from 
this background. If we consider this, it is easy to reason that the stature of the small 
man was not as trivial as described by Neo-Confucian thinkers. On the contrary, 
small men formed a global elite group that had an open mindset that could cross 
over the borders of old cultures, customs, and traditions. On the other hand, the 
gentleman intentionally disregarded the new trends of the global world and chose 
to be stuck in the value system of the good old traditional community.
In light of this, until now there might have been a misunderstanding about 
Zai Yu 宰予, a disciple of Confucius, in the long history of Chinese thought. 
Zai Yu was infamous for sleeping during the daytime. Confucius is said to have 
criticized him for this:
子曰、朽木不可雕也、糞土之牆、不可杇也、於予與何誅。
The Master said, Rotten wood cannot be carved, nor a wall of dried dung 
be trowelled. What use is there in my scolding him any more?5 (5.9)
Zai Yu had received two opposite evaluations. On the one hand, he was often 
scolded by Confucius, as just shown. On the other hand, he was praised for his 
outstanding ability in speech.
Why did he sleep during the daytime and why did Confucius scold him 
so severely? A careful reading of this chapter reveals that Confucius did not 
criticize him to his face. Instead, Confucius made critical remarks when Zai Yu 
was absent. In short, Confucius disclosed his dissatisfaction about Zai Yu delib-
erately in front of other disciples.
Confucius’ act should be interpreted in light of the fact that Zai Yu was a 
very competent, globally minded member of the elite and had rich connections 
to diverse sources of the latest information about the world. We may presume 
that he continued to update his pool of information and knowledge by meeting 
with well-informed people who moved around the country. The meetings took 
place in the evening, and this affected his sleep.
I assume that Confucius was keenly aware of Zai Yu’s activities, which put 
Confucius in a dilemma. A wanderer himself, Confucius was in need of the 
118 Different Confucianisms
information and knowledge Zai Yu had for the purpose of finding valuable 
work. However, Zai Yu was a person who should be categorized as a small man. 
This dilemma might have led Confucius to share his negative views of Zai Yu 
with his disciples during Zai Yu’s absence.
We can find a reference to a rather exaggerated situation in the Mencius, 
which depicts the scenes where Zai Yu and Zi Gong 子貢 make great efforts 
and use their speaking talents to promote Confucius as a greater sage than Yao 
堯 and Shun 舜 (by Zai Yu) or even as the greatest sage in the history of human-
kind (by Zi Gong). Confucius was definitely ambivalent about Zai Yu.
The Third Life
What did the Confucian gentleman uphold to provide protection for his tra-
ditional community and the society at large? In order to answer this question, 
some conceptual clarifications will be required.
Here I wish to introduce the notions of the first life, the second life, and 
the third life. These may sound awkward, but they are crucial in my interpreta-
tion of East Asian philosophy.
Humankind has learned that there are two types of life. One is physical, 
and the other is meta-physical or spiritual. The physical life is perceived and 
sustained in our daily living, which depends on natural processes for well-being 
and continuity. Yet, this life is doomed to perish or be destroyed for a variety of 
reasons. The human being cannot but accept this law of nature with a funda-
mental sorrow and despair.
In order to relieve sorrow and despair, the human being finds comfort and 
rescue in religious notions about life. Statements such as “Even after the body 
has perished, the spiritual life continues eternally” and “Even though this physi-
cal being is limited, the spiritual life given by God is absolutely immortal” have 
been around for a very long time. The religious view of nature and life exempli-
fied by these statements has had great influence throughout human history.
The former and the latter types of life I refer to here as the first life and 
the second life, respectively. Between and within each of these two types of 
life there are a number of variations. Even though we have conducted a deep 
search into these variations, they basically reside within, and not beyond, the 
two notions of life.
Now I would suggest a further notion: the third life. In essence, it is neither 
biological nor spiritual; it is animistic. A good example of this third life can 
be found in the Japanese conception of a natural being such as a stone or tree 
acquiring “life” as a kami. This third life can only appear when members of the 
human community have a shared perception of the life-ness (or Aura in Ger-
man) and accordingly recognize it as kami.
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Not being biological or spiritual, the existential mode of the third life is 
accidental, unpredictable; it may or may not emerge in any particular relation-
ship between or among the entities of the world. This third life may sound illu-
sive or superstitious, as humankind has not yet fully recognized it. But I argue 
that this third life exists around our daily life although it is not perceived.
In sum, we can attempt to conceptualize and compare the three modes of 
life as in table 1.
It is important to note that the third life is not unique to the Japanese 
notion of animism. A careful reading of the Confucian literature indicates that 
the notion of ren has profound logical connections to the “life-ness” between 
and among social entities. This notion breaks the boundary of the conven-
tional socio-ethical understanding of ren in terms of “benevolence” or “love of 
humanity.”
Confucius’ ren at its core refers to the life of between-ness. This notion is 
rooted in Confucius’ peculiar worldview that life is not a universal phenom-
enon, but an accidental, coincidental, adventitious one, which can only be rec-
ognized between and among the members of the community who happen to 
share certain common sensibilities. This is the kernel of the Confucian view of 
the third life. Whether a stone or a tree is perceived to be alive or not is not a 
concern of deductive reasoning through universal values. It is recognized and 
sanctioned by the members of the community who happen to share a certain 
inductive awareness or perception about the said concern. In this sense, ani-
mism can be understood as a worldview in a new context that is non-physical 
(non-first) and non-spiritual (non-second) in its mode of existence; it may or 
may not penetrate all modes of intersubjective relations of the world.
Table 1. Three Modes of Life
the first life the second life the third life
Nature, 
essence
Physical, biological Religious, spiritual Awareness, recognition of 
between-ness
Locus Individual, human 
body
Universal Inter-subject (nature-
human, human-human)
Mode of 
existence
Visible and tangible 
in this world
Transcendent, 
transpersonal
Accidental, illusive, 
apparition
Scope of 
concern
Human needs, 
desires
Everything Contingency
Contents Substantial Absolute truth Aesthetic, sensuous
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Ren as the Third Life
It is a common understanding that one of the core concepts of the Analects is 
ren. Yet it is not easy to come up with a handy definition of ren as discussed in 
the Analects. The difficulty stems from the fact that Confucius did not give 
a clear-cut definition of ren and instead mentioned it here and there in frag-
mented fashion in the Analects. This difficulty became ever more serious as the 
readers of the Confucian literature attempted to grasp some consistent meaning 
out of the heterogeneous, fragmentary words of Confucius. Captured by the 
image or prejudice of Confucius as a “great sage,” the general reader presumes 
that there must be a logically coherent set of meanings among such fragmentary 
words. This is where we fail to obtain the true meanings and implications of ren.
In order to overcome this habitual thinking, among all things we need to 
realize that there is no consistent definition or meaning of ren in Confucius’ 
thought. It is important to realize that ren is not supposed to be assigned a par-
ticular consistent definition if we recall Confucius’ animistic views of life, soci-
ety, and the world. Logically speaking, the animistic worldview cannot offer any 
universal, deductive, and consistent definition of life, let alone ren.
Ren becomes manifest and realized in coincidental and unintended ways. 
This is why disciples of Confucius always wanted to ask about ren while Confu-
cius did not want to discuss it at great length. If there were any clear definition 
of ren, Confucius could lay it out once and for all, instead of taking up the topic 
time and again with his disciples. The very ambiguity of ren led Confucius to 
characterize it as something unclear, situational, and random, which his disci-
ples were not up to swallowing.
For example, when Confucius says
克己復禮爲仁.
He who can himself submit to ritual is Good.6 (12.1)
we should not conceive of this as a general definition of ren. This sentence 
means that if we can ourselves submit to ritual, there might appear an acciden-
tal life called ren. Ren is coincidental rather than entirely accidental. There is 
regularity and predictability to some extent; ren may or may not materialize 
according to a gentleman’s experiences and intentions. In order to make certain 
this regularity and predictability, people should learn and practice li 禮 (ritual) 
as the reinforcing system for promoting the status of their being.
When Fan Chi 樊遲 asked about ren (12.22), Confucius answered that it 
is “to love men” (樊遲問仁、子曰愛人). However, this should not be consid-
ered anything close to a definition. Confucius’ answer should not read as “To 
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love men is ren.” Instead, when he provided this answer, he might have meant 
that when a gentleman loves men, a new form of life-like between-ness called 
ren might appear in that particular coincidental interface between the gentle-
man and the men.
But we need to be reminded of the matter of regularity. When the gen-
tleman loves a human, ren might materialize, but we do not definitely know 
whether or not ren materializes at each interface between the gentleman and 
the human.
When Confucius said “He who can himself submit to ritual is ren” to Yan 
Hui 顔囘 and “to love men” to Fan Chi, he might have thought that ren would 
appear only to some specific persons under some specific situations. And all 
these incidents of ren must be recognized from shared subjective perspectives. 
This explains why there exists a variety of meanings and connotations of ren.
Having discussed the preceding, we can understand that ren is neither 
benevolence nor “human-heartedness” (as in Fung Yu-lan),7 nor is it morality. 
Instead, it is life. To be more precise, ren represents a form of life in the way 
it involves the interface and interrelatedness of social entities. In other words, 
it is the life of between-ness, which is anchored in the power of inter-entity 
consciousness.
Life and Time
Ren is not eternal. It can be momentary, transitory, and ephemeral, because it is 
the third life. This is why Confucius thought that timing was the most impor-
tant factor for the gentleman:
子曰、學而時習之、不亦説乎、有朋自遠方來、不亦樂乎、人不知
而不慍、不亦君子乎。
The Master said, To learn and at due times to repeat what one has learnt, 
is that not after all a pleasure? That friends should come to one from 
afar, is this not after all delightful? To remain unsoured even though one’s 
merits are unrecognized by others, is that not after all what is expected of 
a gentleman?8 (1.1)
The key word in this chapter is “time.” The Master did not say “To learn and to 
repeat what one has learnt”; he said “To learn and at due times to repeat.” Here, 
the phrase “at due times” is not to mean some points in time where some duty 
or obligation is implied. The repeating could be incidental; yet the final out-
comes of the unplanned or unintended incidents would prove that the legiti-
mate timing had been exercised. A gentleman neither prepares nor plans nor 
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aims at a certain time deliberately. Instead he is cultivated to grope for the very 
best moments, which appears to be coincidental to the beholders.
However, we should be cautious about the “coincidental” nature of this 
revelation. It is because a lot of practice, training, and rehearsal are demanded 
for one to be able to catch the perfect timing. It is not guesswork. It is not a 
deliberate work either. In a natural stream of consciousness, a gentleman gets 
to catch the moment accurately as though he had planned it perfectly. This is 
the very meaning of “at due times.” And it is at this very moment that the third 
life materializes in the form of pleasure and benefits all members of the group.
In a similar vein, the phrase “有朋自遠方來” should not be read as “from 
afar (遠方) friends come.” Instead we should read it as “from afar (遠) at the 
very right moment (方) friends come.” The reason is that Confucius is talking 
about timing here, too. He says here that at the very moment that friends come 
from afar, the third life, paraphrased as “delight,” appears between the two per-
sons. The timing may look coincidental, but the two true gentleman friends 
realize that the right timing is a manifestation of their shared perception.
From this animistic point of view, we can read the third sentence as fol-
lows: At the very moment when one remains unsoured (or not disappointed) 
even though his merits are unrecognized, the third life appears in the form of 
gentleman-ness.
A logical corollary is that the gentleman here is not a specific object that 
has an unchanging identity; it rather is a perception or recognition. The gentle-
man here implies a phenomenon or incident that can enlighten the life, and, for 
him to do so, timing is crucial. Even if the gentleman can enlighten life once, 
we should not presume that his gentleman-ness might last forever. In the next 
moment he can become the small man since the gentleman-ness does not stand 
for an unchanging, constant entity but a plastic, performative agency.
The following chapter proposes quite a challenge in figuring out the ani-
mistic nature of Confucius’ writing:
色斯舉矣、翔而後集、曰、山梁雌雉、時哉、時哉、子路共之、三
嗅而作。
[The gentleman] rises and goes at the first sign, and does not “settle until 
he has hovered.” (A song) says: The hen-pheasant of the hill-bridge, 
Knows how to bide its time! Bide its time! When Tzu-lu made it an offer-
ing, it sniffed three times before it rose.9 (10.18)
It is hard to comprehend this chapter clearly unless we understand the special 
importance of timing in Confucius’ thinking. In my animistic point of view, 
this chapter must be interpreted as follows.
When Confucius and his disciples went on a journey, a hen-pheasant fly-
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ing in the atmosphere about them rose and settled on a tree after hovering for a 
while. The Master said, “The hen-pheasant of the hill-bridge knows the time, it 
knows the time!” After listening to these words, Zi Lu (Tzu-lu) 子路 gave food 
to it, but the bird only sniffed three times and rose.
Confucius praised the hen-pheasant because it knew the timing. This 
statement corresponds completely to the opening chapter of the Analects. In 
the beginning there is the Chinese character xi 習, which portrays a young bird 
flapping its wings trying to fly.
Now in the last chapter of Book 10 (actually this book was the last volume 
of the ancient version of the Analects), this young bird has become the hen-
pheasant (the gentleman) and is flying high (xiang 翔) after a lot of learning, 
practice, and experience in order to give life to everything. In the beginning, a 
little infant bird did practice the third life awkwardly, but through a long pro-
cess of training it became able to display the third life without rational reflective 
knowledge. This is why Confucius emphasized what has happened by yelling 
out “Timing, Timing!”
That the hen-pheasant sniffed three times at the food Zi Lu gave it and 
then rose in fact represents the practice of ritual (li). Book 10 is a textbook 
description of Confucius’ daily demeanors and bearings. The compiler of this 
book wanted to say that every move Confucius made represents the ren that 
gives life to everything. Acquiring the life of li, ren, and being a gentleman, the 
hen-pheasant now bows down low three times following the traditional ritual, 
as described in detail here:
(君召使擯、色勃如也、足躩如也):揖所與立、左右其手、衣前後襜
如也、趨進翼如也。
(An extremely elegant bird emerged as the gentleman here as though): 
“When saluting his (her) colleagues he (she) passes his (her) right hand 
(wing) to the left, letting his (her) robe (tail feathers) hang down in front 
and behind; and as he (she) advances with quickened step, his (her) atti-
tude is one of majestic dignity.”10 (10.3)
And it is as though the bird has gracefully soared high up into the sky when 
Confucius says,
（賓退、必復命曰、）賓不顧矣。
“The guest is no longer looking back.”11 (10.3)
In all these situations, time and life are closely interrelated, for the third life 
emerges always “at due times.” Confucius puts emphasis on timing in the daily 
practice of letting the third life emerge in the community.
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Rising of the Second Life
This specific worldview of Confucius is based on a particular perspective on 
life. It recognizes life as a phenomenon that only occurs in a particular com-
munity or in a group that shares feelings, and not as a universal phenomenon. 
This is an animistic worldview in itself. Whether a stone or a tree is living or not 
is not to be decided deductively by a universal standard. It should be decided 
inductively by the collective feelings of the people or multitude that observe 
and listen to the stone or the tree.
However, this animistic worldview had been thoroughly destroyed in the 
process of dissolution of the traditional society while a powerful empire with a 
centralized government was establishing itself in the post-Confucian era, espe-
cially during the Zhanguo 戰國 (Warring States) period.
The global powers detested the old-fashioned animistic worldview of 
Confucius and adopted the opposite side’s universal and shamanistic world-
view. This saga is depicted in the genealogy from the Daoists to Mencius to Xun 
Zi 荀子 of the Legalist school. Daoists were a philosophical group who thought 
that it was not animistic life but Dao, the ultimate spiritual being, that was the 
ruler of the universe. Since Dao is universal, everything derives from and goes 
back to it; there are no mediating mechanisms such as customs, rules, or cul-
tures between Dao and individual things. This completely brand-new school of 
thought was intimately understood in particular by the newly emerging global 
powers, whose intention was to destroy the old clan societies.
The following episode from Book 18 provides a vivid description of the 
nuanced relationship that Confucius and the early Daoists had with each other.
長沮桀溺耦而耕、孔子過之、使子路問津焉、長沮曰、夫執輿者爲
誰、子路曰、爲孔丘、曰、是魯孔丘與、對曰是也、曰是知津矣、
問於桀溺、桀溺曰、子爲誰、曰爲仲由、曰是魯孔丘之徒與、對曰、
然、曰滔滔者天下皆是也、而誰以易之、且而與其從辟人之士也、豈
若從辟世之士哉、耰而不輟、子路行以告、夫子憮然曰、鳥獸不可與
同群也、吾非斯人之徒與而誰與、天下有道、丘不與易也。
Ch’ang-chu and Chieh-ni were working as plough-mates together. Master 
K’ung, happening to pass that way, told Tzu-lu to go and ask them where 
the river could be forded.
Ch’ang-chu: Who is it for whom you are driving?
Tzu-lu: For K’ung Ch’iu.
Ch’ang-chu: What, K’ung Ch’iu of Lu?
Tzu-lu: Yes, he.
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Ch’ang-chu: In that case he already knows where the ford is.
Tzu-lu then asked Chieh-ni.
Chieh-ni: Who are you?
Tzu-lu: I am Tzu-lu.
Chieh-ni: You are a follower of K’ung Ch’iu of Lu, are you not?
Tzu-lu: That is so.
Chieh-ni: Under Heaven there is none that is not swept along by the 
same flood. Such is the world and who can change it? As 
for you, instead of following one who flees from this man 
and that, you would do better to follow one who shuns this 
whole generation of men.
And with that he went on covering the seed. Tzu-lu went and told his 
master, who said ruefully, One cannot herd with birds and beasts. If I am 
not to be a man among other men, then what am I to be? If the Way pre-
vailed under Heaven, I should not be trying to alter things.12 (18.6)
This chapter introduces the picture of the primitive Daoists, Chang Ju (Ch’ang-
chu) and Jie Ni (Chieh-ni), who were not mere hermits. They were ploughing 
their field without exchanging words. Daoists did not need words, while Con-
fucius’ group always needed a lot of words to communicate with each other. 
Nevertheless, Chang Ju and Jie Ni were not ignorant men; they knew everything 
in the world including the fact that Confucius and his disciples would come to 
them on that day. Since they always had the newest information concerning the 
whole world through the spiritualistic network of primitive Daoists, the meet-
ing between them and Confucius was in fact not at all coincidental, and there 
seemed to be no surprise in this seemingly “accidental” encounter. The Daoists 
had all the information even though they hardly move around.
Chang Ju and Jie Ni were not perfect Daoists, but they understood the 
world in terms of universal spirituality and wanted to unite themselves to the 
One, escaping from an artificially segmented society.
This episode provides a window through which we can look at a situa-
tion where Confucius and his disciples were looking for the “right path” in a 
disorderly world. But from the perspective of Chang Ju and Jie Ni, Confucius’ 
worldview was completely wrong. The reason is as follows. Confucius thought 
that he was going to cross over to a certain land when he came to a river, and 
he looked for a ford. This turned out to be a perfectly wrong understanding of 
the world. At the time, there was no land at all in the eyes of Chang Ju and Jie 
Ni. Everywhere the country was under water, and no one could distinguish land 
from river. So it was futile to look for a ford. Jie Ni said, “Under Heaven there is 
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none that is not swept along by the same flood. Such is the world and who can 
change it?” This deductive recognition is the perfect expression of the primitive 
Daoist and spiritualist worldview. Everyone was drowning in the same moving 
flood of universal water, but no one could realize this except for the believer in 
the second life.
From Mencius to Neo-Confucianism
Mencius is widely believed to have been a successor of Confucius. However, 
he may in fact have been influenced by primitive Daoists and did bring about 
great changes in Confucianism. Mencius discarded the inductive methodology 
of Confucius and instead developed boldly the deductive methodology learned 
from primitive Daoists.
Mencius intended to destroy the profit-oriented (li 利) worldview of the 
hegemony-seeking global powers through righteousness ( yi 義). Needless to 
say he was Confucian in this regard, but his perception of life was completely 
different from that of Confucius. Mencius might have been a successor to the 
Daoist concept of life, which approaches life in terms of spiritual matter (qi 氣). 
As I have mentioned, this is a typically spiritualistic worldview that believes all 
things in the universe are made of qi.
Confucius had never explained human nature by employing universalistic 
or deductive discourses. But Mencius explained it deductively in terms of uni-
versal morality and the metaphor of moving water spreading all over the world. 
This indicates a stark difference between the two thinkers.
After Mencius, Confucius’ animistic notion of life on the one hand and 
the spiritual notion of life by Daoists and Mencius on the other came to be in 
competition with each other. Over the course of time Confucius’ out-of- fashion 
notion of animistic life was forgotten, and his words in the Analects became 
incomprehensible all too soon. In this way, the interpretations of the Analects 
have all become out of focus because of their tendency to understand Confucius 
in terms of the second life. Thus, Confucius became a spiritual Divine Sage with 
absolute perfection.
The complete version of the notion of spiritual life in Chinese philoso-
phy lies in Neo-Confucianism. According to the Neo-Confucian worldview, 
animism or the third life ought to be held in disdain as a lower-level or “vul-
gar” notion of life. The thorough extermination of the animistic way of think-
ing from the public sphere in China and Korea can be understood as a Neo- 
Confucian crusade in the name of civilization.
On the other hand, the animistic worldview was well preserved in a country 
that was relatively less civilized, that remained “barbaric” from a Neo- Confucian 
point of view, and that lacked a strong, centralized governing authority: Japan. 
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This offers a sharp contrast with China and Korea, where strongly centralized 
power existed that was highly civilized from the Neo-Confucian point of view. 
Japanese waka 和歌 and haiku 俳句 are just two illustrations of the animistic 
form of artistic expression that serves to realize and give form to the ephemeral 
third life.
The Japanese cherish the momentary aura in these forms of literature and 
strive to grasp the ephemeral yet eternal quality of “life” (inochi いのち) that is 
inherent in them. Japanese Shintoism is also animistic in its worldview and was 
not absorbed into shamanism or spiritual religion or formal thought until the 
Meiji era. The reason is that “vulgar” animism had widely penetrated to the far 
corners of the country, and the love of the Japanese for the Analects may be due 
to the very animistic atmosphere of the literature, instead of the spiritualism 
emphasized by a moralistic Neo-Confucianism that deviated from the original 
Confucian teachings.
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128
CHAPTER 9
The Noble Person and the Revolutionary
Living with Confucian Values in Contemporary Vietnam
NGUYEN Nam
At  a  co n fer en c e  in Hanoi in 2012 on research methods for studies on 
Confucianism, a couple of papers were presented on President Hồ Chí Minh 
and Confucian teachings. During the discussion on this topic, a participant 
brought to the audience’s attention the case of the well-known medical doctor 
and political activist Nguyễn Khắc Viện, who was seriously criticized in North 
Vietnam in the 1960s for figuring out, in an essay, Confucian elements in Hồ 
Chí Minh’s thought. Rereading Viện’s essay, titled “Confucianism and Marx-
ism in Vietnam,” together with his notes added to the text later in 1984, we can 
retrieve some traces of a downturn period for Confucianism in the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Examining how the essay and its author have been 
treated throughout different phases of recent history, we can see the changing 
attitudes toward Confucianism, the opposing public points of view on it as part 
of socialist leadership, and the diverse standpoints of Vietnamese intellectuals 
under the influence of prevalent sociopolitical discourses.
Equally interesting is Nguyễn Khắc Viện’s analysis of passages cited from 
Hồ Chí Minh’s handbook Let’s Change Our Methods of Work. The citations 
comprise a set of moral values put under the name of “Revolutionary Vir-
tues,” and they are unquestionably the modifications of Confucian cardinal 
moralities. Thus, these “revolutionary virtues” epitomize the revolutionization 
of Confucian pivotal virtues, which makes them more effective for and suit-
able to new revolutionary tasks. Through Hồ Chí Minh’s revolutionization of 
Confucian moral values, it is not hard to see an enduring of Confucianism in 
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his ideological foundation, and this is a universal feature shared by East Asian 
leaders, no matter which ideology they are pursuing. Furthermore, the core of 
Confucian virtues remains as a powerful force to unite people around a leader-
ship that skillfully employs it in East Asian society. All these arguments will be 
justified through the scrutiny of Hồ Chí Minh’s Confucian foundation and his 
cardinal revolutionary moral values as explained in Let’s Change Our Methods 
of Work.
Introductory Remarks
In 1962, the French journal La Pensée, a quarterly review of “modern rational-
ism” founded in Paris, published a feature essay titled “Confucianisme et Marx-
isme au Vietnam” (Confucianism and Marxism in Vietnam) (La Pensée, no. 
105 [October 1962]) by Vietnamese pediatrician and political activist Nguyễn 
Khắc Viện (1913–1997). It was later translated into English in 1974,1 and sub-
sequently became Viện’s most widely read work. Ironically, however, it was not 
available in Vietnamese translation until 1993, more than three decades after 
its initial publication2 and about seven years after the implementation of Đổi 
Mới (Renovation) policy in Vietnam.3 The 1993 Vietnamese edition included 
a short but significant note from the translators, who observed that the essay 
“has been translated into many languages. That year [1962], the Sự Thật Pub-
lishing House4 in Hanoi translated it into Vietnamese, but did not publish it.”5 
Although the translators offered no explanation for the three-decade delay in 
publication, Nguyễn Khắc Viện himself offered a few hints in an appendix to 
the 1993 volume. The appendix, which Viện had drafted during the 1980s, pro-
posed “to review a few crucial points from the previous essay before discussing 
other issues.” Viện first restated the main argument that he had advanced in 
1962, and acknowledged that his thesis had provoked controversy:
Confucianism paved the way with auspicious conditions for the intro-
duction of Marxism [into Vietnam]. This is an argument that has caused 
many “waves and winds.” The main argument is that unlike other reli-
gions, [the aim of ] Confucianism is to direct human beings’ thought 
completely into social life; therefore it stands on the same page with 
Marxists. If we are able to convince a Confucian that Marxism can realize 
all the social ideals that he has ever thought of, this Confucian should 
be willing to decline Confucianism and accept Marxism. Meanwhile, 
socially persuading a Christian, a Buddhist, or a Muslim remains insuf-
ficient, because persuasion cannot provide them with an answer about 
the transcendental afterlife. Like Marxists, Confucians do not raise such 
a question.6
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As a way of defending his argument, Viện identified two main histori-
cal aspects of Confucian thought. The first and most foundational aspect was 
the essentially humane quality of Confucianism, which emphasized the ideal 
of human social improvement. The second and far less appealing aspect of 
Confucianism had to do with its recasting as a bureaucratic ideology of gov-
ernance. Viện summed up this difference as follows: “one is the mandarin’s 
Confucianism, and the other the scholar’s.” According to Viện, the first aspect 
of  Confucianism—its fundamental humanity—was particularly apparent in 
the Confucian background of Communist Party founder Hồ Chí Minh. Viện 
argued that this claim regarding Hồ’s affinity for Confucianism had been the 
main reason that his essay had not previously been published in Vietnam.
Due to their lack of awareness of these two trends, a number of people 
have blotted out the historical role of Confucianism, upholding that since its 
beginning, Confucianism has only played a negative role antithetical to the so-
called folk-thought. Armed as these people are with such a prejudice, whenever 
they hear someone asserting the proximity between Confucianism and Marx-
ism, or, more seriously, mentioning some Confucian elements in President Hồ’s 
thought, they will treat [these allegations] as “heresies” or “insubordinations.”
To back up his claims about Hồ’s embrace of Confucianism, Nguyễn Khắc 
Viện also cited at length a few passages from a 1948 handbook authored by 
Hồ titled Sửa đổi lề lối làm việc (Let’s change our methods of work). In this 
text, Hồ undertook to transform pivotal Confucian values into revolutionary 
moral concepts. An investigation of Viện’s essay, coupled with an analysis of 
Hồ’s handbook, reveals some of the ways in which Vietnamese intellectuals and 
political elites undertook to adapt core elements of Confucian morality into a 
revolutionary ethical system.
Nguyễn Khắc Viện and His Essay
According to the autobiographical account in his book Đạo và đời (The way 
and life), Nguyễn Khắc Viện was born into “a laureate family.”7 His father 
Nguyễn Khắc Niêm (1889–1954) passed the imperial examination at a very 
young age in 1907, with the title of Metropolitan Graduate with Honors, and 
then served as a mandarin of the Nguyễn dynasty, but did not want his son 
to follow in his footsteps. Viện was sent to a Franco-Vietnamese elementary 
school, and later attended high school in Vinh, Huế, and Hanoi. After study-
ing in Hanoi’s Medical School for three years (1934–1937), Viện continued 
his study in Paris. Having earned his medical degrees in pediatrics and tropi-
cal diseases in 1940 and 1941, respectively, he became active in the politics of 
the overseas Vietnamese community in France. Suffering from tuberculosis, 
Viện had to undergo seven surgeries between 1943 and 1948: eight of his ribs, 
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the entirety of his right lung, and one-third of his left lung were removed, and 
doctors warned him that he had at most two years to live. But instead of sur-
rendering to this miserable fate, Viện consulted various “books on Eastern and 
Western philosophies,” and finally adopted the technique of “breathing with 
the stomach” as a treatment for his aliments. In 1949, as Viện was recovering, 
he joined the French Communist Party. This was a significant political land-
mark in Nguyễn Khắc Viện’s life, and he would later describe himself as “rooted 
in Confucianism but equipped with [the] experimental science that is liberal 
democracy and Marxism.”8
As the secretary general and Communist Party secretary of the Overseas 
Vietnamese Federation in France from 1952 to 1963, Nguyễn Khắc Viện was 
a leader of the Vietnamese liberation movement in France, and contributed to 
notable French journals such as La Pensée, La Nouvelle critique, Démocratie 
nouvelle, and Europe. His essay “Confucianism and Marxism in Vietnam” was 
written during this time, coincident with the construction of “the initial foun-
dation of socialism” in North Vietnam and “the struggle against [the] U.S. neo-
colonialism regime” in South Vietnam.9 Recalling the causes and conditions of 
his essay’s composition, Viện writes:
On the occasion of a discussion with writer Albert Camus, I raised the 
question on the relationship between Confucianism and Marxism in 
Vietnam. I presented a few arguments. First, Confucianism actually had 
two trends; one was humane/anthropocentric [nhân bản 人本], and the 
other feudal [phong kiến 封建]. Second, although differing from one 
another, Marxism and Confucianism share a common point [in] that 
[each] directs human thought toward the improvement of social orga-
nization, and the construction of relationships among people, but makes 
no claims about where the soul goes after death, whether [to] heaven 
or hell. Hence, if persuaded, those who follow Confucian teaching can 
accept Marxism. Based on these observations, I wrote an essay printed 
in the journal La Pensée in 1962. This work received a lot of attention 
from the public within and outside Vietnam because the way it posed 
questions was not as rigidly dogmatic as the style favored by many Party 
authors during that period. Some brothers from Sự Thật [“Truth”] Pub-
lishing House also suggested that the work be translated and published, 
but they could not obtain permission and had to abandon the idea.10
In addition to reiterating his main point about the basic compatibility of 
Confucianism and Marxism, Nguyễn Khắc Viện also specified the adaptability 
and relevance of Confucianism in a new society founded on Marxist philoso-
phy. Trained with the anthropocentric and collectivistic spirit of Confucian-
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ism, Vietnamese Confucian scholars, according to Viện, saw no conflict in their 
transition from the teaching of Confucius to the doctrine of Karl Marx. Viện’s 
bifurcation of Confucianism into “humane/anthropocentric” versus “feudal” 
traditions was designed to legitimate it in the new socialist Vietnam. Yet it was 
the very distinctiveness of the essay’s claims that had triggered the negative reac-
tions against it.
Due to his antiwar activities, Nguyễn Khắc Viện was expelled from France 
and returned to Vietnam in 1963. Around the same time, the Ninth Plenum of 
the Vietnam Worker’s Party passed a Resolution on “The International Situ-
ation and the Party’s International Duties,” which called on the Party to fight 
against opportunism, revisionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism.11 Viện later 
described the political atmosphere in North Vietnam at that time as fraught 
with tension and suspicion:
When I returned [to Vietnam], people in the country were conducting a 
course on learning Resolution Nine against revisionism. Since I had just 
come back, I did not yet fully understand the Party’s internal situation. 
[The transfer of ] my Party membership was also not yet accepted. [Viet-
namese] members of the French Communist Party who had returned to 
Vietnam before 1960 only needed to complete a couple of formalities, 
and quickly joined the Vietnamese Party. However, as there occurred the 
problem of fighting against “revisionists” starting from 1960, European 
parties were regarded as “revisionist,” and consequently Party members 
coming home from European countries had to endure a trial period [to 
verify if they were qualified to join the Vietnamese Communist Party]. 
The political situation of 1963 was truly quite complicated.12
Although Nguyễn Khắc Viện did not explicitly link the suppression of the 
Vietnamese version of his essay to the 1960s domestic context in North Viet-
nam, such a political situation was evidently unfavorable for the publication of 
his work.13
After his return, Viện eventually gained admission to the Party and was 
placed in charge of the Foreign Language Publishing House in Hanoi, where 
he became “an interpreter of Vietnamese history, culture, and the Vietnamese 
struggle to the many intellectuals, militants, and journalists sympathetic to Viet-
nam who visited Hanoi during the Vietnam War, from 1965 to 1975.” In this 
role, he was “one of the Vietnamese scholars who did most to interpret Vietnam 
for the West.”14 Although he rejoiced at the end of the war and the reunification 
of the country in 1975, Viện remained critical of whatever was detrimental to 
the development of the nation. During the period from 1976 to 1993, he sub-
mitted about thirty recommendations, comments, and letters discussing various 
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critical issues of the country and calling for reforms to leaders of the Party, the 
National Assembly, and the Government. These documents were not released 
to the public at the time, and only a portion of them was recently published.15 
In 1992, in keeping with the implementation of the Đổi mới policy, the Party’s 
General Secretary Đỗ Mười had several meetings with various audiences, assur-
ing them that the Party would welcome divergent ideas from the people.16 It is 
probably not coincidental that in the following year, 1993, Thế Giới Publishers 
(formerly Viện’s Foreign Language Publishing House) printed the Vietnamese 
translation of his essay together with some of his other writings in a book titled 
Bàn về đạo Nho (On Confucianism).
The publication of Nguyễn Khắc Viện’s book On Confucianism in 1993 
should be examined in relation to the broader reappraisal of Confucianism in 
connection with its alleged contribution to the rise of the “Four Asian Tigers” 
(alternatively, “Four Asian Little Dragons”)—Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. As early as 1974, Edwin O. Reischauer attributed the eco-
nomic success of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore to a 
number of key traits easily linked to Confucian values.17 In his “1984’s Supple-
mental Notes,” Viện mentioned en passant that “a Japanese scholar18 has also 
formed the argument that Confucianism has helped nations like Japan, Taiwan, 
[and] Korea easily move toward modernity.”19 In the same vein as these observa-
tions, Le Nouveau monde sinisé (The new sinicized world) by French scholar 
Léon Vandermeersch was translated into Vietnamese in 1992, reconfirming the 
appreciation of Confucianism within an Asian framework.20 More than thirty 
years after he first wrote it, Viện’s essay seemed to be reaching Vietnamese read-
ers at a propitious moment. Four years later, in 1997, its author passed away at 
the age of eighty-four.
In a section of the 1962 essay called “Confucians and Marxists,” Nguyễn 
Khắc Viện painted a picture of Vietnam’s first Marxists. In most cases, these 
revolutionaries were “petty intellectuals,” educated in the Franco-Vietnamese 
education system but “forced to end their studies before taking their baccalaure-
ate exams.” In other cases, they were “village teachers, often at private schools, 
just like the scholars of old.”21 Having grown up in the Confucian tradition, 
these Vietnamese Marxist cadres often appreciated and integrated Confucian 
principles of political morality into their revolutionary lives:
The notion that leaders should exemplify high moral standards was 
deeply engrained in Confucian countries. . . . [Today’s Marxists] still 
recite Confucian sayings: “Do not be corrupted by wealth,” “Do not suc-
cumb in the face of adversity,” “Do not bow your head before demonstra-
tions of force.”22
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To support this contention, Viện quoted long passages from a handbook called 
Sửa đổi lề lối làm việc (Let’s change our methods of work) that was employed as 
a main material for the Party’s cadre training during the national liberation war 
in the late 1940s. Although Viện did not mention the identity of the writer of 
the handbook, Hồ Chí Minh (under the pen name of X.Y.Z.) is widely known 
to have been its author. And even though the reason why the author’s name is 
omitted remains unknown, the cited passages in Viện’s essay clearly showed how 
Hồ had transformed pivotal Confucian moral values into key virtues required 
for the revolutionary. Before examining their transformation in detail, let us do 
a quick review of Hồ Chí Minh’s attitude toward Confucianism.
The Issue of the Noble Man and the Revolutionary
A number of Vietnamese scholars have written about Hồ Chí Minh and Con-
fucianism since the 1990s.23 The opening of a 1993 essay titled “Nguyễn Ái 
Quốc—Hồ Chí Minh với Nho giáo” (Nguyễn Ái Quốc—[also known as] Hồ 
Chí Minh and Confucianism) by Nguyễn Đình Chú points out that
There exists something strange in the following case: Confucianism had 
had a predestined affinity with Nguyễn Ái Quốc since his childhood, and 
followed Hồ Chí Minh to the end of his life; and although the disci-
pline “Hồ Chí Minh Studies” was founded and has been developing for 
about thirty years, the recognition of Confucian influence on Nguyễn 
Ái Quốc—Hồ Chí Minh—was officially promoted only three years ago 
(1990), on the occasion of the commemoration of the centenary of his 
birth. Perhaps the title of “Cultural Personality” that the world offered 
him on the occasion of this commemoration24 plus the atmosphere of 
renovation started after the Sixth National Plenum of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam have helped us to overcome that abnormal thing.25
The Confucian background of Hồ Chí Minh has recently been lauded as a key 
part of his commitment to patriotic tradition. According to an official biogra-
phy of Hồ Chí Minh (announced on the website of the Ho Chi Minh Museum), 
Hồ “was born into a family of patriotic Confucian scholars, and grew up in a 
locality that had a patriotic tradition of valorous fighting against aggression.”26 
Thus, we may wonder what Hồ Chí Minh himself thought of Confucianism.
In a conversation with Russian poet and essayist Osip E. Mandelstam 
(1891–1938) in Moscow in 1923, Nguyễn Ái Quốc (the future Hồ Chí 
Minh) offered an understanding of Confucianism framed within a Vietnamese 
context:
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I was born into a Vietnamese Confucian family. . . . The youth from those 
families often studied Confucianism. Comrade, you must know that 
Confucianism is not a religion but a science of moral experience and 
conduct. Based on this foundation, one puts forward the notion of the 
“Great Unity.”27
Mandelstam recorded these words in an interview-like essay under the title 
“Visiting an International Communist Warrior—Nguyễn Ái Quốc.” For Man-
delstam, the view of Confucianism as “a science of moral experience and con-
duct” plus the Confucian goal of the “Great Unity” in Nguyễn Ái Quốc’s narra-
tive were highly suitable to communist ideals.
Hồ Chí Minh regarded Confucianism as part of his life. In a speech pre-
sented at the ceremony to celebrate the National Unity Front (Liên hiệp quốc 
gia) organized by the Buddhist Association for National Salvation (Hội Phật 
giáo cứu quốc) on January 5, 1946, Hồ claimed that “ As Buddhists believe in 
Buddha, [and] Christians believe in God, we believe in the teaching of Confucius. 
Those are the most venerated to whom we entrust.”28 Later, during an interview 
with Vasidev Rao of Reuters in May 1947, when asked whether Hồ Chí Minh’s 
government would include members of all social classes and parties in order 
to reach a political solution for a Vietnamese-French relationship, Hồ asserted 
that “Hồ Chí Minh may pursue Marxism, or follow Confucianism, but the Viet-
namese government still comprises representatives of all parties and even those 
who belong to no party at all.”29
Among the extant writings collected in Hồ Chí Minh: The Complete Works 
(Hồ Chí Minh toàn tập), there survives a short article titled “Confucius,” pub-
lished in 1927.30 This article expressed Hồ’s reaction to the Chinese Nationalist 
Government’s decision “to henceforth abolish all ceremonies commemorating 
Confucius as well as projected expenses for those rituals, and to use all temples 
of Confucius as public schools.” Hồ’s reaction in this particular case was based 
not only on his political standpoint, but also on his general understanding of 
Confucius and Confucianism. According to the article, the Chinese Nationalist 
Government’s official order was issued on February 15, 1927.31 Hồ Chí Minh 
(also known as Ly Thuy around that time) wrote the article in Guangzhou—the 
former seat of the Nationalist Government, and commented on the abolition 
of the ceremonial ritual clearly from a communist perspective. The Nationalist 
Government’s order discussed in Hồ’s article was the beginning of an ideologi-
cal policy that would be widespread in China in the next few years, pinpointing 
Confucius’ political shortcomings, and reevaluating the contributions of Con-
fucianism to the development of China through history.32 Ho’s response to this 
policy was decidedly mixed. While he seemed prepared to accept the abolition 
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of Confucianism as a political doctrine, he argued that it could and should be 
preserved as a system of moral values:
With the abolition of rituals commemorating Confucius, the Chinese 
government has dropped an old institution that goes against the spirit 
of democracy. For us, the Vietnamese, let us perfect ourselves spiritually 
by reading Confucius’ works, and revolutionarily reading Lenin’s works 
is a must.33
Eighteen years later, as the provisional president of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam, Hồ Chí Minh had the chance to formally pay respect to Confu-
cius and his teaching in a revolutionary spirit and style. As the head of the new 
state, standing against colonialism and feudalism, in David Marr’s words “Hồ 
was quite selective when it came to participation in commemorations, reflecting 
the national persona he was crafting for himself.”34 Nonetheless, on October 21, 
1945, President Hồ invited the former emperor, Bảo Đại, who had previously 
announced his abdication, and was currently serving as a “Supreme Adviser” to 
the new DRV, to accompany him to Hanoi’s Giám Temple (also known as the 
Temple of Literature, dedicated to Confucius) and attend the Autumn Ritual 
commemorating the Sage. It was worth mentioning that not only Vietnamese 
government officers but also high-ranking Chinese officials took part in this 
annual commemoration. It was also noteworthy that Hồ Chí Minh played the 
role of the ritual host, and that the commemoration “was carried out with a 
specifically new spirit” through several reformed rituals, reflecting the “break-
ing with bad feudal practices to follow the path of revolutionary democracy.”35
The fusion of Confucian and revolutionary values was prevalent indeed 
during the early years of the DRV. Perhaps the best evidence of this appears in 
the reworking of the concept of “noble person” ( junzi/quân tử 君子) in official 
DRV discourse. Only about three weeks after the commemoration of Confu-
cius hosted by President Hồ, the DRV’s first university opened in Hanoi. As the 
General Director of the Higher Education Department and the Director of the 
École française d’Extrême-Orient, Professor Nguyễn Văn Huyên delivered the 
opening speech at the university’s inauguration in the presence of President Hồ. 
Emphasizing the university’s responsibility to train a new generation of Viet-
namese intellectuals, Nguyễn Văn Huyên announced:
We all feel responsible in training a number of people who possess good 
morals and the capability to guide the masses. Should you allow me to 
employ an ancient term with its ancient connotations from an Eastern 
civilization, [these people are] quân tử, who, on the one hand, know how 
to hone their knowledge to be able to evaluate any force of civilization, 
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and who, on the other hand, also apprehend how to process practically so 
that they can apply their wisdom in life, raising the national flag together 
with their brothers, sisters, and compatriots of different professions, even 
in thunderous storms, and in all international meetings on culture built 
on the glorious foundation of peace, justice, liberty, happiness, and uni-
versal love of human beings in the future.36
The quân tử (noble person) in this speech implicitly carried on the traditional 
Confucian values, yet was also a blend of both nationalism and international-
ism. Although sometimes overlooked, the notion of the “noble person” always 
serves as the foundation for the construction of the ideal personality (colored 
with a specific political ideology) in countries influenced by Confucian culture. 
In his essay, Nguyễn Khắc Viện portrayed Hồ Chí Minh as “a Confucian scholar 
who changed from one philosophy to another,”37 and “yet still retained his basic 
personality of a ‘quan-tu.’ ”38 Peter A. DeCaro, in his study Rhetoric of Revolt, 
even dedicates a full-length chapter to a portrait of “Ho Chi Minh: The Chun 
Tzu [ junzi].”39 Just as he had reformed the rituals commemorating Confucius 
along revolutionary lines, Hồ Chí Minh would promote the new image of the 
revolutionary (and not the “noble man”), with redefined Confucian values, in 
his handbook Let’s Change Our Methods of Work.
Let’s Change Our Methods of Work
For a better apprehension of the handbook Let’s Change Our Methods of Work 
(hereafter, “the handbook”), a brief review of its historical background is 
needed. Hồ Chí Minh completed the handbook in October 1947 under the 
penname of X.Y.Z. It was first printed by Sự thật (“Truth”) Publishing House 
in 1948, and was subsequently reprinted several times in Vietnam.
During the short but tumultuous period from 1945 to 1948, the Vietnam-
ese were fighting for their country’s unity and independence from the Japanese 
and French occupiers. Taking advantage of the Japanese surrender at the con-
clusion of World War II, the Việt Minh (League for the Independence of Viet-
nam), under the leadership of Hồ Chí Minh, established the new state known 
as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on August 28, 1945. A few days later, 
on September 2, Hồ proclaimed Vietnam’s independence in Hanoi, opening 
his speech with Thomas Jefferson’s declaration “that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that 
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”40 More than a year 
later, unwilling to lose its colony, France opened fire in Hanoi on December 17, 
1946; shortly after that, on December 19, France issued an ultimatum, demand-
ing the disarmament of the DRV’s armed forces. Refusing the French demand, 
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on December 20, as DRV President, Hồ appealed to the whole nation to stand 
up and join the national resistance against the colonial regime. The Việt Bắc, a 
mountainous region between the Sino-Vietnamese border and the Red River, 
then became “the very cradle of the resistance.” In October 1947 the French 
secretly launched the Lea Campaign to “destroy the foundation of Vietnamese 
resistance” in the north; it was also at that time that the Central Party Com-
mittee’s Standing Bureau decided to “destroy the winter march of the French 
army.”41 Hồ’s resistance government not only fought against the French army, 
but also commenced building the foundation for a new ideology. David Marr 
succinctly describes the beginning of this long and complex process:
From his mountain hideout during the Pacific War, Hồ Chí Minh pro-
moted a mix of Confucian and modernist values to be assimilated by 
the [Indochinese Communist Party] members and then taught to fol-
lowers. . . . The Propaganda Ministry under Trần Huy Liệu took respon-
sibility for devising a comprehensive program of social transformation 
dubbed the New Life Campaign (Vận động Đời sống Mới).42
These were the historical circumstances under which the handbook was com-
pleted. Its targeted readership clearly included Party members and cadres who 
were striving for the nation’s independence and governing part of the country’s 
territory.
Revolutionary Virtues
Under the title “Revolutionary Virtues” (Đạo đức cách mạng), Hồ presents a 
concise account of the moral values that a cadre must display and embrace in 
order to transform himself into a revolutionary:
It is not difficult for a cadre to become a real revolutionary if he wants 
to. Everything depends on his heart-and-mind [lòng mình]. If his sole 
interest is the Party, the country, and his compatriots, he will gradually 
become totally just and selfless [chí công vô tư 至公無私]. As he has been 
just and selfless, his personal faults will progressively decrease, and his vir-
tues described below will become increasingly apparent each day. In brief, 
the good virtues are five in all: humanity [仁], righteousness [義], knowl-
edge [智], courage [勇], and integrity [廉].43
This excerpt brings up a number of issues, including the origin of chí công vô tư, 
a phrase that would later become one of the foundational revolutionary moral 
values of the members and cadres of the Vietnamese Communist Party. It also 
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illustrates Hồ’s selective appropriation of certain Confucian virtues to form 
the list of five required norms of revolutionary virtue. The first chapter of the 
Classic of Loyalty (Zhong jing 忠經), titled “Heaven, Earth, and Gods” (“Tiandi 
Shenming” 天地神明),44 begins with the following lines:
A maxim from ancient times [states that] the only virtue for the above 
and the below to receive Heaven’s favor is the way of loyalty. Overshad-
owed by Heaven, sustained by Earth, and followed by human beings, 
nothing is greater than loyalty. Loyalty means [standing at] the center, 
being totally just and selfless.45
Another dictum in the same chapter also reads, “Loyalty is what is described 
as ‘being whole-hearted’.”46 Thus, the notion of being “totally just and selfless” 
and the importance of the heart-and-mind in self-training to become “a real 
revolutionary” asserted in Hồ’s handbook seem to have been inspired by this 
classical text. Although Hồ did not cite the Classic of Loyalty explicitly, the cir-
culation and popularity of the classic in Vietnam can be confirmed by the local 
reproduction of this work now preserved at the Han-Nom Research Institute 
in Hanoi.47
At first glance, the five good virtues of the revolutionary are reminiscent of 
the “Five Constants” (wuchang 五常) originally advocated by Dong Zhongshu 
董仲舒 (179–104 B.C.E.). Indeed, three of Hồ’s five essential revolutionary vir-
tues apparently were taken directly from the “Five Constants”: benevolence (ren 
仁), righteousness ( yi 義), and knowledge (zhi 智). Hồ opted to replace the 
other two of the five, ritual (li 禮) and trustworthiness (xin 信), with courage 
( yong 勇), and integrity (lian 廉). However, a further reading of the Analects 
shows another group of three fundamental virtues of the noble man:48
The Master said, “The way of the superior man is threefold, but I am not 
equal to it. Virtuous [ren], he is free from anxieties; wise [zhi], he is free 
from perplexities; bold [ yong], he is free from fear.”49
The Master said, “The wise are free from perplexities; the virtuous from 
anxiety; and the bold from fear.”50 
The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 中庸) also gathers ren, zhi, and yong 
into a trio called dade 達德 (“universally binding virtues”): “Knowledge, benev-
olence, and courage, these three are the universally binding virtues” (Zhongyong 
20).51 Hence, following this approach, one may treat Hồ’s revolutionary virtue 
quintet as a combination of the dade trio and two additional elements (righ-
teousness and integrity). However, due to the quintet format of the essential 
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revolutionary moral values, they were apparently grouped together according 
to the model of the “Five Constants.” The choice and use of these Confucian 
moral concepts was reminiscent of the New Life Movement in China of the 
early 1930s, which emphasized the roles of the old Confucian virtues of ritual 
(li 禮), righteousness ( yi 義), integrity (lian 廉), and knowledge (zhi 智) as a 
means to reinforce nationalism and modernization.52
In his essay titled “Virtues of Junzi,” Antonio S. Cua tries to distinguish the 
basic interdependent/complete virtues of ren 仁 (benevolence, humaneness), li 
禮 (rules of proper conduct, ritual, rites), and yi 義 (rightness, righteousness, 
fittingness) from dependent/partial virtues such as kuan 寬 (magnanimity), xin 
信 (trustworthiness), and yong 勇 (courage). According to Cua, the cardinal vir-
tues of ren, yi, and li are “relevant to all situations of human life as our actions 
have always effects on others,” whereas the partials have their “application to 
circumstances,” and, furthermore, their ethical value “depends on connection 
with the . . . cardinals.”53
The emphasis on certain moral values reflects specifically temporal socio-
political demands, even as the modification of the connotations of the selected 
moral concepts reveals the efforts to make them fit well in new social contexts. 
Although the handbook does not specify any reasons for its particular choices 
from the Confucian repertoire of moral concepts, reading its interpretation of 
the five highlighted virtues can help to better understand why Hồ selected them.
H um a n i t y
Humanity (ren) is the first virtue to be interpreted, and its interpretation also 
paves the way for the representation of the remaining virtues. The handbook 
explains:
The virtue of humanity consists of loving deeply and wholeheartedly 
assisting one’s comrades and compatriots. That is why the cadre who dis-
plays this virtue wages a resolute struggle against all those who would 
harm the Party and people. That is why he will not hesitate to be the 
first to endure hardship and the last to enjoy happiness. That is why he 
will not covet wealth and honor, nor fear hardship and suffering, nor 
be afraid to fight those in power. Those who want nothing are afraid of 
nothing and will always succeed in doing the right thing.54
In this explanation of “humanity,” readers can identify at least two Confucian 
writings that have been reworded and altered for a better fit into the handbook’s 
new context. First, there is Fan Zhongyan’s 范仲淹 (989–1052) oft-quoted 
motto from his “Memorial to Yueyang Tower” (Yueyang Lou ji 岳陽樓記): “Be 
the first in all under heaven to bear hardship, be the last in all under heaven to 
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enjoy happiness.”55 Moreover, Fan’s thought is followed by a slight modification 
of Mencius’ definition of “the great man” (dazhangfu 大丈夫). A passage in the 
Mencius reads:
To be above the power of riches and honors to make dissipated, of pov-
erty and mean condition to make swerve from principle, and of power 
and force to make bend—these characteristics constitute the great man.56
For Hồ, the ideal revolutionary was obviously close to the Confucian 
“great man.” At the same time, Hồ departed from classical precedents in subtle 
ways. As described by the handbook, the “virtue of humanity” comprises hon-
estly loving (thật thà thương yêu) and wholeheartedly assisting (hết lòng giúp đỡ) 
“one’s comrades and compatriots.” Here, humanity also requires sincerity (cheng 
誠) and full devotion of one’s heart-mind ( jinxin 盡心) to realize one’s object 
of commitment. Unlike the Confucian “great man,” the revolutionary “wages a 
resolute struggle against all those who would harm the Party and people.” Thus, 
for Hồ, loyalty (zhong 忠) was directed first and foremost to the Party and the 
people while love was clearly class-oriented.
R i gh t eo us n ess
As for righteousness ( yi 義), the handbook writes:
Having a sense of duty means uprightness—not having ulterior motives, 
doing nothing unjust and having nothing to hide from the Party. It also 
means not being preoccupied by personal interests in conflict with those 
of the Party.57
The distinction between “just” and “unjust,” the individual’s transparency in 
front of the Party, and the harmonization between the individual’s and the 
Party’s interests here are clearly based on a subset of class-based moral values 
that the revolutionary must follow strictly. The distinction between “right” and 
“wrong” of course requires the involvement of knowledge/wisdom.
K n ow led ge
According to the handbook, selflessness plays a crucial role in the display and 
application of knowledge (zhi 智):
Since one’s conscience [zhi/trí] is not clouded by personal interests, clar-
ity of purpose can be easily maintained. It becomes easier to reason and 
find the right way. One can judge men and investigate matters. Useful 
projects can be accomplished, while interests harmful to the Party can 
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be avoided. For the sake of the [Party’s] just cause, people of value will be 
promoted while vigilance against crooks is maintained.58
Often rendered into English as “knowledge” or “wisdom,” zhi/trí, as Henry 
Rosemont has observed, “is the philosophically significant most frequently 
occurring term in the Analects.”59 Having examined this concept in various con-
texts of the Analects, Rosemont concludes that “[Zhi] is perhaps best defined 
as a sense of what it is most fitting to do in our interactions with our fellow human 
beings, understanding why, performing those actions, and achieving a sense of well-
being from so doing.”60 Hence, there is another translation suggested by Roger 
Ames for this Confucian concept: the term “realize” can serve well here, for 
“it is epistemically as strong in English as ‘know’ with respect to truth condi-
tions.”61 Moreover, since “realize” also means “[making] real” it simultaneously 
carries the meaning of “[putting] into practice” with the proper stances and 
feelings toward what one is making real in one’s conduct. Through Confucius’ 
teaching on zhi/trí, Rosemont finally sees it as “religious or spiritual instruc-
tions for how to live a meaningful life.”62 The handbook’s description of this 
concept also reflects this spirit, but redefines it on the basis of the interests of 
the Party and the people.
Co u r age
For Hồ, the introductions of nhân, nghĩa, and trí prepared the way for the 
fourth moral virtue, “courage” ( yong 勇):
Having courage means carrying out what one believes is right. It means 
not being afraid to correct one’s faults, to endure suffering, and to face 
hardship. It means not hesitating to reject honors and ill-gained wealth. 
If necessary, it means the sacrifice of one’s life for the Party and country 
without qualm.63
The premise on which Hồ understands yong is clear: it must be carried out on 
the basis of daring to realize “what one believes is right” ( gặp việc phải có gan 
làm).64 This principle is in agreement with Confucius’ sayings in the Analects, 
where the Master emphasizes the critical need of righteousness in improving 
personal courage:
To see what is right and not to do it is want of courage.65 (2.24)
Zilu said, “Does the superior man esteem valor [courage]?” The Master 
said, “The superior man holds righteousness to be of superior impor-
tance. A man in a superior situation, having valor without righteousness, 
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will be guilty of insubordination; one of the lower people, having valor 
without righteousness, will commit robbery. (17.23)
According to the Analects, courage must be guided by righteousness, and in 
its turn righteousness must be based on humanity/benevolence as indicated 
by Confucius: “Men of humanity are sure to be bold, but those who are bold 
may not always be men of humanity” (14.5).66 Based on the Analects’ accounts, 
one scholar has described the interrelationship among humanity, righteousness, 
and, implicitly, courage as follows:
Hence, a ren person must be a righteous ( yi) person. If this reasoning is cor-
rect, the relationship between ren and yi has to be that ren determines both 
yi as the rightness of an action and yi as the righteousness of the agent.67
Noteworthy is that courage is often linked to other virtues in the Analects, 
such as the love of learning: “There is the love of boldness without the love of 
learning; the beclouding here leads to insubordination” (17.8).68 Bravery must 
follow propriety/rites (li 禮) to avoid chaos—“Boldness, without the rules of 
propriety, becomes insubordination” (8.2)69—and this is why Confucius hates 
those who “have valor merely, and are unobservant of propriety” (17.24).70 In 
the handbook, since the “propriety/rites” of the Five Constants are not listed 
among the five required virtues of the revolutionary, the absence of the link 
between this moral value and courage is understandable. However, as we have 
seen in the elucidations of the previous three moral values of benevolence, righ-
teousness, and knowledge, loyalty to the Party and the people stands out as the 
pivotal criterion that defines every single virtue essential for the revolutionary’s 
self-cultivation. This trend of thought was first promoted in 1946 in the educa-
tional system of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and became an essential 
moral norm of the Vietnamese state.71 Hồ Chí Minh would later crystallize this 
loyalty in his oft-cited motto, originally written in 1955:
Revolutionary virtue can be summarized as clearly distinguishing right 
from wrong, persevering with class position, wholeheartedly being loyal 
to the country, and unreservedly practicing filial piety toward people (tận 
trung với nước, tận hiếu với dân).72
Nine years later, in 1964, he proclaimed another version of the motto:
Our army is loyal (trung 忠) to the Party, and practices filial piety (hiếu 
孝) toward the people, being ready to fight and sacrifice their lives for the 
independence and freedom of the fatherland, and for socialism.73
144 Different Confucianisms
“Being loyal to the country/the Party and practicing filial piety toward the 
people” has been regarded as one of Hồ Chí Minh’s fundamental ideas. The 
textbook Tư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh (Hồ Chí Minh’s thought), prepared for college 
students, observes this principal virtue:
Hồ Chí Minh introduces new revolutionary contents into a new con-
cept, namely “being loyal to the country and practicing filial piety toward 
the people.” This is the most important moral criterion. Moving from 
being loyal to the king and practicing filial piety toward parents to being 
loyal to the country and practicing filial piety toward the people is a revo-
lution in moral conception. Hồ Chí Minh reverses the old Confucian 
concept, and constructs new morality as if “a man firmly stands on his 
feet, and raises his head toward the sky.”
In Hồ Chí Minh’s view, the country is the people’s country and the peo-
ple are the country’s owner. Hence, “being loyal to the country and prac-
ticing filial piety toward the people” is the expression of responsibility 
toward the enterprise of nation-building-and-defending and the develop-
ment path of the country.
The core content of loyalty to the country is that within the relationships 
of individuals, community, and society, one must give the foremost prior-
ity to the interests of the Party, Fatherland, and Revolution.74
The common thread that traverses the first four revolutionary moral values of 
humanity, righteousness, knowledge, and courage has been summed up in Hồ 
Chí Minh’s mottos and clarified in the commentaries: as the representative of 
the country and the people, the Party deserves the top priority, and loyalty to 
the Party assures the perfection of the five fundamental revolutionary virtues 
highlighted in the handbook. Reading the handbook in its original context 
when the Party was taking the lead in the fight against feudalism and the resis-
tance against French colonialism, one can straightforwardly understand why 
courage was one of the five desired moral values for the revolutionary.
I n t egr i t y
As a Confucian moral value, depending on the contexts in which it emerges, lian 
廉 has been rendered into various English equivalents, such as “grave reserve,”75 
“self-denying purity,”76 or “upright, honourable, integrity and character.”77 How-
ever, the most common equivalent is “integrity,” which also appears in Nguyễn 
Khắc Viện’s citation from the handbook:
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Having integrity means not coveting status or wealth, not seeking an easy 
life or not willing to be flattered by others. That is why one can be lucid 
and generous and avoid self-degradation. There exists only one type of 
 eagerness—that is the eagerness to study, work, and make progress.78
In the Vietnamese original of the citation, the term tham (“coveting” 貪) stands 
for different English rewordings, such as “seeking” or “willing.” The quote ends 
with the eagerness for self-cultivation, and this reminds us of a saying from the 
Analects: “When his desires are set on benevolent government, and he secures 
it, who will accuse him of covetousness?” (20.2).79 Having a rhetorical structure 
similar to Confucius’ cited assertion, the handbook defines “integrity” as the 
avoidance of any temptations that lead to self-degradation, and the enthusiastic 
striving for self-improvement.
Two years later, in 1949, writing under the pseudonym of Lê Quyết Thắng, 
Hồ Chí Minh revisited this moral concept in a series of four newspaper articles 
on diligence (cần 勤), frugality (kiệm 儉), integrity (liêm 廉), and straightfor-
wardness (chính 正),80 and discussed liêm in great detail:
Liêm means purity, without greediness. In the past, under feudalism, 
mandarins who did not squeeze money from the people were called liêm, 
but it has only a narrow meaning. Our country is now the Democratic 
Republic; and the term liêm has a broader meaning. Everyone must prac-
tice liêm. Similarly trung is to be loyal to the Fatherland, and hiếu means 
to practice filial piety toward people. We love our parents, but we must 
also love others’ parents, and inspire the love for parents in all human 
beings.
Liêm must be accompanied by kiệm. Correspondingly, kiệm must 
be paired with cần. Kiệm is the premise for the practice of liêm, because 
lavish spending begets greediness.
 . . . Our nation is carrying out the war of resistance and structuring 
the country, building the New Life in our new Vietnam. Not only do we 
need to be diligent and frugal, but we must also keep our purity/integ-
rity (liêm).81
Here, as in the earlier handbook, Hồ sought to redefine Confucian key moral 
values in the context of revolutionary Vietnam in the 1940s. An examination of 
some Confucian classics, such as the Analects, Mencius, Liji (Classic of Rites), 
and Xunzi, to name but a few, shows that liêm has various connotations, and 
as a moral value it can be universally practiced without restriction to any social 
class.82 Like Hồ’s elucidations of the other Confucianism-based moral values, 
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his interpretation of liêm is positioned within the framework of the war of resis-
tance and nation-building led by the Communist Party.
W h y  A r e  P ro p r i et y  a n d  T rust wo rt h i n ess  M iss i n g ?
The absence of two Confucian constants, propriety (li 禮) and trustworthiness 
(xin 信), from Hồ’s set of revolutionary virtues cannot be easily overlooked. 
Given its status as a cardinal virtue, the exclusion of “propriety” from the list 
is particularly striking. As we will see, the logic of the omission of “propri-
ety” helps explain Hồ’s decision to leave “trustworthiness” off the list. Having 
reviewed extant documents relevant to Hồ Chí Minh and Confucian morality, 
Hoa John Le Van concludes:
As a son of a Vietnamese mandarin-scholar, [Hồ Chí Minh] was trained 
early in the Confucian heritage. The five cardinal virtues of compassion, 
righteousness, ritual, knowledge, [and] integrity, perhaps except for rit-
ual, were part of [Hồ]’s personal life.83
Nonetheless, Hồ Chí Minh himself did not stipulate why he left “propriety” 
out of the repertoire of revolutionary virtues. Various scholars have endeavored 
to fill in the gap, rationalizing any possible reason that might have caused Hồ 
to pass over “propriety.” The following is a line of reasoning articulated by a 
Vietnamese academic:
Whenever talking about human beings’ virtue, Confucians often link 
it with li/lễ of the Five Constants (ren, yi, li, zhi, xin). Based on the 
explanation from the Shuowen jiezi [說文解字, Explanation of patterns, 
elaboration of graphs], the principle of li is “stable steps, respecting the 
spirits, and seeking happiness,”84 reflecting the relationship between 
human beings and spirits. [Li] is combined with theocracy, and devel-
oped into the distinction between superior and inferior, rich and poor, 
closeness and distance, that is founded on a strict aristocratic ranking 
system. Therefore, in the Zuozhuan, the account of Zhanggong’s [莊
公] eighteenth year says, “As fames and positions vary, rituals are also 
different.” . . . Thus, li/lễ stands for the social status of the feudal hierar-
chy. Among the dominant classes, li/lễ also cannot escape from it. Li/lễ 
becomes a powerful political tool, and an effective method for control-
ling the realm and people in the feudal monarchical age. Thus, in Hồ 
Chí Minh: The Complete Works (ten volumes with 7,053 pages in total), 
Uncle Hồ never mentions the term li/lễ from the Five Constants of feu-
dal Confucians.85
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The passage starts with a definition of li (unfortunately, inaccurately trans-
lated) from the Shuowen jiezi to suggest that li was originally deployed as an 
instrument to enhance the unequal relationships between human beings and 
spirits. It then takes the next step of identifying li as a feudal social practice, a 
claim that appears to confirm the class-based nature of this moral concept and 
reveal it as a “powerful political tool, and an effective method for controlling 
the realm and people in the feudal monarchical age.” Although Hồ Chí Minh 
never endorsed such an understanding of li/lễ, it seems to be widely accepted in 
Vietnam, as the phrase lễ giáo phong kiến (“feudal proprieties”) carries strongly 
negative connotations (especially of gender inequality). However, the author 
of the excerpt above seemingly overlooks a well-known dictum of Confucius 
in the Analects: “To overcome oneself and restore the practice of proprieties 
is benevolent love.”86 Since ren (benevolence) is the ground of li (rules of pro-
priety), and li must be in accord with ren, “customs, rituals, regulations, and 
rules eventually should be regulated by ren.”87 In other words, rules of propriety 
are the vehicle for realizing and strengthening benevolence. When discussing 
the civility of the revolutionary policeman in a letter written in March 1948, 
Hồ Chí Minh reminds the reader that police must treat people with respect, 
etiquette, and moral standards (lễ phép).88 Obviously, revolutionary benevolent 
love needs to be expressed through certain revolutionary rules of propriety. Li/
lễ was omitted from President Hồ’s writings possibly due to the fact that it was 
generally understood as “rites” or “rituals,” and its hierarchical features had been 
prevalently associated with feudalism. However, as the set of rules of propriety 
or social conventions, li/lễ was unquestionably required and practiced in the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Although trustworthiness (xin 信) is not recorded in the handbook’s list 
of moral virtues that the revolutionary must acquire, it occasionally emerges as 
a required virtue in a number of other writings by Hồ Chí Minh. In his speech 
given at the concluding ceremony of a complementary training course for mid-
level cadres in 1947, Hồ declared:
A good cadre must have revolutionary morality. If one is well-trained in 
military affairs, but lacking revolutionary morality, it is difficult to suc-
ceed. In order to acquire revolutionary morality, one must possess the 
following five elements: Trí [智], Tín [信], Nhân [仁], Dũng [ 勇], [and] 
Liêm [廉]. I now clarify them.
Trí means clear-headedness, knowing both the enemy and our-
selves; recognizing good people and supporting them; identifying bad 
ones and not employing them; being aware of our goodness and improv-
ing it; identifying evil and avoiding it.
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Tín means [that] whatever is said must be trustworthy; assertions 
and practices must be in accordance with one another; we must try our 
best to earn people’s and soldiers’ trust.
Nhân means to possess universal love: loving our country, people, 
and soldiers.
Dũng means being forceful, decisive but not jeopardizing, having 
well-prepared plans and determinedly carrying them out straightaway, 
even if facing dangers. It also means to have bravery in any business.
Liêm means not to covet fame or position, not being excessively 
desirous of life, money, and sex. A cadre who dares to sacrifice his life 
for the fatherland, for his people, and for the just cause does not covet 
anything.89
The above-cited passage not only furnishes us with another chance to 
further comprehend Hồ’s understanding of trí, nhân, dũng, and liêm, but also 
supplies us with his explanation of tín, another moral value. Hồ Chí Minh’s 
notion of tín is basically in agreement with the Confucian notion of xin, which 
emphasizes verbal commitment with respect to one’s deeds. This point can be 
illustrated through a couple of examples from the Analects. For instance, when 
asked about how a man’s conduct can be appreciated by his fellows, Confucius 
replies, “Let his words be sincere and truthful, and his actions honorable and 
careful.”90 In another case, the Master places emphasis on the imperative con-
cordance between words and conduct: “At first, my way with men was to hear 
their words, and give them credit for their conduct. Now my way is to hear their 
words, and look at their conduct.”91 Having examined the concept of xin in the 
Analects, Cecilia Wee comes to the following conclusion:
Xin is concerned primarily with commitments in which verbal (or other) 
representations have been made, where trust can exist, and perhaps usu-
ally exists, against a background of unspoken social norms.92
Indeed, the agreement between words and deeds stands out as the foun-
dational principle of xin, but it must be conducted against the “background 
of unspoken social norms.” This background is spelled out in Hồ’s discourse: 
as all means must serve revolutionary ends, the cadre must be trustworthy so 
as to win his people’s and soldiers’ hearts-and-minds. Hồ Chí Minh obviously 
did not treat the Confucian Five Constants as an entirety; he broke them down 
into individual entities and recombined them with other moral values into dif-
ferent clusters of five. Depending on his audience, Hồ selected a certain cluster 
to pre sent to his targeted readers/listeners. Thus, even though xin/tín does not 
emerge among the “Revolutionary Virtues” discussed in the handbook Let’s 
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Change Our Methods of Work, it remains as an essential quality of the revolu-
tionary in other writings by Hồ Chí Minh.
The handbook in general and its five revolutionary moral elements in par-
ticular are in many ways reminiscent of Chinese Communist Party leader Liu 
Shaoqi’s 劉少奇 Lun gongchan dangyuan de xiuyang (On the cultivation of Com-
munist Party members).93 First delivered as a series of lectures for CCP members 
at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Yan’an in 1939, Liu frequently invoked 
the Chinese concept of self-cultivation (xiuyang 修養), and therefore aligned 
his views with “Chinese tradition, most specifically with Neo- Confucian praxis 
based on the Great Learning [Daxue 大學], the Mean [Zhongyong 中庸], and 
self-examination through quiet-sitting.” In this work, Liu cited several sayings 
from Confucian and Neo-Confucian sources, but these quotes “survive in the 
collective memory only as traditional sayings without awareness of their exact 
provenance.”94 Liu’s work was translated into Vietnamese and also employed as 
training material for Vietnamese cadres in the late 1940s.95
Unlike Liu’s indoctrination work, Hồ’s handbook does not contain any 
direct quotations from the Confucian classics, although traces of those texts 
can be discerned in his text, as this chapter has shown. By rephrasing Confu-
cian sayings in Vietnamese language, the handbook rhetorically presents them 
in a simple and easy-to-understand way, and consequently strips off the old-
fashioned classical veneer of the original texts. This tactic is especially clear in 
Hồ’s discussion of the Confucianism-inspired essential revolutionary virtues. 
The Confucian roots of these terms were instantly recognizable to Vietnamese 
elites trained in the Confucian educational system. And yet, as they were popu-
larly employed and practiced in daily life, ordinary Vietnamese embraced them 
as common sense and as part of their culture, even though they were unaware of 
their classical provenance.
After examining several Confucian values as they were reinterpreted in Hồ 
Chí Minh’s writings, Hoa John Le Van concludes:
[Hồ]’s unique revolutionary contribution was his adaptation of Marx-
ism to elaborate a new dimension of traditional Confucian values that 
had tightly bound Vietnamese society in ritual bondage. Earlier, we have 
noted that [Hồ] deliberately excluded [lễ, ritual] from the five basic Con-
fucian virtues.96
That Hồ infused traditional Confucian values with revolutionary meanings is 
undeniable. However, based on the evidence presented here, it is hard to find 
any trace of Marxist theory in Hồ’s adaptation of Confucian moral concepts. 
In addition to distilling and simplifying Confucian values, Hồ’s revolutionary 
framework points his readers to the ultimate goal: service to the Party and the 
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people, or, in Neil L. Jamieson’s words, to “behave toward the party as if it were 
your family.”97
Conclusion
Although there has never been any government-led campaign of “Criticizing 
Confucius” during the Democratic Republic of Vietnam era (1945–1975) or 
in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam period (1975 to the present), the treat-
ment of Confucius and his doctrine has changed significantly over the decades. 
Often identified with pejorative suppressive feudalism, Confucianism has 
sometimes been targeted for eradication, even in countries where it enjoyed 
deep influence. Nguyễn Khắc Viện’s essay “Confucianism and Marxism in 
Vietnam” serves as an example, showing an intellectual effort to acknowledge 
the positive aspects of “Confucianism of the scholars” of a Vietnam in transi-
tion. However, a number of his arguments, including his discussion of the rela-
tionship between Hồ Chí Minh and Confucianism, faced negative reactions 
and criticisms from contemporary readers. Only after the implementation of 
the Đổi mới (Renovation) policy, the international reappraisal of Confucian-
ism due to the success of the four Asian Little Dragons, and the commemora-
tion of Hồ Chí Minh as a “cultural personality” on the occasion of the cen-
tenary of his birth, did Viện’s essay have the chance to reach its Vietnamese 
readers. Since the publication of the essay in Vietnam, numerous studies on 
Hồ Chí Minh and Confucianism have been carried out, revealing his skillful 
transformation of Confucian values to serve the nation’s revolutionary cause. 
Cited in Nguyễn Khắc Viện’s essay, the section “Revolutionary Virtues” from 
Hồ Chí Minh’s Let’s Change Our Methods of Work and other examples from 
Hồ’s writings reveal how Hồ transformed pivotal Confucian moral values and 
reintroduced them as essential virtues required for the revolutionary. Simpli-
fied, Confucian values are rendered into new revolutionary contexts. The 
Confucian noble person is transformed into the ideal revolutionary and put 
forward to serve the revolution.
Appendix 1
1 9 8 4 ’s  Su p p lem en ta l  N ot es
by Nguyễn Khắc Viện98
Please allow me to review a few crucial points from the previous essay before 
discussing other issues:
We must clearly identify two trends of thought in Confucianism: one is 
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the original stream that is humane, and the other is a stream belonging to the 
ideology of the bureaucratic apparatus; one is the mandarin’s Confucianism, 
and the other the scholar’s.
Due to their unawareness of those two trends, several people have blotted 
out the historical role of Confucianism, asserting that since its beginning, Con-
fucianism has only played a negative role in opposition to the so-called folk-
thought. Of course, as they’re armed with such a prejudice, whenever they hear 
someone asserting the proximity between Confucianism and Marxism, or, more 
seriously, mentioning some Confucian elements in President Hồ’s thought, they 
will consider [these sayings] “heresies” or “insubordinations.”
Also due to this type of prejudice, they believe that Nguyễn Trãi [阮廌] 
[1380–1442] has nothing to do with Confucianism, repudiating all Vietnam-
ese patriotic Confucians as a whole, and treating patriotism merely as anti-
Confucian. Someone even writes, “Patriotism is the pathbreaking light (let me 
emphasize the term ‘pathbreaking’) for the early naissance of a traditional and 
unique culture in Vietnamese territory.”
Such statements reverse the historical process. There must first have been 
the establishment of a thriving and distinctive culture, and later from this foun-
dation patriotism would gradually take shape. When the Bách Việt [百越, or 
“One-Hundred Viet] nations fought against the Qin-Han army, they were not 
motivated by patriotism; even in the time of the Trưng sisters [the rebellion 
against the Han military], there did not exist a true patriotism as it is under-
stood in our time. People must have gone through a long historical process in 
which the resistance against foreign invasions was not the exclusive element 
that formed patriotism. One must include the following components:
Self-protection from natural disasters through the construction of 
embankment systems
The establishment of a centralized monarchical government
The construction of a national culture
Without the centralized monarchy with its mandarin machinery account-
able for national duties based on a unified ideology, there could not exist the 
awareness of patriotism at an advanced level. Only when facing natural disasters 
and foreign invasions would commoners come to the recognition of transcend-
ing their local mentality, scholar gentry would be conscious of their duties to the 
nation, and everyone would be [unified] around the image of a king. Within a 
long historical evolution, being loyal to the king [trung quân 忠君] and being 
patriotic [ái quốc 愛國] would have remained inseparable from one another. 
Confucianism played a crucial role in the formation of patriotism. Nguyễn 
Đình Chiểu, Mai Xuân Thưởng, [and] Phan Đình Phùng were Confucians, 
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and one cannot distort the truth by claiming that these patriots totally had no 
relationship with Confucianism.
Later, as history moved forward, there emerged more progressive regimes 
and ideologies. To return to Confucianism is reactionary, but to fully reject 
the role of Confucianism is really childish. Only the emergence of capitalist 
[thought] and proletarian thought could end the historical role of Confu-
cianism. Nowadays it is easy to point out the weaknesses of Confucianism, 
but one has to relocate it back into its historical context to be able to see its 
multifacetedness.
Some have argued that people do not accept Confucianism because it 
arrived in our country together on “the hooves of invading soldiers.” What a 
simplistic view! Some portion of the people will accept an ideology because 
of its contents, but not for its place of origin (let’s consider the cases of Bud-
dhism and Marxism!). In the early independent period, during the Lý and Trần 
dynasties, the centralized monarchical machinery had not reached an advanced 
level; although the warlords were gone, rice fields, estates, and the fiefs of royal 
nobles still existed. Confucianism and its unified mandarin apparatus were not 
accepted. The mandarin machinery employed Confucianism as its weapon to 
compete with Buddhism. During this period, Confucianism was progressive in 
comparison to Buddhism.
Others have also considered the Lý-Trần period with the dominance of Bud-
dhism more progressive than the post-fifteenth-century Lê dynasty founded on 
Confucianism. To some extent, Buddhism was better than Confucianism, and 
the Lý-Trần regime more “likeable” than that of the Lê dynasty. However, exam-
ined within the nation’s historical process, the Lê period achieved a higher level 
of unification of the kingdom. Newly independent, the Lý [and] Trần dynasties 
could only defend the northern borders of their realm; with a population still 
small, they could not fully explore the Red River Delta, and they had to con-
front two kingdoms, Champa and Khmer, without a decisive victory. The realm 
was always threatened by two-pronged attacks from the Northern and South-
ern frontiers. In the Lê dynasty, Đại Việt [大越, “Great Viet” = Vietnam] clearly 
gained more advantages: the Northern and Southern borders were secured for 
a long time, and the territory was expanded southward. This was a centralized 
monarchy with a mandarin apparatus working on a unified ideological founda-
tion of Confucianism. In the historical context of that time, this regime was the 
most rational (in comparison to the Champa and Khmer kingdoms). Later on, 
Confucianism could not handle conflicts and had to concede.
Confucianism paved the way with auspicious conditions for the introduc-
tion of Marxism [into Vietnam]. This is an argument that has caused many 
“waves and winds.” The main argument is that unlike other religions, [the aim 
of ] Confucianism is to direct human thought completely into social life; there-
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fore it stands on the same page with Marxists. If we are able to convince a Con-
fucian that Marxism can realize all the social ideals that he has ever thought of, 
this Confucian should be willing to decline Confucianism and accept Marxism. 
Meanwhile, socially persuading a Christian, a Buddhist, or a Muslim remains 
insufficient, because persuasion cannot provide them with an answer about the 
transcendental afterlife. Like Marxists, Confucians do not raise such a question.
Recently a Japanese scholar99 has also formed the argument that Confu-
cianism has helped nations like Japan, Taiwan, and Korea more easily move 
toward modernity.
On this favorable land, Marxism sowed new seeds—science, democracy, 
and international proletarian spirit, which were completely new elements. 
However, like Confucianism, when the Party has held political power, the 
risk of the bureaucratization of Marxism is always threatening, and a Marxism 
bureaucratized in several aspects is very similar to Confucianism. Criticizing 
Confucianism is also helpful for the criticism of today’s bureaucratism.
Appendix 2
Co n f u c i us 1 0 0
Guangzhou, February 20, 1927
On February 15, the Government of the Republic of China issued a decree: 
henceforth to abolish all ceremonies commemorating Confucius as well as pro-
jected expenses for those rituals, and to use all temples of Confucius as public 
schools.
Confucius lived 2,478 years before our time. During the last 2,400 years, 
he had been worshiped by the Chinese people. All Chinese emperors called 
Confucius the head of sages, and offered honorific titles to his successors.
From ancient times, the Vietnamese people and Vietnamese kings highly 
respected this sage. Nevertheless, the Chinese government has just decided that 
from now on, there is no longer any official worship for Confucius. Is that truly 
a revolutionary action?
Let us first review who Confucius is, why kings and emperors venerated 
him so approvingly, and why the Chinese government now rejects such a sage 
who has been so greatly worshiped.
Confucius lived in the Spring-Autumn period. His virtue, scholarship, 
and knowledge have earned great admiration from his contemporaries and later 
generations. He studied tirelessly, and never felt shame when learning from his 
inferiors; being unknown to the masses did not bother him at all. His renowned 
formula “See what a man does. Mark his motives. Examine in what things he 
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rests. How can a man conceal his character?”101 reflects the profundity of his 
cleverness.
Nevertheless, in a setting twenty centuries ago, during the time when capi-
talism and imperialism did not exist, and nations were not oppressed as we have 
now experienced, Confucius’ mind was never roused by revolutionary doc-
trines. His virtue is perfect but cannot accommodate our contemporary trends 
of thought. How can a round lid fittingly cover a square box?
Kings venerated Confucius, not only because he was not a revolutionary, 
but also due to the fact that he carried out a prevailing propaganda beneficial to 
them. They exploited Confucianism in the same way as imperialists are exploit-
ing Christianity.
Confucianism is founded on three cardinal guides, namely [that] the king 
is the guide to his subjects, a father to his children, and a husband to his wife; 
and five constant virtues, namely benevolence, righteousness, courtesy, wisdom, 
and trustworthiness.
Confucius compiled the Spring and Autumn Annals to criticize “rebel-
lious ministers” and “villainous sons,”102 but did not write anything to indict 
the crimes of “evil fathers” and “parochial princes.” In brief, he was obviously a 
speaker who defended the exploiters against the oppressed.
Judged by Confucian teaching, Russia, France, China, the United States, 
and democratic countries are nations in which moral principles are missing, and 
people who rise against the monarch are seditious. If Confucius lived in our 
time, and persistently kept those opinions, he would become a reactionary per-
son. There could also be another possibility that this super-man would be able 
to cope with the situation, and quickly become a loyal inheritor of Lenin.
With the abolition of rituals commemorating Confucius, the Chinese gov-
ernment has dropped an old institution that goes against the spirit of democ-
racy. For us, the Vietnamese, let us perfect ourselves spiritually by reading Con-
fucius’ works, and revolutionarily reading Lenin’s works is a must.
Published in Thanh niên (Youth) newspaper, no. 80 (1927)
Translated [into Vietnamese] from a French translation
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CHAPTER 10
The Ethics of Contingency
Yinyang
Heisook KIM
I n  o r d er  to  u n d er sta n d  how Confucian culture is relevant to a 
changing world cultural order, we must allow this tradition to speak on its own 
terms. That is, we must appeal to its own philosophical vocabulary. The lan-
guage of yinyang is pervasive in Confucian philosophy, from the Yijing in clas-
sical times down to the contemporary New Confucianism. What I want to do 
in this chapter is to bring clarity to this central idea, and then explore its philo-
sophical implications and cultural expressions. The ethics of contingency that I 
try to draw from the doctrine of yinyang would be of significance especially in 
the age of contingency that we are living in.
The concept of yinyang in the East Asian philosophical context has 
worked as a core idea that explains changes, harmony, and unity in both the 
universe and the human world. Originally, yin and yang were two words refer-
ring, respectively, to the dark and to the light. Yin indicated the phenomenon 
of a cloud blocking the sun and yang that of the sun shining. But later they 
were combined to mean a complex quality (a pair of opposites) or function (a 
dialectical movement) of things or phenomena that displayed a dynamic feature 
of the world.
The concept of yinyang as a dialectical principle or as Dao is most per-
spicuously present in the Yijing 易經, or Book of Changes, which has had tre-
mendous influence on Confucianism, ancient and modern. Even though “yin-
yang” is found in Daoist philosophy, the Laozi, and the Zhuangzi, but not in 
the four cardinal Confucian books (Si shu 四書), the Confucian metaphysics 
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and cosmology developed in the Song dynasty cannot be discussed without it. 
Its influence on Confucian culture in general is even greater. The concept of 
yinyang, connected with that of the Five Phases (wuxing 五行) of Fire, Water, 
Wood, Metal, and Earth, has exercised great explanatory power in China since 
the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.) and was widely used among Han Con-
fucians, especially by Dong Zhongshu, for political purposes. Since Song Neo-
Confucianism developed a unique worldview by fully exploiting the Yijing, the 
doctrine of yinyang and wuxing has constituted a basic Confucian philosophi-
cal framework within which natural phenomena and human affairs could be 
explained. Its influence in Confucian culture is so extensive that we cannot fully 
understand its nature without recourse to it. In particular, the concept of yin-
yang defines a special aspect of Confucian reasoning: it is the ability to balance 
between two conflicting opposites through ways that are quite different from 
other ordinary ways of reaching equilibrium and from the way that Western 
dialectical reason works.
As the explanatory force of yinyang has been enormous, the range of its 
use has been wide to the extent that it has covered the areas of metaphysics, 
epistemology, logic, aesthetics, and ethics as denominated by the discipline 
of Western philosophy. The main reason for yinyang having such diverse and 
widespread use is that the history of its use is long and complex, generating mul-
tiple layers of meaning.
Risking oversimplification, I want to divide these layers into three categories.
1. Yinyang as substances. In a Neo-Confucian context, it is used to indicate 
two modes of qi 気. It is also not unusual to find contexts where yinyang 
refers to people or entities like male and female and heaven and earth.
2. Yinyang as the properties of things. It also refers to such properties of 
things as dark-light, soft-hard, feminine-masculine, and low-high.
3. Yinyang as a principle of signification. This refers to a function that gener-
ates contrasts and differences or a principle that makes changes in the 
world.1
For all of these equivocations, there is one essential aspect of yinyang: it is 
always concerned with the cyclic relation and the changing movement between 
contraries or opposites. They keep rotating without cessation. It is the way (dao 
道) in which there is an eternal movement where yin follows yang and yang fol-
lows yin, as in the movement of bending and expanding, and in the change of 
day and night. This relation includes interdependence, in which opposites are 
interfused and intermingled so that they cannot exist on their own even though 
they keep their own identities in the sense that one cannot be reduced to the 
other or be defined by the other. The exact nature of the relation, however, can-
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not be manifested in clear terms or concepts. In the appended remarks of the 
Book of Changes, we find this passage: “The unfathomable in the operation of yin 
and yang is called spirit (shen 神).”2 Throughout the history of the development 
of Confucianism, we may find different types of yinyang relations: (1) There is 
yinyang as a successive relation, where a yin phase follows a yang phase as in an 
ebb and flow. (2) There is yinyang as a simultaneous relation, where yin grows 
and yang shrinks simultaneously. In this type, yin and yang always come together, 
overlap, and interpenetrate. And (3) there is yinyang as a stimulus-response rela-
tion in order to make a unified whole. My concern in this chapter is to think 
about the ethical implication of the principle of yinyang characterized in type 2.
The Superposition of Yinyang and Its Moral Implications
The Book of Changes consists of judgments and comments on sixty-four sym-
bolic hexagrams, each consisting of double trigrams, and each one of these in 
turn consisting of eight trigrams having an iconic relation with an element of 
the universe. One of the governing concepts of the Changes is the intertwin-
ing of yinyang to the effect of yin existing in yang and yang in yin (陰陽錯綜). 
Here, Heaven (qian 乾), earth (kun 坤), water (kan 坎), fire (li 離), wind (xun 
巽), thunder (lei 雷), mountain ( gen 艮), and pond (dui 兌) are considered the 
basic elements of the universe. Each corresponds to a state of affairs or a quality 
such as being lofty, being low, being in adversity, being bright, bending, being 
in action, stopping, and being pleased. This accordingly yields various mean-
ings piling up one upon another. A trigram consists of three lines, divided or 
undivided. The divided line represents yin and the undivided yang. The first, 
third, and fifth lines of a hexagram are considered to take yang positions, and 
the second, fourth, and sixth, yin positions. A divided yin line ( yinyao 陰爻) 
may take either a yang or a yin position. In this way, yin and yang are always 
superposed in a hexagram yielding different judgments depending on the ways 
they are superposed.
The fact that opposites and contraries are always intertwined, interpen-
etrating, and interdependent has an ethical implication of great importance in 
the East Asian cultural context. There is nothing that is one hundred percent 
pure yang or pure yin. The hexagram qian 乾 consists of six yang lines represent-
ing the image of pure yang. But the second, fourth, and sixth lines are located 
in yin positions, which means that yang lines ( yangyao 陽爻) are located in yin 
positions. There is yin force hidden even in qian as pure yang. Even when some-
thing looks like pure yang, it contains a moment that makes the transformation 
of it into the other phase possible. The negative moment penetrating into the 
purity of yang or yin is indispensable for a certain state of affairs to change into 
another phase. Everything categorized as yang or yin contains a moment of its 
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own negation within it to make the alternation possible. All things in the uni-
verse change through the alternation of opposing forces, yin and yang. Every-
thing comes and goes in a cyclic order of the universe. When a state of affairs is 
such that a thing reaches the utmost limit of its development, it is doomed to 
change into the opposite state (i.e., its annihilation). On reaching the utmost 
limit, however, there is already inherent in the thing a seed of downfall at the 
moment of change. The sage is that person who can examine the subtle emer-
gence of the moment and foresee the turning of one phase into the next. The 
moment is so subtle that ordinary men cannot recognize it. The ethics of yin-
yang exhorts people to learn the wisdom of the sage who can see the phase of a 
thing within the process of its changes and thus within the totality of the vicis-
situdes of life. This is the way we understand dao.
A sage is a person who can see the superposition of yin and yang in all phe-
nomena of the universe. By noticing a sign of fall in rising and a sign of rise in 
falling, for instance, a sage can see the superposition of fall and rise. All things 
appear in the twofold yin and yang. As there is neither pure yang nor pure yin, 
there is nothing that is absolutely good or evil in a moral context. Unlike the 
Western philosophical tradition, where one may find the concept of absolute 
substance, or the concept of the highest good (summum bonum), the Confu-
cian tradition does away with the concept of absolute good and absolute evil. In 
the Christian tradition, evil has been posited as the other of the perfect good, 
God. Modern philosophers tend to internalize evil as something deeply rooted 
in human nature. Kant, for example, identified radical evil in human nature as 
the perversion of our will exposed in our desires and inclinations.3 The contem-
porary political philosopher Hannah Arendt observed in her early work The 
Origins of Totalitarianism that radical evil is rooted in some original fault of 
human nature, even though she later claimed the banality of evil.4 But in the 
East Asian Confucian tradition, what counts as evil is the inappropriate mani-
festation of moral feelings and values. Even if the moral feelings represented in 
the four sprouts (si duan 四端) are themselves purely good, they tend toward 
being evil when not being properly utilized. Evil in this context does not have a 
radical feature of being deeply rooted in human nature. In the Confucian con-
text, it is not the case that human feelings and desires are bad on their own 
account. Only when they run against the principle of the middle and the rules 
of propriety do they become evil. But how do we know the middle and what is 
proper in all the variety of human situations?
The Middle as Not Fixed, but Situated
The moral ideal in the ethics of yinyang is not the removal of the bad, as it is 
in Kantian ethics, where one’s moral will is free of desires and inclinations that 
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follow the dictates of a practical reason that is absolutely independent of sense 
experience. As mentioned above, the dao that governs all the changes in the uni-
verse tells us that there is no eternal good or bad. Everything has its own limit 
containing the seed of its downfall. Thus, if you are experiencing bad fortune, 
then it means that good fortune will soon come. If you are on the apex, then you 
have to prepare yourself for the downward road. Even before you arrive at the 
highest point, you should already have prepared for the lowest, because the low-
est is already present in the highest without being seen. By avoiding the ultimate 
and the final, you can control your desires at the proper level. You always have to 
stop before your desire is fully realized. Full realization or perfection is almost 
the same as excess and overflow. Being at the highest simply means being at the 
beginning of falling: the judgment on the top yang in the hexagram Qian runs, 
“ ‘A dragon that overreaches should have cause for regret’: when something is 
at the full, it cannot last long.”5 The position of a noble man is not the top, but 
right below the top (the fifth line).
The principle of the middle, in a Confucian context, tells us to avoid stand-
ing on two ultimate ends of a line in all human situations. To determine the 
middle, we have to examine closely the situation we are in. As everything con-
stantly changes, there cannot be a fixed middle point where the balance between 
the two opposing forces, yin and yang, can be achieved. In accordance with the 
time and position in which one is located, one can determine where the middle 
point is. But it is not easily found. Nor can we depend on our intuition, as may 
be proposed in ethical intuitionism. There is no such thing as a moral intuition 
by which one knows the middle once and for all. Only the wisdom of a sage may 
let us know where the middle is. Wisdom is based on a deep reflection on human 
experience, helping us to attain a fine sensibility that enables us to be in tune with 
the needs of the time and space of a particular situation (shizhong 時中).
Let us think about the example in the Mencius (“Jin Xin I” 盡心章句上, 
26) where the difficulty of taking the middle is mentioned. Taking the middle 
is different from holding just one middle point while disregarding a hundred 
others. It is rather like holding the whole by holding one point, the middle as 
the center point of weight.6
Cheng Yi, in his commentary to the Mencius, says that the middle is the 
most difficult concept to understand, and thus we dare not talk about it but 
rather try to grasp it in quiescence, utterly focused using our inner eye (mo shi 
xin tong 默識心通): “It is most difficult to understand the word zhong (中). 
Thus you should try to know it through your inner mind in silence.”7
The middle is always contextually determined depending on the perspec-
tive one takes. The wisdom of a sage is the wisdom that sees the balancing point 
in the fluctuation of things and the flexibility of truth in human affairs. But this 
wisdom is different from moral intuition, which is a priori given as the wisdom 
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learned through experience and through trial and error. Everything has its own 
middle. It is therefore impossible to grasp the middle in general, or the truth in 
all human affairs, as Cheng Yi tells us:
It is impossible to grasp the middle. If we knew the middle, then we 
would not have to wait to search for the middle in each case of human 
affairs and in every natural phenomenon. If there were a given middle, 
then it is not a real middle.8
To find the middle of something, we have to examine it in its particularity, 
that is, examine the specific situation within which it is located. The middle 
must be determined in each individual case. As a skilled surfer knows how to 
balance at every movement of the waves, so a sage knows how to be attuned to 
the needs of the times in human affairs. As every layperson can learn the skill 
of surfing only by participating in surfing, a common man learns the wisdom 
of the sage through experience. Learning involves knowing how and when to 
advance, to retreat, to preserve, to live, when to gain, and when to lose. Through 
regret and good fortune, one can learn lessons and come to know proper timing 
and the way to refrain from certain actions at inopportune times.
On the surface, Confucian ethics has much in common with moral intu-
itionism. The concepts of Mencius’ four sprouts (si duan) and Wang Yangming’s 
innate knowledge (liangzhi 良知) are often considered to advocate innate or a 
priori moral knowledge. But I think rather that they represent a moral ability 
or disposition inherent in every human being. Moral knowledge in Confucian 
contexts always comes through constant learning and self-cultivation simulat-
ing the wisdom of a sage. It is not a priori or intuitively given but rather is to 
be searched in every moment of our experience by taking care of the moment. 
To attain moral wisdom, it is important to ride the change and transformation 
of affairs, trying to view matters in the totality of unending change. Is this kind 
of ethical position to be assimilated into a situation ethics? In what follows, I 
would like to argue that the ethics of yinyang is not a kind of situation ethics 
that may result in ethical relativism or ethical nihilism.
Keeping Desire Subdued through Concerned Consciousness
It is important to note that the yinyang ethics proposed in a Confucian context 
is not opportunistic, the strong emphasis on timing and the strong blame for 
inopportune choice of action notwithstanding. Situation ethics does not accept 
universal moral principles or values that may hold in every human situation. 
All moral judgments depend on the situation one is located in at the moment 
of action. In contrast, according to Kantian ethics, telling a lie is morally bad 
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in whatever situation one is placed. If everyone tells a lie, then a linguistic dis-
course itself, let alone the everyday communication among people, would not 
be possible. In Kantian ethics, a maxim cannot be a moral rule if it cannot pass 
the test of universality. Kant thought that the first core of morality is universal-
ity, which prescribes that we must all be the same human beings. When one tells 
a lie, therefore, one goes against the principle of humanity. Regardless of the 
situation, certain actions are not to be allowed.
But in the context of yinyang ethics, we cannot make a Kantian judgment 
on the act of telling a lie as such. In certain situations, the act could also be one 
of helping a dying person or saving another person’s life. Moral goodness is not 
something inherent in actions and intentions. It can only be measured in the 
wider context of human actions. There is no fixed rule to define the scale of 
that context. It only depends on one’s own moral sensibility finely developed 
through one’s experience in society. This kind of contextual and situational atti-
tude of yinyang ethics, however, does not result in ethical relativism because in 
all situations one should not take one’s eyes off the dao, moral truth, and rec-
titude. In the ethics of yinyang, there is a strong belief in the way of things and 
the dictates of the inner nature of things. The indeterminacy of the middle only 
shows the subtlety of the way these dictates emerge.
Accepting the contingencies and vicissitudes of life does not necessarily 
lead one to a relativist attitude toward what is valuable and right. A relativist 
believes that there are many ways to be good or right and that it is not possible 
to determine one right way. But the moral attitude advocated in the Book of 
Changes is that of an inquirer ever searching at every turn of life for what is right 
and morally true. The truth is not of relative value. Even though the truth is not 
what we can easily find, being hidden in moving moments of time, it does exist. 
To find the truth, we need wisdom and sensitivity to the manifold of human 
affairs. Wisdom is attained through constant efforts to achieve rectitude and 
propriety. These efforts include learning to take care of what every moment of 
life requires, willingness to rectify faults, and keeping one’s own person through 
all adversities ( jinshen 謹身). Learning through experience with a humble mind 
will show the way to the truth.
To make the proper response in every moment, one has to adopt an alert 
and fearful attitude ( jieju 戒懼) toward the contingencies of life. This attitude 
of caution does not result from calculating the advantages or disadvantages one 
may have from taking a certain course of action. It is the awareness of the con-
tingencies of human lives where nothing lasts long that makes us humble and 
fearful. A yang state contains a yin element, and a yin state a yang element. Let’s 
consider an example of a line statement of the third yang in Qian, that is, the 
top of the lower trigram located just below the upper trigram. Here, yang is in 
its proper position (the third, top being yang elements) but located in the lower 
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trigram, which contains yin force. The statement says, “The noble man makes 
earnest efforts throughout the day, and with evening he still takes care; though 
in danger, he will suffer no blame.” In the “Commentary on the Words of the 
Text,” we find this paraphrased as follows:
The noble man fosters his virtue and cultivates his task. He fosters his 
virtue by being loyal and trustworthy; he keeps his task in hand by culti-
vating his words and establishing his sincerity. A person who understands 
what a maximum point is and fulfills it can take part in the incipiency of 
the moment. A person who understands what a conclusion is and brings 
it about can take part in the preservation of righteousness. . . . Thus when 
he occupies a high position, he is not proud, and when he is in a low posi-
tion, he is not distressed. To be at the top of the lower trigram is still to be 
below the upper trigram.9
Being alert and fearful is a moral attitude commonly exhorted in Confu-
cian texts, and constitutes a core value that differentiates Confucian ethics from 
a situation ethics of a relativist vein. This attitude keeps one from overreaching 
a maximum point and from pursuing the full realization of one’s desire. Con-
cerned consciousness or caution is a precondition under which one searches for 
what is right at the moment of action. It is an attitude that accepts the contin-
gencies of human lives. One who is alert and fearful sincerely pursues rectitude 
and sincerity at the moment of one’s choice of action. This attitude is needed 
to discern subtle changes in the processes of the world. It is not an expression 
of hesitation or oscillation between relative values. Rather, it helps one to find 
truth hidden in myriad moments of time. If one masters this moral attitude 
without losing rectitude in all actions, then one would suffer no blame and no 
regret. Unlike a relativist, who does not believe in a moral truth, a Confucian 
person being alert and fearful strongly believes in the existence of moral truths 
that underlie the moments of time and that are only revealed to searching and 
reflecting minds.
From Personal Morality to Social Ethics
Texts in Confucian ethics are abundant with everyday norms and exemplary 
models mainly focused on building moral character and traits in an individual, 
usually a male noble person ( junzi 君子). They prescribe various ways for a 
person to be a morally right person modeled on a Confucian sage. But the final 
goal in Confucian ethics is not simply the perfection of an individual mind, 
or the fulfillment of virtues allotted to a person in accordance with social and 
familial position, but the common well-being of a wider community. Individual 
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moral fulfillments must converge upon the general well-being and order of a 
society, eventually producing harmony within it.
For example, there is a much cited a passage in the Great Learning to the 
effect mentioned above:
The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world 
would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to 
their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regu-
late their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who 
wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. 
Those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their wills sin-
cere. Those who wished to make their wills sincere would first extend 
their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists in the investiga-
tion of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; 
when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is 
sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life 
is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regu-
lated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when 
the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world.10
In the Confucian tradition, the philosophical and political base of the state 
is the family. As is widely recognized, a state is considered a big family. It is quite 
natural, therefore, that Confucian ethics is much focused on ramifying the role 
of an individual within a family and on analogically extending personal moral-
ity to the public arena. Most fundamental to making a Confucian individual is 
establishing sincerity within that individual’s mind through constant inquiry 
into what is true. I have argued in the previous section that what differenti-
ates Confucian ethics from situation ethics is the keen awareness of the true 
and of rectitude. The emphasis on knowledge is more conspicuous in the Neo- 
Confucian tradition than in the Yangming school.
The political ideal of the nation as a big family no longer serves the con-
temporary world based as it is on principles and laws not known to a traditional 
Confucian society. Confucian ethics nowadays seems to be left within the bound-
ary of an individual life. To develop it into a social or political ethics, we need to 
pay attention to the spirit of the ethics of yinyang as an ethics of contingency that 
sees human civilization in constant change where nothing ever lasts. The ethics of 
contingency, as I have examined in the previous sections, suggests to us that there 
cannot be an eternal winner or loser, and that there cannot be ultimate otherness. 
It tells us that when one phase prevails, the opposite phase will soon follow. To live 
through such an ever-changing world we should continue to be alert and fearful 
without losing rectitude. This attitude is good not only for helping individuals to 
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keep their desires within certain limits, but also for helping the state to attain jus-
tice by keeping it from going to the extreme in making social policies and pursu-
ing relations, political and economic, with other states. All, being interconnected 
and interpenetrating, are under the perennial changes and mutual influences in 
which we move toward an ideal goal of reaching balance and harmony. Based on 
the metaphysics and the ethics of yinyang, we may have to redefine the identity of 
an individual and a nation. We may also envision a world order in which it is the 
correlational and intercultural aspects that are most valued.
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CHAPTER 11
Zhong in the Analects with Insights into Loyalty
Winnie SUNG
T h is  c h a p t er  at t em p ts  to analyze the notion of zhong 忠 in the Ana-
lects. Since zhong is often translated as “loyalty” in the existing literature, it is 
tempting to read Confucius as placing emphasis on the importance of being 
loyal, and this will easily call to mind many negative connotations associated 
with loyalty such as blind submission, ungrounded favoritism, and the erosion 
of integrity. Such a strong association between zhong and loyalty might prevent 
us from fully understanding why zhong is valued. The aims of this chapter are 
to examine Confucius’ use of zhong as recorded in the Analects, to articulate 
the early Confucian conception of zhong, and to extract ethical insights from 
such an early Confucian conception by juxtaposing it against the contemporary 
conception of loyalty.
Zhong is often hailed as one of the cardinal concepts in early Confucian 
ethics. In English translations, the early Confucian term zhong is often rendered 
as “loyalty.” The same tendency is found in modern Chinese translations. For 
example, in his modern Chinese translation of the Analects, Yang Bojun uses 
a seemingly similar modern Chinese expression, zhongxin 忠心, which means 
loyalty, as a modern translation of “zhong.”1 In addition, there is a tendency to 
take the early Confucian conception of zhong to mean loyalty to a ruler. With 
regard to the spread of Confucianism to Japan, scholarly interest in zhong has 
been focused predominantly on loyalty to the emperor or the state and on the 
potential tension between loyalty to the state and filial piety.
If zhong is understood as loyalty, this understanding not only potentially 
conflicts with other ethical attributes, such as filial piety,2 but it also seems to be 
in tension with the early Confucian ethical system as a whole. Loyalty requires 
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one to have a special regard for someone. I give unwavering support to my 
friend, to whom I am loyal, because my friend stands in special relationship to 
me. However, even though early Confucians do emphasize special relationships, 
the ideal seems to be that ethical agents should eventually extend their care to 
everyone.3 The emphasis on loyalty is a prima facie obstacle to the extension of 
care to other people in general. If the focus of zhong is more narrowly on one’s 
loyalty to the ruler or state, there are further problems, such as whether one is 
justified in being loyal to a corrupt ruler or what one should do in practical cases 
where there is a conflict between one’s loyalty and one’s duty to the general pub-
lic. This raises the worry that the Confucian idealization of loyalty is in tension 
with our current global dynamics. Chenyang Li, for example, points out that 
one of the main contemporary challenges faced by Confucianism is pressure 
from liberal-democratic value systems. While Confucianism emphasizes loyalty 
to one’s country and family, liberal democracies tend to emphasize individual 
autonomy and freedom.4
Worries along this line are not unfounded. Indeed, the Confucian notion 
of zhong has evolved throughout the imperial period to mean something ever 
closer to loyalty to the ruler. As we look for resources in early Confucian thought 
that could contribute to resolving our current global predicaments, we certainly 
need to be wary of the failings of Confucianism over its long history. However, 
we should not let our reading of the early Confucian conception of zhong be 
colored by these later developments. As some scholars have already pointed out, 
in the early Confucian texts zhong does not always mean loyalty, especially not 
in texts earlier than the Xunzi.5 What I attempt to do here is not to elaborate on 
the Confucian emphasis on loyalty but to salvage the early Confucian view on 
zhong by clarifying the concept of zhong in the Analects.
As the following analysis will show, if we discard the assumption that 
zhong means “loyalty” in the Analects and try instead to approximate the mean-
ing of the term as it is discussed in the text, we can retrieve valuable insights 
from early Confucian thought that have contemporary relevance. In section 
two below, I seek to approximate what zhong means in the Analects without 
being guided by any contemporary understanding of loyalty. In section three, I 
articulate what I take to be the early Confucian conception of zhong based on 
the textual observations made in section two. In section four, I discuss the ethi-
cal significance of zhong by juxtaposing it with our contemporary conception 
of loyalty. I attempt neither to equate Confucius’ conception of zhong with 
loyalty nor to defend loyalty. Whether or not zhong means loyalty does not 
affect the second and third parts of the present investigation. What matters 
for the fourth part is that we can retrieve some early Confucian insights on a 
psychological attitude that has to do with how we relate to others. This atti-
tude has aspects that overlap with those we find appealing about the notion of 
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loyalty, yet avoids some of the difficulties with the contemporary understand-
ing of and emphasis on loyalty.
Zhong in the Analects
The term zhong appears in sixteen passages in the Analects and is used as either 
an adjective or a noun. As D. C. Lau aptly points out in the introduction to his 
translation of the Analects:
Translators tend to use “loyal” as the sole equivalent for zhong even when 
translating early texts. This is a mistake and is due to a failure to appre-
ciate that the meaning of the word changed in the course of time. In 
the later usage, it is true, zhong tended to mean “loyalty” in the sense of 
“blind devotion.” But this was not its meaning at the time of Confucius.6
Lau himself translated zhong as “doing one’s best” instead of “loyalty.” Since 
the nature of Lau’s work is translation, he did not have the space to go into 
detailed discussion of why “doing one’s best” is more suitable than “loyalty.” 
Nonetheless, his insightful remark certainly suggests the limitation of translat-
ing zhong as “loyalty” and alerts us to do justice to the nuances and complexi-
ties of zhong. The task of this section is to follow up on Lau’s suggestion and 
investigate the usage of zhong in the Analects. There is, of course, a question 
about the extent to which the Analects is an accurate record or representation 
of Confucius’ thought. Indeed, two of the important quotes about zhong come 
from Confucius’ disciple Zeng Can 曾參 (also known as Zengzi 曾子), rather 
than Confucius himself (Analects 1.4, 4.15). Such ambiguity will not greatly 
affect the discussion, and I leave open the possibility that this is not necessarily 
what Confucius himself took zhong to mean. The goal here is to analyze the 
concept of zhong as it is presented in the text of the Analects. For convenience, I 
shall continue to use the name “Confucius” in my discussion to refer to the ideas 
expressed in the Analects.
Three main observations may be made about zhong in the Analects. First, 
zhong has to do with how one engages with others in general. Although later 
scholarship tends to understand zhong as a normative trait that ministers should 
embody or the proper attitude that ministers should have toward their superi-
ors, there is no indication that Confucius thought that zhong pertains specifi-
cally to ministers or any hierarchical relationship. In the Analects there is one 
instance where it is said that ministers should serve the lord with zhong (3.19) 
and another where a minister is described as zhong (5.19). But even in these 
two instances there is no conclusive reason to think that zhong is a specific ethi-
cal trait of ministers or an attitude that someone in a lower hierarchical posi-
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tion should assume toward those who are superior.7 This observation is in line 
with those made by Satō Masayuki, who conducted a detailed textual analysis 
that traces the development of zhong in the Spring and Autumn period and 
argues that the concept of zhong at the time of Confucius broadened from an 
ethical attribute of the leaders to an ethical attribute of individuals in general.8 
A piece of positive evidence suggesting that zhong is about how one relates to 
people in general is Analects 13.19. When Fan Chi asks Confucius about ren, 
Confucius says:
居處恭，執事敬，與人忠。
While at home hold yourself in a respectful attitude; when serving in an 
official capacity be reverent; when dealing with others be zhong.
It is worth nothing that the emphasis in this passage is that one has to be zhong 
in interacting with others or with people in general (ren 人).9 There is no sug-
gestion that one can only be zhong with someone who stands in special relation 
to oneself.
In a similar vein, one of the things Zengzi reflects on daily is whether he 
has failed to be zhong to others:
曾子曰，吾日三省吾身，為人謀，而不忠乎，與朋友交，而不信
乎，傳不習乎。
Zengzi said, “Every day I examine myself on three counts. In my planning 
for others, have I failed to be zhong? In my dealings with my friends have I 
failed to be trustworthy in what I say? Have I failed to practise repeatedly 
what has been passed on to me?”10 (Analects 1.4)
It is said in this passage that Zengzi would frequently reflect on whether he had 
been zhong with people and xin 信 (trustworthy) with friends.11 It is interesting 
to note that Zengzi takes xin to be the appropriate attitude for one’s interact-
ing with friends and zhong the appropriate attitude for one’s interacting with 
people in general (ren 人).12 This suggests that the domain of relationships that 
zhong covers is not restricted to special relationships. Another point made about 
zhong in this passage is that zhong is concerned with planning on others’ behalf.
This leads us to the second observation: zhong in the Analects is intimately 
linked to offering advice. As the passage above suggests, zhong is an idealized 
state in which we mou 謀 for others. Mou in early Chinese texts is often used to 
mean planning strategies, offering advice to others, or giving thoughtful consid-
eration to how to help others deal with a situation.13 The association between 
being zhong and one’s planning for others deserves attention. Indeed, in about 
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a third of the passages where “zhong” appears, zhong is concerned with speech. 
There is hardly any evidence that zhong has to do with doing.14 According to 
Confucius, the superior person always keeps nine things in mind, and one of 
them is zhong in speaking:
君子有九思，視思明，聽思聰，色思溫，貌思恭，言思忠，事思
敬，疑思問，忿思難，見得思義。
There are nine things the gentleman turns his thought to: to seeing 
clearly when he uses his eyes, to hearing acutely when he uses his ears, to 
looking cordial when it comes to his countenance, to appearing respect-
ful when it comes to his demeanor, to being zhong when he speaks, to 
being reverent when he performs his duties, to seeking advice when he is 
in doubt, to the consequences when he is enraged, and to what is right at 
the sight of gain. (Analects 16.10)
The “nine things” identified by Confucius all seem to be concerned with the 
appropriate attitudes one should strive to assume when one finds oneself in any 
of these nine circumstances. For example, in looking at something, one should 
aim at looking at it clearly; in having doubts, one should aim at raising questions.
Similarly, in saying things, Confucius thinks that one should aim at zhong. 
This suggests that zhong is a mental state or attitude toward which one should 
aim when saying things. This impression is further supported by Analects 15.6:
子曰，言忠信，行篤敬，雖蠻貊之邦，行矣，言不忠信，行不篤
敬，雖州里，行乎哉。
The Master said, “If in word you are zhong and xin and indeed single-
minded and reverent, then even in the lands of the barbarians you will 
go forward without obstruction. If you fail to be zhong and xin or to be 
single-minded and reverent in deed, then can you be sure of going for-
ward without obstruction even in your own neighbourhood?”
It is obvious in this passage that both zhong and xin are attributes of speech. 
In addition, Analects 12.23 discusses zhong as the manner in which one should 
offer advice:
子貢問友。子曰，忠告，而善道之，不可則止，無自辱焉。
Zigong asked about how friends should be treated. The Master said, 
“Advise them in a zhong manner and guide them properly, but stop when 
there is no hope of success. Do not ask to be snubbed.”
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An important clue in this passage is the latter part where Confucius says that 
one should stop if there is no hope of success in convincing the friend. This 
implies that zhong advice is not necessarily something that the friend would 
want to listen to.
Commentator He Yan took zhong in this context to mean that one should 
say what it is that is right and what it is that is wrong. His comment is insightful 
and it helps us make better sense of Analects 14.7:
子曰，愛之，能勿勞乎，忠焉，能勿誨乎。
The Master said, “Can you love anyone without making him work hard 
[alternative translation: without working hard]? Can you be zhong with-
out saying something to correct them?15
Confucius’ view here seems to be that if one is zhong toward someone, it is 
inevitable that one would want to say something to instruct and correct them 
(hui 誨). Both passages convey the point that being zhong has to do with telling 
others what is right—at least what the subject deems to be right. Confucius is 
probably aware that the hard truth might not be something that the other side 
can receive very well and therefore says in Analects 12.23 that one should stop if 
the friend does not listen, to avoid possible infringement of propriety.
The third observation is that what motivates one to make this kind of cor-
rective yet potentially irksome advice is a concern for others rather than the self. 
The following passage gives us a glimpse into the kind of person whom Confu-
cius considers as zhong:
子張問曰，令尹子文，三仕為令尹，無喜色，三已之，無慍色，舊
令尹之政，必以告新令尹，何如。子曰，忠矣。
Zizhang asked, “Ling Yin Ziwen gave no appearance of pleasure when he 
was made prime minister three times. Neither did he give any appearance 
of displeasure [yun 慍] when he was removed from office three times. 
He always told his successor what he had done during his term of office. 
What do you think of this?” The Master said, “He can, indeed, be said to 
be a man of zhong.” (Analects 5.19)
Although this passage tells us very little about Ziwen, one striking characteristic 
of him according to this passage is that he is neither pleased nor upset by whether 
he himself holds office. Even when he was removed from office three times, what 
seems to be at the center of his attention is whether the office itself was handed 
over properly, rather than how his own standing was affected. It is worth noting 
that the term that is being used for displeasure here is yun 慍. While yun roughly 
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means feeling irritated or upset, it seems to be a special kind of displeasure that 
arises from one’s thinking that something should not have happened to oneself, 
and one thinks the situation should be rectified. As we can observe from the 
accounts in the Guoyu, a ruler would feel yun when he believes that he has been 
offended and he wants to rectify the situation by going into battle.16
A similar idea is found in Analects 1.1 when it is said that the superior person 
is not yun even when others fail to appreciate him. This suggests that, in Confu-
cius’ view, people will normally yun when they are not recognized, presumably 
because they think they deserve to be recognized. In Analects 5.19, not only did 
Ziwen not show signs of yun; he would even ensure that the office was handed 
over properly so that the next prime minister would know what needed to be 
done. This suggests that Ziwen’s focus was not on whether he was treated the way 
he thought he deserved to be treated but on what would advance the interest of 
the state. This is probably also why he did not show any sign of pleasure when 
he was made prime minister, for what occupied his mind was how he could do 
his job well in order to advance the interest of the state rather than dwelling on 
how the appointment reflected well on himself. This brief account suggests that, 
for Confucius, the state of zhong is one in which the subject is preoccupied with 
considerations of how to advance the interest of others and has bracketed, or at 
least marginalized, considerations of how to advance the subject’s self-interest.
The general shape of these observations on zhong in the Analects is in line 
with the uses of zhong in early texts before and around Confucius’ time. Indeed, 
scholars have noted that zhong is hardly used as a normative concept before the 
Analects. As Qu Wanli notes, there is no mention of zhong in the judgments of 
the hexagrams in the Zhouyi 周易, the Shangshu 尚書, the Shijing 詩經, or the 
Chunqiujing 春秋經.17 This suggests that zhong is not used to describe a con-
cept, or, at the very least, thinkers before Confucius had not paid attention to 
the importance of zhong.18 It is in the Zuozhuan and the Guoyu that we start to 
see relatively more frequent occurrences of zhong. Assuming that the composi-
tion of the Zuozhuan 左傳 and the Guoyu 國語 are roughly contemporaneous 
with the Analects, we may through these two texts get a sense of the linguistic 
context of Confucius’ time.
In the Zuozhuan, zhong is also concerned with a relational attitude that 
one has in one’s interactions with others, and this attitude has the character of 
being objective and looking at the facts of the situation. For example:
所謂道忠於民而信於神也上思利民忠也祝史正辭信也
What I call Dao is being zhong to the people and being truthful [xin] 
to the Spirits. When [the ruler] thinks about benefiting the people, it is 
called zhong; when [the priests’] words are all upright, it is called xin.19
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Here, zhong is characterized as an attitude the ruler assumes when he relates 
to his subjects. This further reinforces the impression that zhong is concerned 
with benefiting, rather than obeying, others. In addition, zhong, as a relational 
attitude, is not restricted to one’s relation to those superior to oneself.
In another instance in the Zuozhuan,
公曰 小大之獄 雖不能察 必以情 對曰忠之屬也可以一戰
[When] the Duke said, “In great and small matters of legal process, even 
though I cannot investigate them thoroughly, I must rely on the facts,” 
[Cao Gui] replied, “This is a type of zhong, [and] with it you can go into 
battle.”20
In Cao Gui’s reply to Duke Zhuang, we again get the impression that zhong is 
taken to mean viewing the situation objectively without being colored by pre-
sumptions or biases.
In the Guoyu, we also see a tight connection between zhong and offering 
thoughtful advice. In “Jinyu” 3, we find the line
不謀而諫不忠
Remonstrating without planning—it is not zhong.
It is clear in this instance that what makes one zhong is not just giving any kind 
of advice. Rather, a zhong subject would need to plan thoughtfully (mou 謀).21 
The thought here is probably that it is not sufficient to credit someone with 
zhong if she just candidly speaks her mind; what is also required is that she has 
to hold herself responsible and be committed to the person with whom she is 
zhong. Since she is committed in such a way, she has to consider carefully the 
different factors at play, put herself in the other person’s shoes, and devise the 
best strategy that she can offer.
Another relevant piece of textual evidence is in “Jinyu” 2:
除闇以應外謂之忠. . . . 今君施其所惡于人，闇不除矣
To remove dimness in order to respond to the external is called 
zhong. . . . Now that the ruler imposes what he dislikes on others, the dim-
ness is not removed.
The metaphor of dimness here suggests that a person who fails to be zhong is 
obscured in a certain way. Whether it is selfish desires or a deficiency in cogni-
tive understanding that is obscuring the subject, when the subject is in such a 
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state of moral obscurity he will impose what he dislikes on others. Interestingly, 
this idea also echoes the parallel between zhong and shu in Analects 4.15:
子曰，參乎，吾道一以貫之。曾子曰，唯。子出，門人問曰，何謂
也。曾子曰，夫子之道，忠恕而已矣。
The Master said, “[Zeng] Can! There is one single thread binding my 
way together.” Zengzi assented. After the Master had gone out, the dis-
ciples asked, “What did he mean?” Zengzi said, “The way of the Master 
consists in zhong and shu. That is all.”
And shu, for Confucius, is about “not imposing on others what you yourself do 
not desire” (15.24). Even though we lack the information here to tell what it is 
that connects the points about being obscured, zhong, and imposing on others, 
we can at least infer that not being zhong and shu is, in some way, to disregard 
the interest of others.
The Early Confucian Conception of Zhong
In the preceding section, I tried to organize Confucius’ ideas about zhong. In 
this section, I shall try to articulate my own interpretation of the early Confu-
cian conception of zhong on the basis of the three textual observations above. 
The goal is to approximate a faithful interpretation of Confucius’ view on 
zhong, but I submit that my discussion of zhong from this point onward might 
depart from the way the early Confucians initially thought about zhong. The 
hope is that we can extract from the textual observations above a line of think-
ing that is of interest to us in contemporary ethical discourse.
If we piece together the three observations about zhong, we start to get the 
picture that zhong is a state of mind in which one interacts with others, most 
often in the context of offering advice. A zhong person is someone who would 
offer this advice or strategic plans, even though she knows quite well that this 
is not something the recipient can comfortably accept. It might be easier for 
her to say something that is conveniently pleasing to the recipient, but a zhong 
person would choose to tell the hard truth because her concern is to advance 
the interest of others instead of her own. She would, of course, still observe the 
basic etiquette and behave with decorum (12.23), but this will not change the 
content of her advice if she sincerely thinks that the advice is right and will do 
the recipient good. If this picture is roughly what Confucius espouses, then we 
can probe further into this conception of zhong by analyzing the nature of zhong 
advice, the objects of zhong, and the motives zhong entails.
Let us first analyze the nature of zhong advice. For convenience, I will label 
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the zhong person as Z and the recipient of the zhong person’s advice R. As we 
have seen, a piece of zhong advice is not necessarily something that would please 
R. But since Z cares about R, she would want to correct the mistake that she sees 
R is making (Analects 14.7) or potentially making. In considering what benefits 
the other, the zhong person’s sole focus is on what is the right thing for R to 
do. The characteristically Confucian assumption operating in the background 
is likely to be that there is a distinction between what is in fact good for the self 
and what satisfies self-regarding desires, and that there is identification between 
what is in fact good for the self and what is in accordance with ethical standards. 
Hence, when I say that Z is one who offers advice that advances R’s interest, I do 
not mean that she tries to satisfy R’s desires or help R obtain whatever it is that 
R wants; instead, I mean Z will try to tell R what is in fact good or, equivalently, 
what is in fact right for R to do. From Z’s point of view, her advice to R is what 
she thinks will in fact advances R’s interest, which is also to say that her advice is 
about what is in fact in accordance with ethical standards.
It is not necessary for Z in fact to be right about what R should do. What 
is necessary is that she tell R what she sincerely believes to be the right thing to 
do. She might in fact be wrong, but it will not affect her being zhong. We can 
imagine a particular cultural setting where it is believed that a woman has to 
be confined to bed for a year after giving birth or else there will be far-ranging 
negative effects on her health. Let us suppose this is a myth. It is possible that 
someone who comes from this cultural setting would advise her friend who has 
just given birth to stay in bed for a year because she sincerely believes that this 
is good for her friend’s health. Even though she is mistaken in this case, she can 
still be considered zhong in offering what she sincerely deems to be the advice 
that accords with the right standards. This is probably why, in Confucius’ view, 
zhong is still short of ren (Analects 5.19, 5.28), for it is still possible that one 
misjudges a situation and imposes bad advice on others.
Paul Goldin suggests that zhong in the Analects conveys the sense of “being 
honest with oneself.”22 It should, however, be emphasized that, in my interpre-
tation, zhong is different from just offering one’s honest opinion. Honesty is 
certainly important here, for I have to say what I take to be the case, but it is 
not the defining feature of zhong. A subject may be required to be honest under 
other ethical constraints; she can also be dictated by her natural temperament 
to say what she thinks is true. However, if she has not put serious thought into 
what furthers the interest of R, honest opinion alone cannot count as zhong 
advice. Zhong has the constraint of good cognitive judgment. Z does not simply 
report true beliefs to R but has to make the effort to work out the various factors 
at play in the situation and form a view about what is best for R.23 The require-
ment for good judgment also implies that the subject must have her own view 
on what the ethical standards are and which ones are applicable in the situation.
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Our analysis so far shows that it is the psychology of having someone’s 
best interest at heart that is constitutive of zhong, and this psychology is often 
instantiated in the context of offering advice. One important feature of being in 
a zhong psychological posture is that the zhong person holds herself responsible 
for others’ well-being. People sometimes undertake responsibilities by publicly 
entering into special relationships, such as politicians assuming duties at office 
and doctors taking patients. In these relationships, there is an external set of 
responsibilities that the subject is required to fulfill. If a doctor fails to advise 
the patient on the best treatment available because of certain self-regarding 
considerations, the patient can accuse the doctor of failing to be zhong because 
the doctor is supposed to be responsible for her health problem. However, it is 
not always the case that our responsibilities for others are clearly and formally 
defined. Coming to see someone as a friend, for example, is often a gradual pro-
cess that is not formalized by a public act.
Also lacking is a set of clearly defined responsibilities between friends. Sup-
pose Z and R are friends. It is conceivable that there are many circumstances 
under which it is ambiguous as to when R can hold it against Z for failing cer-
tain responsibilities and Z herself might well be aware of it. If there is some kind 
of psychology ensuring that Z will still have R’s best interest at heart even if R 
cannot hold her responsible, then this psychology is not R’s holding Z respon-
sible, but Z’s holding herself responsible for R. The upshot of this is that zhong 
does not necessarily require a mutual understanding or acknowledgment of 
the zhong person’s responsibility. It is crucial to being zhong that one hold her-
self responsible and commit herself to promote the best interest of those with 
whom she is zhong. A failure of zhong is when Z fails to deliver on her responsi-
bility, and it is possible that this kind of failure is only known to Z herself. For 
example, I would have failed to be zhong if I had advised my friend not to apply 
for a certain job partly because I myself wanted to apply for the job and saw her 
as a rival. Even if the advice actually turned out to be beneficial to my friend and 
she would never have found out that I had factored in my own selfish interest in 
my planning on her behalf, I would still have failed to be zhong.
Let us now turn to the kind of relationship to which zhong pertains. Recall 
from our first textual observation that the scope of the object of zhong is broad 
and covers other people in general.24 Although there is no textual evidence sug-
gesting that the object of zhong must be someone who stands in special rela-
tion to the subject, there are good reasons to think that, in practice, zhong is 
an attitude that usually pertains to special relationships. This is so because the 
circumstances that call for zhong are likely to be those that involve people with 
whom one is in some kind of special relationship. Suppose I were approached 
by a stranger on the street who happens to ask me for advice on whether she 
should quit her job; I think the intuition here is that I am not in a position to 
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give advice because I do not know her. Hence, in order to be in a position to give 
zhong advice, the zhong person must be in a position where she has adequate 
knowledge of the other person, the circumstances she is in, and the different 
factors at play. In our everyday life, the latter position is usually attained in spe-
cial relationships.
That zhong is more often called for in special relationships further explains 
why zhong is a difficult psychological posture to sustain. Since the interests of 
both parties in a special relationship are so intimately intertwined, it is both 
practically and epistemically more difficult to separate considerations of what 
is good for others from what is good for oneself. Sometimes considerations 
creep in without the subject’s awareness. A finance minister, for example, might 
propose a tax reduction for vehicle purchases. It might be true that such a tax 
reduction is in fact good for the state, but she might have factored into her con-
sideration that this policy would serve her own interest in purchasing a vehicle. 
There could also be cases where the subject is not so blatantly self-serving. From 
an external standpoint, the public might insist that the finance minister take 
advantage of her position to benefit herself, but from the finance minister’s own 
point of view, she might sincerely think that she was only considering what is 
good for the general public.
There are even fussier cases where it is difficult to tell what the subject’s 
intention is from both external and internal standpoints. A parent might know 
the temperament of her child so well that she knows what kind of advice would 
upset the child. It is very likely that this worry about her upsetting the child 
would bias her consideration, and it turns out that the advice she gave is the 
kind that does not upset the child. However, in both cases, from the finance 
minister’s and the parent’s point of view, they might sincerely believe that they 
are offering advice on what is in fact the right thing to do. We do not have to go 
so far as to suppose that there is something like self-deception or unconscious-
ness involved. It can simply be that the interests in special relationships are so 
tightly connected that it is a challenging epistemic task to separate and differen-
tiate considerations of the two.
What will ensure that the zhong subject does not slide into considerations 
of her self-interest, then? It seems that what grounds the zhong subject’s focus 
on others’ welfare is not a cognitive appraisal of the situation, for, as we have 
seen, there are cases where even if one holds herself responsible and is commit-
ted to the welfare of others, her self-interest might be so bound up with that of 
her object that it is genuinely difficult for her to keep track of where one ends 
and another begins. My proposed understanding is that zhong is grounded in 
the subject’s affective concern and care for others, which motivates the subject’s 
entire psychological posture to shift from focusing on the self to focusing on 
others. It is by virtue of this affective concern for others that, even if the subject 
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cannot cognitively discriminate between others’ interests and those of her own, 
her entire attention is directed to others rather than herself. All the consider-
ations and planning that a zhong person undertakes for others occur under a 
guiding light that is directed to others.
This interpretation also has the advantage of explaining the parallel 
between zhong and shu. While shu is about not imposing on others what one 
dislikes, zhong is about helping others to obtain what is good for them. What 
is common between the two notions is that both are grounded in the affective 
concern for others. At first glance, it might be tempting to understand shu as 
grounded in rational reflection. For example, it is convenient for me to shovel 
the snow in front of my house to my neighbor’s side. But on reflection, my 
neighbors might shovel snow to my side, and this is something I would not 
want. However, if I know for certain that what I impose on others will not come 
back to me, what is it that holds me back from taking a free ride? If we take 
seriously the parallel between zhong and shu, a plausible explanation is that it is 
because I care about my neighbor that once I come to see on reflection that this 
is something that I myself will dislike, I would not want to do it to my neighbor. 
The reason I do not want to impose on my neighbor is not that I rationally 
reason that I would not want her to do the same to me but because I have an 
affective concern for her so that I do not want her to go through the feeling of 
discomfort that I would go through if it were imposed on me.
Zhong and Loyalty
In this section, I extract several ethical insights from the early Confucian concep-
tion of zhong outlined above and make it relevant to contemporary interests by 
juxtaposing it with loyalty. I do not want to suggest that zhong is the Confucian 
conception of loyalty. Even if the early Confucians did have in mind a certain 
idealized psychological posture that is akin to loyalty, it is unlikely that such a 
posture is exhausted by the concept of zhong alone. If there is some early Con-
fucian conception of “being loyal” that we can model, such a conception must 
involve a broader cluster of related concepts, such as jing 敬, cheng 誠, zhong 忠, 
yi 義, and xin 信. My limited goal here is to show that zhong partially captures 
in some important ways the psychological terrain of loyalty, and this gives us a 
basis to think that early Confucians still have some important insights to offer 
to present-day discussions. It will also be shown how zhong can avoid some key 
difficulties with our contemporary understanding of and emphasis on loyalty. 
This should help us further appreciate the distinctive insights of early Confucian 
ethics. Since my purpose is to make relevant early Confucian insights to contem-
porary interests, the notion of “loyalty” under consideration is not a technical 
one but a colloquial one. In that regard, a dictionary definition of loyalty should 
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suffice to capture what we mean by “loyalty.” According to the Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary, “loyal” is defined as “giving or showing firm and constant 
support or allegiance to a person or institution.”25 Throughout my discussion of 
“loyalty” below, it is this commonsense view of loyalty that I have in mind.
Loyalty is not an outdated concept. People across cultures still value loyalty 
in many domains of our contemporary life, whether it is the loyalty of a friend, 
of a spouse, of a family member, of an employee, or of a citizen. In modern mul-
tinational corporations, for example, loyalty is still expected from employees. 
However, if the balance between loyalty and duty to public justice is not main-
tained properly, things done in the name of loyalty sometimes have unfortunate 
consequences, with large-scale impact on the public. The Ford Pinto case is an 
example wherein excessive emphasis on loyalty had disastrous consequences.26 
Between 1970 and 1977 there were about five hundred to nine hundred burn 
deaths resulting from explosions of the Ford Pinto model caused by a faulty fuel 
system. Records show that in the pre-production period, engineers had already 
discovered that the gas tank used in the Pinto was unsafe and seriously consid-
ered switching to a different kind of gas tank. However, the loyalty of many 
of these engineers had prevented them from speaking up to the executive vice-
president of Ford or “blowing the whistle.” In another case at the B. F. Goodrich 
plant, engineer Kermit Vandivier handed in a fraudulent report of a new brake 
design for LTV Aerospace Corporation against pressure from his supervisor and 
resigned. The resignation was supposed to take effect a few weeks later, but the 
chief engineer, citing Vandivier’s “disloyalty” to the company, informed Vandi-
vier that he would accept his resignation “right now.”27 In view of the tension 
between the demand of loyalty and the sometimes disastrous consequences that 
result from being loyal, let me briefly highlight how zhong, in three respects, 
preserves the appeal of loyalty and avoids its difficulties.
One prominent feature of loyalty that normally appeals to us is its emphasis 
on special obligations. There is usually a history that we share with people who 
are special to us, and these historical qualities make us think that we have stron-
ger obligations to those who stand in special relationship to us. For instance, 
I have a stronger obligation to support my friend because she is the one who 
stood by me and helped me during a difficult time. There are also circumstances 
under which by entering into special relationships, like getting married, I also 
make a promise always to be supportive to my partner.
Failing to be loyal is also in some ways like breaking a promise. This 
prompts philosophers like Andrew Oldenquist to argue for the moral priority 
of special obligations over universal moral principles.28 But once we take this 
route, there is the problem of grounding special obligations. As William God-
win puts it: “What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my’, that should justify us in 
overturning the decisions of impartial truth?”29 One might adopt an “objective 
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consequentialist” reply along the line suggested by Peter Railton,30 arguing that 
the form of deliberation that puts special relationships first is in fact conducive 
to bringing about the best possible outcomes. An objectivist consequentialist 
should indeed cultivate the trait of being loyal even though traits like this might 
sometimes manifest themselves in acts that do not seek to maximize the good. 
Railton himself gives the example of a couple, Juan and Linda, who live apart.31 
Suppose Juan faces the choice of paying Linda a surprise visit to temporarily 
cheer her up or donating his money for travel to charity. The difficulty with this 
line of thought, however, is that it is unclear how a consequentialist agent can 
identify her consequentialist commitment with an agent-relative commitment. 
It seems that the commitments of the consequentialist agent are, after all, com-
mitments that make reference to the commitment to the best outcome, rather 
than the well-being of a particular person. Even if the objective consequentialist 
is committed to the person, such commitment is still derivative.
By contrast, the notion of zhong preserves the emphasis on special relation-
ships and circumvents the problem of grounding special obligations. Zhong is 
not grounded in special relationships. Instead, zhong is constitutive of special 
relationships.32 If we really are friends, I will necessarily want to take your best 
interest to heart and sincerely tell you what I think is the best thing for you. If 
in offering advice to you I have always factored in my own interest or made sure 
your interest will not conflict with my own, it is questionable if there really is 
a relationship between us as substantial as friendship. Indeed, as I argued in 
the previous section, the early Confucian reply is that there should not be any 
“magic of ‘I’ ” in consideration of zhong at all. What zhong requires is precisely 
that any consideration of “my X” will be out of the picture in one’s delibera-
tion of what is good for others without sliding into consideration of oneself. A 
mother who is a lawyer may advise her child to pursue a career in law as well. 
Whether or not this is a piece of zhong advice does not turn on how well her 
child ends up doing in her career but on whether, when she offered the advice, 
she was only thinking about what is in fact good for the child or was thinking 
that “because she is my child, she has to follow in my footsteps.” The latter kind 
of thought would discount her advice as zhong even if the child turns out to 
enjoy her career in law. Since a zhong person’s regard for others is not further 
defined in terms of a regard for something that is “mine,” she will not let any 
consideration pertaining to herself affect her judgment of what really is good 
for others.
It is precisely because zhong does not focus on the “mine” component, pace 
Oldenquist, that it also extends to non-special relationships. A zhong subject 
holds herself responsible and is committed to looking out for others who are 
related to her by virtue of certain undertakings or social roles in a way that is 
in accordance with ethical standards. This means that the content of a zhong 
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person’s obligations is not derived from special obligations but is derived from 
ethical standards. The obligation of a doctor to work in the best medical inter-
est of her patient, for example, is not derived from the special relationship the 
doctor has with the patient but from the ethical standards to which the doctor 
is subject.33
A second appealing feature of loyalty is the resoluteness or perseverance 
of a loyal subject,34 who will remain committed to her object even when doing 
so might be disadvantageous to her own interest. For many loyal subjects, it is 
not that they do not have alternatives available to them. But because of their 
loyalty, they do not see the alternative options as available to them. Instead, 
they dedicate all their strength and will to serving the interest of their object. 
This resoluteness is especially valuable when a third party potentially rivals the 
object of loyalty, which is most often seen in soldiers’ putting their lives on the 
line to protect their country. It is very tempting to think that there is something 
admirable in how a subject would unwaveringly put her object’s interest above 
her own. The obvious worry with this kind of resoluteness is that it threatens 
integrity. The demand of loyalty might require the subject to willingly compro-
mise or overlook her ethical standards, as we saw with engineers involved in the 
Ford Pinto case. Moreover, since loyalty requires one to follow and support the 
object of loyalty, some form of loyalty might even discourage the subject from 
forming a view about what matters to herself because it is always the object’s 
interest that should be at the forefront of her mind. For example, for centuries 
women were discouraged from thinking for themselves about what matters to 
them because that could potentially conflict with the interest of their husband. 
Hence, in demanding loyalty there is the danger of reducing the subject to a 
servile state in which she has little self-respect.
The early conception of zhong also values resoluteness. One will offer what-
ever advice one sincerely believes is good for others, even if the consequence of 
doing so is costly to oneself. As we saw in the case of Ziwen (Analects 5.19), it 
is possible that a minister’s zhong might result in his removal from office; how-
ever, this will not deter him from saying what he thinks is the right way to safe-
guard the interest of the ruler and the people. And even though Confucius says 
that one should stop advising when there is no hope of success (Analects 12.23), 
it is not far-fetched to surmise that Confucius would think, should the friend 
come back and seek advice again, that the subject would still be required to be 
zhong. Implicit in the notion of zhong is the expectation that the subject her-
self needs to have her own beliefs about and commitment to ethical standards. 
Since the subject sees herself as accountable to others, she will also endeavor to 
form a view of the situation and deliberate about the relevant ethical standards 
at issue. This is also why zhong advice is not just an honest opinion but has to 
be something that is thoroughly thought through by the subject. Hence, what 
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makes a zhong person’s concern for others resolute is her firm commitment to 
observe ethical standards because of the assumption that what is good for one 
must be what is in accord with ethical standards.
The emphasis on a consideration of others’ interests in a way that is inde-
pendent of self-interest in zhong might lead some to worry that the subject’s 
own interest and self-respect are threatened. This worry stems from a confla-
tion of seeing oneself as one factor in the situation and seeing self-interest as the 
objective of one’s consideration. It is possible that the subject’s is one factor at 
play in the situation, in which case she should also take that into consideration. 
When sage Shun married without his father’s permission, he did not do so out 
of self-interest. Rather, he took himself into account when thinking about what 
would further the interest of his father. Since Shun thought it would in fact 
be good for his father if his father had descendants, he felt it would be best 
for himself to get married so that his father could have descendants (Mencius 
4A26). With zhong there is no connotation of obedience, implying that there is 
no requirement in the concept of zhong for the subject to go along blindly with 
the demands of others. If zhong is primarily a mental attitude that concerns how 
we offer advice to others, there is also little reason to think that there can be 
conflicting zhong as in the case of conflicting loyalties. If I am loyal to Team A, 
the nature of my loyalty will prevent me from supporting any team other than 
Team A. But if I am zhong to person X, there is nothing in the structure of zhong 
that prevents me from offering my honest advice to person Y about what I take 
to be right for her. This does not preclude the possibility that there is something 
else in my relationship with X that prevents me from offering zhong advice to Y.
It is interesting to note that, for the early Confucians, the image of the 
zhong subject is almost the exact opposite of the village worthies (Analects 
17.13). While a village worthy is always eager to please her audience so as to 
advance self-interest when she in fact does not have any view that can be called 
her own, the zhong subject is only concerned with thinking about what advances 
her audience’s interest.35 She will carefully form her own view of the situation 
lest her object is obscured and, in voicing her honest opinion when necessary, 
she is willing to risk offending her audience.
The third aspect of loyalty that we normally find appealing is the emotive 
aspect. Josiah Royce poignantly characterizes this aspect of loyalty as follows:
The finding of one’s rest and spiritual fulfillment even in one’s life of toil 
itself—this state is precisely the state of the loyal, in so far as their loyalty 
gets full control of their emotional nature.36
The idea that one’s loyalty is at least supposed to have some grip over one’s 
affective state is implicitly accepted in our everyday understanding. Suppose 
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one claims to be a fan of a certain sports team but never shows any excitement 
or disappointment when the team wins or loses. It is difficult to see how one is 
really loyal to the team, even if one attends every game just as a fan would do. 
Supposing this affective dimension of loyalty to be what makes loyalty valuable, 
it cannot be the particular kind of affective state that can sustain the loyal sub-
ject’s perseverance and devotion.37 At least it cannot be the fleeting or primitive 
kind that directly responds to stimuli in the environment. Then, what causes or 
sustains this kind of ongoing emotional state wherein the subject has “neither 
eyes to see nor tongue to speak” and will serve her object “with all [her] might 
and soul and strength?”38 Royce’s own answer is that if one has the need to glo-
rify oneself it is only by devoting oneself to an object that one sees oneself as 
worthy. However, there is something paradoxical in this line of thought. If the 
starting point built into loyalty is a self-serving one after all, how can we attain 
the kind of wholehearted devotion to the other that is idealized in loyalty?
In a zhong state, even though the way one works toward the interest of 
another is regulated by ethical standards, this kind of psychological posture, 
which requires effort and is demanding to sustain, is grounded in an affective 
concern for others. This is not to say that the emphasis of zhong is affective con-
cern as such. What it means is that the kind of resoluteness and strictness with 
oneself in doing what is ethically appropriate is grounded in affective concern. 
If this is correct, the proposed interpretation of zhong captures the necessity 
of both ren 仁 (benevolence) and yi 義 (propriety) in being zhong. While one 
has to be yi, that is, subjecting oneself to ethical standards, one’s resoluteness in 
subjecting oneself to ethical standards is grounded in ren, an affective concern 
for others.
The question, then, is what causes one to have such affective concern for 
others in the first place. It is at this point that I also lack the textual evidence 
to speculate what Confucius’ answer would be. The following passage perhaps 
gives us a clue:
季康子問使民敬忠以勸，如之何。子曰，臨之以莊，則敬，孝慈，
則忠，舉善而教不能，則勸。
Ji Kangzi asked, “How can one get the common people to be reverent, 
zhong, and to be filled with enthusiasm?” The Master said, “Rule over 
them with dignity and they will be reverent; treat them with kindness 
and they will be zhong; raise the good and instruct those who are back-
ward and they will be filled with enthusiasm.” (Analects 2.20)
Confucius’ response suggests that one’s becoming zhong has to do with treating 
others with kindness. I surmise from this and my early observation about the 
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affective dimension of zhong that, for Confucius, what causes one to be zhong is 
that one is being affected or feels a certain resonance. The subject is jolted into a 
zhong state not only because she values her ethical commitments at a cognitive 
level but also because her heart, so to speak, is moved at an affective level. If this 
is something close to what Confucius had in mind, then an implicit assumption 
or nascent idea underlying his conception of zhong is that human beings are 
beings that have the capacity for affective resonance. It is by virtue of this capac-
ity that we are affected by others’ kindness and thereby develop an affective 
concern that motivates an attitude of zhong.
The preceding analysis has sought to piece together fragments about 
zhong in the Analects and to use these as the basis for articulating an early 
Confucian conception of zhong. I hope I have approximated a picture, even 
if it is not a completely accurate representation of the original, that helps us 
retrieve certain early Confucian ethical insights that are of contemporary 
interest to us.
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CHAPTER 12
Whither Confucius? Whither Philosophy?
Michael NYLAN
B er na r d  W i lli a ms ’  Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy registers two 
important observations: first, that philosophy had better not aim to give an 
account of moral knowledge like that expected in scientific fields, since that 
would be futile and inappropriate; and second, that ethical philosophy is at 
best a particularly imprecise form of philosophizing. Moreover, as Otto Neu-
rath noted, “we repair the ship while we are on the sea.”1 If these observations 
are true, as I believe they are, discussions about the current and possible future 
growth of Confucian studies, here and abroad, had better focus on the specifics 
of present-day practices and beliefs, leaving behind the antiquated and highly 
contentious notions of the Daotong 道統 (“Genealogy of the Way”). With this 
in mind, my chapter is divided into three parts: (1) a brief summary of observa-
tions made by others about contemporary life, which tend to highlight stark 
contrasts between contemporary life and life in the pre-industrial societies that 
gave rise to the early Confucian masters; (2) a summary of the values that we 
can usefully import from early Confucian teachings for adaptation to today’s 
world, East or West, encapsulated in ten words; and (3) a brief consideration of 
motivation in light of a perceived need to make certain early Confucian teach-
ings more appealing to those not conversant with traditions in early China (a 
group that would include many Chinese today). After all, the Shiji 史記 tells us 
that it was Mencius and Xunzi who once made Confucian teachings “sexy and 
appealing” (runse 潤色)2 to the “talking heads” of the fourth and third centuries 
B.C.E., the implication being that it is hardly likely that Confucius would have 
become a household name or “icon” today had they not done so.
The present chapter, in short, attempts to consider this world, a world in 
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an admittedly perilous state, asking how we can move beyond the semi-fictive 
construct that we dub “Confucianism” and the scary calls for “harmony”3 to 
retain some of the best features of the Confucius that we find in the Analects 
and in the writings of his early followers.
Contemporary Life as Exceptional
A number of features sharply distinguish the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries (“contemporary life”) from earlier, pre-industrial eras. Readers 
should note that I will not address many larger aspects of contemporary geo-
political life (e.g., proliferating nuclear arms and the resurgence of backward- 
looking binary models in politics) that philosophy can hardly hope to amelio-
rate.4 I confine my list below to the features of contemporary life that others 
have identified before me and that seem relevant to a discussion about ethics:
1. Contemporary life requires us, as a matter of course, to rely ever more 
substantially on relations and instruments of impersonal trust rather 
than those of personal trust (e.g., email, ATM machines, and Internet 
information).5
2. Contemporary life makes available to each educated person a radically 
expanded set of ethical beliefs, as compared with societies of even a 
century ago.6 Darwin may have sounded one of the first modernist voices 
when he wrote, “Let each man hope and believe what he can.” Certainly, 
I have read the complaints that students (especially those at elite universi-
ties) tend to be smart “sheep” lacking any moral compass,7 but I myself 
see more feasting at an ethical smorgasbord than “careerist zombies.” For 
example, I have Caucasian students who identify their “ultimate concern” 
as Israeli nationalism, Zen Buddhism, atheism, or Sufi-Catholicism.
3. Most of the technologies, slogans, and institutions of contemporary 
life promote isolation and competition between individual persons and 
groups. For instance, the destructive “clash of civilizations” rhetoric bat-
tens on ever-stronger ethnic and cultural identities, as well as deep divi-
sions among sectarian religions. Meanwhile, physical isolation is ensured 
by a host of new technologies such as Facebook and headphones, and is 
then reinforced by the corporate calls for a more “self-reliant” and “flex-
ible” globalized labor market—calls reiterated despite sharply decreasing 
socioeconomic mobility.8 In this our purportedly “ludic century,”9 in 
unwitting defiance of earlier sightings of Homo ludens, institutions of 
group solidarity seem to be fewer and weaker outside the far right, which 
likes megachurches and megastores. Union and professional memberships 
are sharply down, for instance. Up through the mid-twentieth century, 
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concern about neighbors’ opinions exerted a strong influence on personal 
behavior, but there are growing indications that the “international elites” 
(a.k.a. the 1 percent, buttressed by the 10 percent who serve them) iden-
tify far more with the members of their own class than with compatriots 
living in close proximity.10
4. Apparently contemporary life is so sex-drenched that it curiously retains 
many of the anti-carnal sentiments inherited from Platonic idealism, Neo-
platonism, and the Mediterranean monotheisms via Kantian and Marxist 
doctrines. What Roland Barthes, in reifying virtual life, called the new 
“civilization of the image”11 fosters two sorts of conflicting conditions. 
The first can be called “carnal alienation,” opposing the tactile experiences 
of love and friendship in-the-flesh, and the second an incapacity to enjoy 
being well and truly alone. For evidence of “being out of touch with the 
body,” we have only to think of phone sex, pornography-as-substitute sex, 
computerized diagnosis and treatment of illnesses, or remote-controlled 
drone killings. With people never truly in the moment in time and space, 
“the touch screen replaces touch itself. The cosmos shrinks to a private 
monitor, each viewer a disembodied self unto itself.”12 At the same time, 
some experts (e.g., Sherry Turkle at MIT) trace the popularity of these 
demanding “always on, always on you” technologies directly to people’s 
losing their capacity to be alone while increasing their desires for con-
trol.13 Certainly, I know people who cannot sit through a short meal 
without checking their iPhones repeatedly.
5. Ever faster computing is apparently changing the ways that people habitu-
ally interact with one another and analyze materials. As noted in Nico-
las Carr’s The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains, new 
scientific studies now suggest that heavy Internet usage actually reformats 
our neural pathways so as to decrease our attention spans. As of January 
1, 2014, the average American attention span was eight seconds, or one 
second less than that of a goldfish.14 As a result, heavy Internet usage is 
correlated with a stronger desire for speedy results and efficient sound 
bites, which then work harder against our impulses to take the time we 
need for deep reflection or for rewarding long-term commitments.15 
Authentic conversations and companionship (usually messy and invari-
ably time-consuming) are the real losers in this race, as my undergradu-
ates in a recent seminar on friendship remarked.16 One by-product of 
reduced social exchanges may be an increased risk of detaching ourselves 
from other people, and then regarding those outside our immediate circle 
“as less human.”17
6. One early ethical concern was to ascertain the common good, and urge 
people to seek it.18 Contemporary life’s turn to a relentless celebration of 
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“choice”—a concept mainly reduced to consumer choice—is misguided 
on at least two counts: it downplays the role of habit and unthinking 
responses in the construction of personal and social identities,19 and it also 
tends to reduce the exercise of personal freedom to consumer choice.20 
In addition, the well-known phenomenon called “hedonic adaptation” 
usually prevents consumer purchases from leading to feelings of long-term 
well-being.21 Therefore, the freedom to consume is not just partly to blame 
for the environmental degradation we see all around us; it may account as 
well for the growing dissatisfaction with the state of the world, a dissatis-
faction steadily expressed via countless polls since the 1980s.22
7. Nearly all philosophical thinking, in Euro-America and East Asia alike, is 
predicated on the pernicious fiction that people (i.e., people of privilege, 
those thought to truly “count”) are autonomous, rational individuals 
capable of identifying and reforming their own conditions by sheer acts 
of will (—the old Unmoved Mover resurfaces). The language of “human 
rights” consistently argues that all people and nations should aspire to 
realize this condition of legal autonomy,23 despite the obvious fact that 
this construction ignores many, if not most, present-day realities. Neu-
roscientific findings on “free will”24 problematize the very notion of 
“agency,”25 for example. In addition, as Joseph E. Stiglitz has pointed out, 
“[Legal] justice has become a commodity, affordable only to the very 
few.”26 For these and other reasons, more ethicists are turning to consider 
the roles played by the emotions, including self-regard, in shaping percep-
tions and modes of existence,27 while querying the hard-and-fast dichoto-
mies dividing the cognitive and evaluative impulses,28 though their work 
seldom has an impact on the public discourse.
Taken together, such “acids of modernity” are having a predictably corro-
sive effect on human relations.29 Amelioration may be possible, but what forms 
should it take? Many used to the daily specters, if not the actual experience of 
violence,30 suspect that the highest present good may simply be to be left alone, 
in the company of family and friends, to live at peace.31 But the documentary 
film Citizen Four should remind us that we are not left alone; privacy is dead. 
And what is it about contemporary life that has left us begging for a mere non-
aggression pact when humanity as Homo faber is capable of so much more?32
These are ethical questions not amenable to quick or certain solutions. 
There are precedents, however, as Bernard Williams remarked, for treating a 
philosophical account “as a destination not a route.”33 We might benefit from a 
few signposts rather than the imposition of extra rules, since all of us are finite, 
embodied, and historically situated agents, whose rational faculties employed 
in cost-benefit analyses seldom offer much guidance, given how frequently we 
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act on auto-pilot, operate purely by habit, and try to maneuver through a web 
of obligations ringed round with emotions. I will argue below that the Ancients 
have provided us with a series of signposts in the form of “practical wisdom.”
The Utility of the Ancients
For some time now, I have been thoroughly convinced that the Ancients have 
things to teach about what it means to be human, in large part because they 
inhabited a world that was less ruled by arid abstractions and also more cogni-
zant of the need to depend upon long-term personal exchanges and commit-
ments. They “saw things differently than we do—or rather, they saw different 
things,” as one historian of early Rome put it.34 I like to cite Bernard Williams’ 
Shame and Necessity in this connection, where Williams is talking of the Ancient 
Greeks instead of the early Chinese thinkers:
The ethical thought . . . [of these early thinkers discussed here] was not 
only different from most modern thought, particularly modern thought 
influenced by Christianity; it was also in much better shape . . . since this 
system of ideas basically lacks the concept of morality altogether, in the 
sense of a class of reasons or demands which are vitally different from other 
kinds of reason or demand. . . . Relatedly, . . . the questions of how one’s 
relations to others are to be regulated, both in the context of society and 
more privately, are not detached from questions about the kind of life it 
is worth living. . . .35
Needless to say, the erection of strict barriers between moral and practical rea-
sons in contemporary discourse, far from elevating the work of universities 
and ethicists, has made it that much easier to dismiss careful investigation into 
the human condition as either hopelessly “reality-based” (and hence lacking in 
moral fire or political swagger)36 or the sorry product of “ivory tower” idealists 
who couldn’t think their way out of a paper bag in real life. When citing Wil-
liams, I often recall Herbert Fingarette’s first paragraph in his classic Confucius: 
The Secular as Sacred:
Increasingly, I have become convinced that Confucius can be a teacher to 
us today—a major teacher, not one who merely gives us a slightly exotic 
perspective on the ideas already current. He tells us things not being said 
elsewhere; things needing to be said. He has a new lesson to teach.37
History and philosophy should let the dead live again on their own terms, 
as much as possible, so that we moderns may benefit from better acquaintance 
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with unfamiliar thoughts.38 But there are major flaws with Greek thought and 
its Western successors, especially those of the Kantian and neo-Kantian sort. 
Doubtless we can all name features of earlier societies that we would prefer not 
to emulate: the enslavement of human beings, the casual oppression of women 
and homosexuals, the resort to superstition, and so on.39 More subtle is the 
propensity of Greek and later Western thought to be “incurably egoistic” (i.e., 
narrowly preoccupied with the inner life of the presumed self ).40 Furthermore, 
most Western philosophy identifies two main motivations for action (the pur-
suit of pleasure and the grim acceptance of duty), in the rather naive belief that 
moving beyond perceived self-interest will make it much easier to reconcile self 
and society.41 A close comparison of early Greek with early Chinese thought 
illustrates the virtues of the Chinese thinkers: they are not “incurably egois-
tic”; they stipulate far less about the world and its inhabitants, they are inclined 
to distrust arid abstractions claiming universal applicability,42 and ultimately, 
in elevating the Middle Way, they require less of the person while nonetheless 
upholding strict standards for “civilized” conduct. If philosophy is the thera-
peutic examination of belief and action (in the old sense),43 then greater resort 
to early Chinese modes of thinking may well be a salutary exercise for all of us.
Please understand: I am no wild-eyed romantic railing against a loss of 
community or tradition, content to shill for Confucian learning in the hopes 
that blind adherence to older forms will miraculously usher in a “return” to an 
idealized past that never existed.44 Rather I am a hardheaded historian who 
is acutely aware of the dangerous propensity to retroject anachronisms into 
presentist readings of history.45 But I confess that cataloging a huge range of 
invented traditions has led me to wonder whether contemporary life might not 
profit from the selective reinvention of a few traditions designed to counter the 
motley (when not positively murderous) traditions we have inherited. Are we 
not enjoined, as ethical people of some imagination, to “warm up the old” (wen 
gu 溫故)? Our job is to ask not only “How are we to live?” (that being, of course, 
the question posed by Socrates and Confucius), but also “How are we to live 
so as to be more alive?”46 Like the Ancients whom I study, I seek a design of 
life (not wholly “rational”) that would reduce the power of fortune and fate 
through maximal appreciation for hard work in service of communal goods, the 
sort of life that would help myself and others from being “enslaved by things.”47
Older wisdom texts are in general agreement that an ethical life begins 
with moving beyond narrow self-interest. As one contemporary thinker sum-
marizes it:
Imagine that each of us lives at the center of a set of concentric circles, the 
nearest being our own self, the furthest being the entire universe of living 
creatures. The task of our moral development is to move the circles pro-
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gressively closer to the center, so that we regard our parents and children 
like ourselves, our other relatives like our parents, and strangers like our 
relatives.48
Noting that “we are least like anything else in the world when we do not treat 
each other like physical objects, as animals, or even as sub-human creatures to 
be driven, threatened, forced, maneuvered,” Fingarette skillfully argues that we 
are conversely most sublimely and supremely human whenever we fuse personal 
presence to “(learned) ceremonial skill,” making ceremonial acts “the primary, 
irreducible events” constituting our memorable experiences.
In that spirit, I volunteer two early slogans as signposts for contempo-
rary life, slogans associated with the early Confucian teachings and with the 
Zhuangzi, a work in critical engagement with those same teachings. The two 
signposts are “Know what is enough” (zhi zu 知足) and “Treat [others] as hon-
ored guests” (ru jian da bin 如見大賓). The first slogan is typically (mis)labeled 
as Daoist, since it occurs in both the Laozi and the Zhuangzi; however, the 
Xunzi, the Zhouli, and the Kongcongzi use the exact same phrase in the same 
way, so this two-character phrase in classical Chinese is better characterized as 
prevailing “wisdom talk.”49 Likewise, the second slogan, best known from Ana-
lects 12.2, does not belong solely to any particular group. In several pre-Han and 
Han texts, including the Lunheng 論衡, exemplary figures are said to epitomize 
this or closely allied notions, this being the best possible way to “pay due heed 
to and communicate with others” ( jing tong ren 敬通人), based on their knowl-
edge of past and present social practices.50 Helpfully, the second slogan is paired 
with a parallel injunction in the same Analects passage; the injunction equally 
enjoins members of the governing elite to demonstrate their care for “those 
below”: “Employ the people [as carefully] as if officiating at a solemn sacrifice” 
(shi min ru cheng da ji 使民如承大祭).51 Rough equivalents for these slogans 
could be found, no doubt, in many different parts of the world in their distinc-
tive “wisdom books,” suggesting that they can shed a kind of “global radiance,” 
provoking deeper reflection,52 without getting hopelessly mired in arguments 
over the so-called “universal principles” masking neoliberal and statist agendas.
“Learning by subtraction” (as in “Know what is enough”) can serve citizens 
of postmodern societies touting “choice” as the highest freedom.53 For if “it is 
the vice of the vulgar mind to be thrilled by bigness,” contemporary society is 
stupendously vulgar. Whether we would address environmental degradation 
and global warming or protest the serene self-righteousness displayed by our 
most flagrantly corrupt organizations and leaders,54 the mere repetition of this 
mantra may create a distaste for “more is better” and “shop ’til you drop.” The 
same phrase, meanwhile, undercuts the emerging world of virtual reality “rife 
with delusions of omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence,”55 insofar as it 
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reminds us to identify our real needs as human beings, among them the need to 
be loved and physically touched and to maintain a measure of dignity.
As the advantages of “Know what is enough” seem unmistakable, let me 
tarry a bit longer on the second slogan, which urges us to treat others as hon-
ored guests, a slogan redolent with antique notions of hospitality and sanctu-
ary. One line after another of the Analects reiterates some variation on this set 
of injunctions, which leads me to see this extension of exquisite courtesies to 
the lowly among us as the central task for any would-be Confucian,56 then or 
now. We have all heard of the Golden Rule, but Confucius asks both less and 
more of us here.57 On the one hand, we are not expected to love others as our-
selves (something that may be quite impossible for those not graced with special 
gifts). On the other, we are enjoined to consider what words and gestures we 
find humiliating, demeaning, and condescending, and then avoid using those 
words and gestures with others. More pro-actively, we are instructed to treat 
others with the same exquisite courtesy we would render recognized dignitar-
ies. This standard asks us not only to meet, but also to anticipate the needs of 
others, as we would happily do for important guests due to visit. It requires 
recurrently asking others what they would prefer, rather than presuming what 
they deserve and merit. When successful, this highly ritualized performance 
conveys via complex gestures a temporary self-effacement meant to honor the 
engrossing importance of another; thus it balances an acute awareness of one’s 
own person in relation to the visitor(s) with a willing displacement of conscious 
focus on oneself.58 It moreover asks us to regard those who are in our power as 
if they were a higher power, without conceding to worldly powers any power to 
harm ourselves or others.
But let us not ignore the flipside: to receive a dignitary well places the host 
in the gratifying role of the person conferring hospitality. The miracle is that 
somehow the great dignity residing in the one can be shared with another, with 
no diminution to either party. For hospitality given and acknowledged valorizes 
both sides’ implicit claims to worth.59
Unless the host is blessed with stupendous luck, however, easy and affable 
treatment of the guest presupposes the host’s prior acculturation to a range of 
enlivening sociable exchanges. Long before the guest arrives, she must, as if by 
instinct, have learned the art of “reading” people, even strangers. And there is 
more: she must evince a readiness to change course when advisable, in a kind of 
free-form, improvisational fugue or dance.60 As with any art form, the course of 
training for a virtuoso performance is long and arduous; after all, by the moral 
mandate, the host does nothing less than open herself to fully experiencing the 
presence of another person (followed by another and another), equipped with 
the social insights and practices culled over time.61 The ultimate goal: a kind 
of fluency that lends the mundane a sort of magic, thereby reacquainting us 
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with the ordinary mysteries of life. Yet no part of this set of injunctions dic-
tates a particular religious, philosophical, or patriotic creed about this life or 
the next; every part of it hearkens to local practices and individual idiosyncra-
sies.62 Even to pose the question “what is enough?” is, like acting hospitably, to 
firmly refuse to subscribe to one or more universal rules, in that suitable adjust-
ments will continually have to be made to assess “what is enough” and “goodly” 
under changing circumstances. Most importantly, perhaps, learning to aim for 
this set of injunctions moves us firmly away from the “main aspects of modern 
 identity—that is, liberty, autonomy, . . . and . . . the subject’s self-positioning or 
rational self-determination.”63
There is no reliable way to calculate the long-term consequences of our 
actions, however well intended, nor can reason, custom, or experience resolve 
many puzzles of human existence.64 I am willing to live with the Mystery.65 Yet 
it is best to be as precise as possible when we talk, and speaking of “dignity” 
rather than “justice” seems a vast improvement, since no two figures in my read-
ings in philosophy and history have ever arrived at a shared notion of justice. 
Some equate “justice” with utilitarianism and others with communitarianism, 
libertarianism, or God’s will.66 As one smart philosopher put it: “Justice is ines-
capably judgmental . . . an open invitation to narrow, intolerant moralisms.”67 By 
contrast, we all have a fairly good sense of what constitutes the sort of treatment 
we would accord dignitaries, those deemed to have dignity. Dignity is hard to 
make into an abstract quality, and therein lies its attraction for me as a ground-
ing for life. I note in this connection that Wittgenstein’s description of the ethi-
cal/religious is “a sense that we are absolutely safe.”68 Having members of a com-
munity preserve our human dignity—that’s as close to paradise on earth as we 
are likely to get.
The legends about Confucius would have us understand that Confucius 
goes to his death believing himself a miserable failure, but ultimately he is hailed 
as an uncrowned king (and in some texts a virtual god), for his remarkable ability 
to turn personal misfortunes into blessings for others. If the main thrust of the 
Confucian Analects throughout remains the human imperative to accord others 
the same dose of dignity that we would gladly impart to an honored guest, the 
life of Confucius suggests that we may sometimes have to set aside our physical 
comforts and our most cherished mental constructs in order to clear a space 
wherein we may better observe the needs of others. As the Analects makes plain, 
we must not only adopt this way of operating in the world but make it a habit 
before we can possibly see any benefits accruing from this ritualized mode of 
operation. We must try it as an act of faith, in other words. The promise is that 
we are then likely to learn to feel at home in our own skins in our daily rounds. 
We may then derive pleasure (le 樂) from living in the simplest circumstances 
(Analects 6.11, 7.16), from seeking wisdom and acting compassionately (6.23), 
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and from visits paid by friends and peers (1.1), all in the serene confidence that 
“to find it [this way] a pleasure is better than to know it or prefer it” (6.20), 
since secure “pleasure need not be licentious or [to] go to excess” (3.20). The 
early Confucian masters assure us that greater human happiness is to be found 
in connecting, communicating, and sharing than in gaining or asserting power 
over others. In doing so, they supply models for continual engagement with the 
world, rather than urging a hasty retreat from it.
I was deeply moved when reading one op-ed writer’s recent summation of 
her “thought processes” in her younger days:
You do things you regret or don’t understand and then you make other 
choices because life keeps going forward. Or you do something out of 
love and then, through biology or accident, it goes inexplicably wrong, 
and you do what you can to cope. Or you do whatever you do, however 
you do it, for whatever reasons, because that’s your experience.69
Doubtless, some people will deplore the lack of self-knowledge expressed here, 
but to me, at any rate, this looks a lot like life, and not even a particularly bad or 
unreflective sort of life. In A Room of One’s Own, Virginia Woolf commented: 
“Life for both sexes . . . is arduous, difficult, a perpetual struggle”; “it calls for 
gigantic courage and strength,” yet we usually go around “snubbed, slapped, lec-
tured, and exhorted.” To maintain courage in the face of this muddle, the key 
thing may be just to keep the image of our common (if failed) humanity front 
and center before us, refusing to go to a place where we grow numb.70 To that 
end, I read and reread this set of questions posed in early China:
In our world, is there such a thing as supreme pleasure or is there not? 
Is there something that may be used to make ourselves more alive or 
not?71 In the present times, how are we to act? How are we to make a 
basis? . . . What are we to take pleasure in and what are we to deplore?72
This set of questions reminds us that a good life must bespeak plenitude (a 
“richness”), that boils down less to material resources and more to a life open to 
encounter new experiences every single day, thanks to a more capacious regard 
for the world.
Moral philosophy invites a second look at the early Chinese thinkers, who 
go beyond a few guideposts to speak of the sorts of human institutions that 
promote the “most alive” forms of being and acting, producing pleasures great 
and small. If we are looking for something that may help us find our way around, 
everyday experience usually suffices to reveal a startling amount of information 
that we need to know about ourselves and the world we inhabit, if we are to 
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act wisely and well, even if that information is not liable to objective proof.73 
And, as a recent psychology experiment has shown, the only sure indicator of 
what we ourselves will end up doing in a particular moral dilemma is what we 
presume others in our community would do in precisely the same situation.74 
In short, if I wish to act well, I must conceive of the possibility that others will 
act well and then act upon that conception. (This is precisely what one Chi-
nese Classic, the Shujing 書經 or Documents, advises.) But that is not all: I must 
know the members of my community well enough to be able to visualize what 
actions others might take in similar situations. Should I manage that, it should 
be less difficult to conceive of the potential benefits—intangible and unseen, as 
well as tangible—of cooperating with others, while conceding, too, that occa-
sional feeling of being deceived or disappointed in others. That concession may 
be reckoned a small price to pay for the possibility of transfiguration, a sort 
of “rent” for living fully,75 so that one is primed (“heartened” if you will) to 
embrace the rigors of contemporary life.
Confucian Teachings and Their Appeal
Confidence in our ability to improve contemporary conditions is half the bat-
tle. But, as Bernard Williams notes, “Confidence [in an ethical decision] . . . is 
basically a social phenomenon.” He means, in general, that confidence relies 
on social confirmation; a society’s support for a person’s attitude tends to make 
him or her more conscious of holding certain convictions. Williams continues:
Philosophy cannot tell us how to bring it [confidence in an ethical con-
viction] about. It is a social and psychological question what kinds of 
institutions, upbringing, and public discourse help to foster it.76
Williams may be right, but he then concludes—quite wrongly, I feel—that the 
business of philosophy is not to consider social and psychological questions, 
and hence not to think further about institutions. Apparently, he wishes for 
philosophy today to preserve or even harden its current conventional academic 
boundaries. I dearly wish, in return, to ask him why, for it seems to me that 
philosophy has been proposing social and psychological institutions for millen-
nia now, at least since Plato and Confucius. How could an abnegation of our 
responsibility to plan for our own and future generations possibly lead to better 
philosophy? Surely the job of philosophy is to map, then ruminate upon, the 
many ways that human beings have sought to be human.
So, pace Williams, I feel we should be asking, “What mix of motives, 
instrumental and non-instrumental, is most likely to propel people to perform 
their tasks constructively and well, without summoning inadvertent disasters?” 
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A recent set of studies suggests that efforts to promote constructive activities 
should focus on the meaning and potential impact of these initiatives, rather 
than on their connection with conventional markers of “success,” if we are to 
ensure good and lasting outcomes.77 Xunzi made the same point centuries ago, 
in the essay “On Ritual,”78 where he insisted that ritual shapes and channels 
people’s disparate longings within a larger symbolic system that creates mean-
ing. Yet too many self-styled Confucians today have forgotten what both Men-
cius and Xunzi knew: that people living on the margin of subsistence cannot be 
expected to be good candidates for moral development, and people rightly seek 
satisfaction in their social relations and in their work.
Were I in a position of power, such attention to economic and environ-
mental conditions would require me to consider giving out cash grants to the 
poor, so as to ensure their minimum standard of living. Certainly this would be 
cheaper than our current patchwork of “social safety nets”—and nineteen major 
studies agree: only a very small proportion of the poor will waste the money 
(especially if women are the targeted recipients). If we let the poor “eat cash,” 
then alcohol and tobacco consumption falls or stays the same, while drug coun-
seling and anger management programs fare better. Why? People need food 
security if they are to feel that they merit other people’s warm regard.79 And, as 
Mencius bluntly puts it, “It is not worth the trouble talking to a man who has no 
respect for himself . . . or confidence in himself ” (4A1).80
Mencius and Xunzi made Confucian teachings more glossy and appeal-
ing to a wide range of thinkers in a second way: both of these thinkers went 
far beyond the earlier teachings ascribed to Confucius to elaborate the plea-
sures that rest upon establishing a secure place in close communities. Book 1 of 
the Mencius details the conversation between Mencius and King Hui of Liang, 
where the King is asked to conceive of the pleasures that will accrue once he 
rests secure in the allegiance of his own subjects. A lesser moralist might have 
been inclined to score points by labeling the desires of this powerful man as 
flaws, faults, weaknesses, and shortcomings ( ji 疾). Mencius tries quite another 
tactic: he focuses upon the common human desire to be held in high esteem, 
insisting that “all people share the same desire to be exalted,” to be held in high 
regard in one’s own estimation and in that of others. Nonetheless people often 
fail to appreciate the fact that every person has the wherewithal within the self 
to be exalted (6A17).81 But so long as the person believes himself to be capa-
ble of acting morally, Mencius says, this basic compulsion to be admired can 
motivate constructive social action. So whenever power-holders seem unaware 
of their potential to become authoritative figures, they are to be given better 
teachers (6A9).82 Reasoning in much the same way, Xunzi famously articulates 
the view that the fundamental human desires are not obstructions to morality, 
but rather the bedrock of morality.83 Far from endorsing the popular slogans 
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“reduce desires” (shao yu 少欲) or “eliminate desires” (wu yu 無欲), Xunzi argues 
that (a) desires are what people have, (b) desires make the world go around, and 
(c) wise policy-makers use these two facts to devise better institutions of gov-
ernance and compelling models of cultivation (i.e., self-governance). These, in 
turn, ultimately promote the satisfaction of all bodies (and so the body politic 
itself ), with the result that the imperial subjects eagerly learn to “manage their 
lives and their means of living” (zhi sheng chan 治生產).84
In the expansive view informed by Mencius and Xunzi, good governments 
utilize any and all methods that make it markedly easier to rule well—wanting 
good governance to be as easy as the proverbial “reeling in like skeins of silk,” 
as natural as “the spokes of a wheel hub converging on the hub.” The writings 
ascribed to Mencius and Xunzi, not coincidentally, share an unremitting focus 
on institutional matters, with both thinkers assuming that personal morality, 
with rare exceptions, can never be sustained for long in the absence of institu-
tional props. Sumptuary regulations and regular community rituals (e.g., com-
munity banquets and well-defined marriage and mourning practices) are but 
two of the institutions they pushed to encourage the development of the basic 
sociable habits upon which super-civilization is to be built. I doubt that the 
United States will ever establish anything like sumptuary regulations, but that 
kind of willingness to countenance powerful destructive behavior may feed the 
Gordon Gekkos of this world.85 So it is well worth asking, “What features of 
our current tax code truly benefit society by inducing real contributions to it?”86 
Put another way, what message does it send to society-at-large when Scientol-
ogy, Princeton University, and charities set up for cats all get equal tax deduc-
tions under our code?
The early classicists and Confucians in China showed exceptional clarity in 
three areas: they insisted that economic security is a necessary, if not sufficient, 
condition for building good character,87 they carefully delineated the pleasures 
to be had from living in more secure communities, and they urged reward struc-
tures to be put in place so as to encourage people to make more constructive 
contributions to their neighbors and peers, not to mention future generations. 
If the early Chinese thinkers exhibited such practical wisdom millennia ago, 
then one may well ask, “Why is it that Chinese thought and Chinese institu-
tions have received such unrelentingly bad press in modern times?” Anthropol-
ogist Jack Goody offers a forceful analysis in his recent book The Theft of His-
tory.88 According to Goody, long ago, in colonial days, Northern Europe and the 
United States gained the upper hand in discussions about human development, 
thanks to the master narrative of “Western civilization” (a shape-shifting siren, 
if ever there was one), so much so that, regardless of whether the discourse is 
Orientalizing or self-Orientalizing,89 Euro-America is now credited with play-
ing the central role in the evolution of all manner of desirable goods, ranging 
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from “democracy” and “humanism” to, most astonishingly, “antiquity” itself. 
Consequently there is little left for China to claim but perceived “lacks” or “fail-
ures.” Then, too, the spectacularly bad behavior of certain Chinese elites may 
have deterred those unfamiliar with Confucian ideas from undertaking quiet 
study of the good advice proffered by wise men long ago in China. That said, no 
time or place is ever free of cheats and sycophants and connivers.
In any case, that would be a discussion for another day. I cannot do better 
than end on a poem by a Han dynasty poet, Cui Yuan 崔瑗 (77–142 C.E.), that 
encapsulates some of the foregoing themes in a supremely artful way:
One must not speak of others’ faults,
 Nor of one’s own strengths.
If you offer someone something, forget it later on.
 If someone offers you something, never forget it!
A reputation is not worth envying in another.
 Only ren (humankindness) should become your rule and frame,
Keep your person in the shadows, and then act.
 Then how can slander and talk ever really harm you? . . .
So long as all your actions be as constant as the day is long,
 You will find yourself forever sweetly perfumed.
無道人之短。 無說己之長
施人慎勿念。 受施慎勿忘
世譽不足慕。唯仁為紀綱。
隱身而後動。謗議庸何傷？ . . .
行之苟有恆。久久自芬芳。
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CHAPTER 13
Euro-Japanese Universalism, Korean Confucianism, 
and Aesthetic Communities
Wonsuk CHANG
The Advent of European-Japanese Universalism  
since the Nineteenth Century
During the nineteenth century, core Western countries such as Great Britain, 
Germany, France, and Russia began to penetrate into East Asia, and the tradi-
tional East Asian tributary system centered on China was challenged. The con-
sequence of war between Great Britain/France and China in the years between 
1839 and 1860 demonstrated the ineluctable dominance of the main European 
powers over China.
It is interesting to note that until the eighteenth century Chinese civiliza-
tion had served Europe as a model to be emulated, or at worst as a rival. China 
had a lingua franca, a centralized bureaucratic system, and sophisticated phi-
losophies in the form of Confucianism and Buddhism. Yet suddenly, from the 
nineteenth century on, Chinese civilization came to seem increasingly ossified, 
straddled by serious and inherent defects that could only be remedied through 
the tutelage of Western modernity.
The images and the knowledge of East Asia produced by key Western 
countries in the course of the nineteenth century were based on a simple prem-
ise. Everything that had occurred to put Western countries in their current 
position had been inevitable, progressive, civilized, and universal; this included 
ideas and movements such as the rise of capitalism, liberal democracy, and the 
development of the natural sciences and industrialization. At the same time, 
whatever resisted these forces was feudal, barbaric, reactionary, and backward.
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What is distinctive in this era in East Asia is the role of Japan as a late colo-
nizer. In the wake of Perry’s expedition to Japan, during the period 1868–1912, 
and under the slogan of “enrich the country, strengthen the military” ( fukoku 
kyōhei 富國强兵), Japan transformed itself along the Western model of the 
aggressive nation-state. As a late colonizer, Japan presented two faces: inferior-
ity regarding Western domination and superiority vis-à-vis its Asian neighbors. 
Japan defined itself as a paradox, part of a larger community of oppressed Asian 
nations standing against Western hegemony, while also being the most West-
ernized, civilized country among Asian nations.
As a late colonizer, Japan began to develop a knowledge of Korean Con-
fucianism from both of these perspectives. Korean Confucianism was seen as 
the main source of Korea’s backwardness: Korea was destined to fall because 
of its preoccupation with pedantic and unproductive debates, ignorance of the 
state of the people’s welfare, and blind dependence upon the Zhu Xi school of 
Confucianism that was followed by the Korean literati. At the same time, Japan 
was developing a “Pan-Asian” theory of culture regarding the “yellow race” on 
the basis of which Japan claimed the exclusive right and “burden” to intervene 
in Asian countries. As an Asian country that had successfully adjusted to the 
Western model of an aggressive nation-state, Japan began to cultivate a kind 
of European-Japanese universalism, nurtured in the soil of racism and Pan-
Asianism, and to introduce it into the neighboring cultures, including Korea, 
where it was combined with local Confucian beliefs and practices. In this way 
Japan was able to introduce European universalism along with selected elements 
of the Japanese tradition, including Japanese Confucianism, especially the 
Wang Yangming School (Yōmeigaku 陽明学) and the National Studies School 
(Kokugaku 国学).
Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944), philosopher and proponent of the theory of 
Eastern philosophy (Tōyō tetsugaku 東洋哲學)—as distinguished from Western 
philosophy (Seiyo tetsugaku 西洋哲學)—argued that Japanese philosophy was 
unique in that it combined the merits of both Eastern and Western philosophi-
cal traditions. Although today Inoue’s arguments are seriously challenged, they 
were representative of the Euro-Japanese universalism that dominated the mod-
ern intellectual climate in East Asia at the time.
Some Forms of Orientalism and Occidentalism in  
Interpreting Korean Confucianism
Many intellectuals in late nineteenth-century Korea, including Yun Ch’i-ho 
(1864–1945), a Korean “enlightenment” intellectual educated at Emory and 
Vanderbilt Universities in the United States as well as in Japan, began to express 
a highly iconoclastic attitude toward Confucianism, viewing it as a shackling 
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ideology of backwardness, oppression, hierarchism, laziness, and hypocrisy, and 
thereby incompatible with modern values such as individualism, tolerance, and 
freedom, which he felt the Korean people should be pursuing. Commenting on 
a situation where a Chinese teacher quit his position in his Western-style school 
without prior notice, Yun wrote:
The more Confucianism a Chinaman has the less reliable he is in words. 
Shame on Confucianism! After having absolute control over the body, 
mind, and heart of a nation over twenty-five centuries the system has ever 
failed to make honest men and women of its worshippers.
The maxims of Confucianism are simply beautiful. But what is the 
use of them? A system that has no power to make its believer practice 
its maxims is as bad as a Chinese proclamation full of fine things never 
intended to be carried out. A rule can’t work without someone to work 
it. Confucianism is powerless and therefore useless because its foundation 
is no higher than filial piety. It contains the seeds of corruption in its doc-
trine of the inferiority of women, of absolute submission to kings, of its 
everlasting “go-backism.” Its materialism makes men gross. It has no life 
and vitality in it to advance or improve. Now when a system of teaching 
has no power to make its professor a better man than he might be other-
wise it is worse than useless.
A Confucianist thinks he has reached the principle of virtues when 
he fulfills the prescribed rules of filial piety. With him this exceedingly 
commonplace virtue made uncommon covers every sin—licentiousness, 
revengefulness, lying, hatred, great dissimulation. . . .1
More subtle forms of interpreting Confucianism in Korea according to an 
increasingly influential Euro-Japanese universalist perspective were developed 
by other Japanese scholars, including Takahashi Tōru (1878–1967).2
Attacking mainstream Neo-Confucianism for its political-factional con-
flicts that had no philosophical value, its dependency on China, its neglect of 
the people’s welfare, and its general responsibility for Korea’s backwardness, 
Takahashi reevaluated the statecraft of marginalized Confucian scholars, such 
as Chŏng Yag-yong, Yu Hyŏng-wŏn, and Chŏng Che-du, and the Wang Yang-
ming School in Korea of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries.
Takahashi’s perception of the eighteenth-century “Confucian Statecraft 
School” (Keirin no gaku 經倫の學) as a failed forerunner of modernity came 
from his appreciation of Japanese Confucian statecraft studies, such as the Wang 
Yangming School or various other Confucian schools during the late Tokugawa 
period. This Confucian scholarship on statecraft is thought to be a key factor 
behind Japan’s ability to achieve an aggressive nation-state status without being 
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colonized. Takahashi’s appraisal of Chŏng Che-du, a Wang Yangming scholar 
in Korea, also derives from a Japanese chauvinistic attitude because many of 
the participants in the Meiji Restoration, including the likes of Nakae Tōju, 
Kumazawa Banzan, and Yoshida Shōin, were perceived to be from the Wang 
Yangming School.3 Presented with the model of Euro-Japanese universalism, 
Takahashi saw the statecraft of the Wang Yangming School in Korea as either 
very weak or absent altogether. In his view, because the Confucian tradition in 
Korea had become ossified, it could only achieve modernity through Japanese 
tutelage.
Interestingly, Korean nationalists also developed their reinterpretation 
of Korean Confucianism within the confines of a chauvinistic Euro-Japanese 
universalism. Chŏng In-bo (1893–1950), one of the scholar-journalists and 
founders of the Chosŏnhak 朝鮮學 (nationalist Korean studies) movement in 
the 1930s, brought back into the foreground of Korean national history such 
marginalized Korean traditions as Wang Yangming Learning and Practical 
Learning (Sirhak 實學), Confucian scholars like Chŏng Yag-yong, and even 
Tan’gun, the mythical founder of the Korean nation. Chŏng In-bo argued in 
his book Extended Studies of Wang Yangming (Yangmyŏnghak yŏllon 陽明學
演論) (1933) that while the Cheng-Zhu school had undermined traditional 
Korean society with its futile metaphysical debates between rival political fac-
tions, Wang Yangming Studies was able to encourage the Korean people to 
achieve modernity through practicality (Ch. shixin 實心; K. shilshim) and self- 
assertiveness (Ch. zhuti 主體; K. chuch’e).4 As an ardent proponent of the idea of 
“practical learning,” Chŏng was also one of the editors of the Complete Works of 
Chŏng Yag-yong (Yŏyudang chŏnsŏ 與猶堂全書), compiled with An Chae-hong 
and Kim Sŏng-jin during the period between 1934 and 1938. It is noteworthy 
that Takahashi Tōru and Yun Ch’i-ho joined the celebrations upon the publica-
tion of the work. In a predictable manner, Takahashi expressed his approval of 
Yangmyŏnghak yŏllon in his published review of it in 1955.
In the wake of the Great Depression of 1929, Japan became a national 
socialist regime in opposition to the Allies, adopting Pan-Asianism as an ideol-
ogy and launching a series of military attacks: on Manchuria in 1931, China in 
1937, and Pearl Harbor in 1941. Its ideology combined Shinto-Confucian ele-
ments with totalitarianism. Imperial Confucianism (Kōdō Jugaku 皇道儒學), 
supporting the national socialist regime in Japan and the ideology of unifying 
the five Asian races—Japanese, Korean, Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese—was 
a Confucian form of Occidentalism. In a 1931 article, Takahashi restrained 
his harsh criticism of Korean Confucianism with a more positive tone, lauding 
it as an exemplar of national education. Originally Takahashi was adamant in 
criticizing T’oegye (Yi Hwang) (1502–1571) as a mere imitator of Zhu Xi as 
follows:
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T’oegye is the typical example of Korean Confucian thinking, more 
broadly representative of all Koreans’ way of learning. Lacking in cre-
ativity and originality, he was just an authentic transmitter of Zhu Xi. 
In interpreting the Classics, he modeled himself after Zhu Xi’s Collected 
Commentary without considering works prior to Zhu Xi. By contrast, 
Ogyū Sorai and Itō Jinsai, heroic Japanese Confucians, initiated the 
National Learning School, a civil school, rather than the Zhu Xi School, 
a bureaucratic school. This is the stark difference between Japanese and 
Korean Confucianism; there is an everlasting disparity between the two 
nations and schools.5
Yet, according to Abe Yoshio (1905–1978), one of Takahashi’s disciples, this 
same T’oegye was elevated in 1944 beyond the level of practical scholar to that 
of creator:
At the moment the peninsula [Korea], as part of imperial Japan, is com-
mitted to the construction of a moral world. It is worth reflecting on the 
practical thought of Yi T’oegye, the foremost educator-scholar of the 
Korean peninsula and the creator of the philosophy of moral national 
education. Thereby it is never insignificant for us to consider how best to 
act as loyal subjects of the emperor and train our spirits. Moreover, it is 
urgent and relevant for educators on the peninsula whose mission it is to 
transform the people.6
Colonial scholars such as Takahashi Tōru and Abe Yoshio had situated 
T’oegye, like Wang In, who was the putative transmitter of Confucianism from 
Korea to Japan in ancient times, as the creator of moral cultivation in Korea, 
which was then transmitted to Japan. Prior to 1930, T’oegye had seemed a 
quintessential Cheng-Zhu Confucian, responsible for the ossified Confucian 
tradition of Korea. Yet during the war period he was transformed into a model 
of national education, contributing to the ultra-nationalistic Imperial Confu-
cianism headed by the Japanese emperor.
During the war, Confucianism was employed as part of the strategy of fun-
damental “otherness” vis-à-vis Western domination. Confucianism as a whole 
became a representative and inclusive culture of the “yellow races,” antagonis-
tic to the egoistic, hedonistic, dominant Western culture. According to Korean 
Confucian scholar Yi Myŏngse, American and British civilization, character-
ized by individualism, materialism, and utilitarianism, is inherently greedy and 
exploitative. To save the repressed yellow race from becoming the prey of the 
dominating West, Japan had a moral duty (dōgi 道義) to fight on behalf of the 
Asian peoples: “Our imperial army is invincible because we fight for benevo-
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lence and righteousness (renyi 仁義). The Sage’s dictum that the benevolent do 
not have enemies proves this.”7
A Critical Assessment of Modern Assumptions
T h e  P r ac t i c a l  Sc h o o l :  Wa s  t h er e  a  P r ac t i c a l  
Sc h o o l  i n  S ev en t een t h-  t h ro u gh  N i n et een t h- 
c en t u ry  C h osŏ n ?
The colonialist Takahashi’s interpretation of Korean Neo-Confucianism as 
being unproductive and that an anti–Zhu Xi Confucianism (i.e., a “practical” 
Confucianism, including the Wang Yangming School) emerged from the sev-
enteenth to nineteenth centuries is still influential today. Nationalist as well 
as socialist historiographies have argued that there emerged a practical Con-
fucian school, termed Sirhak 實學, whose characteristics were practical and 
whose emphasis was on statecraft, capitalist development, individualism, and 
evidence-based science.
It is interesting to see that in the history of the Confucian tradition, Neo-
Confucians referred to their school as Sirhak, in contrast to the “unproductive” 
Buddhist studies (Xuxue 虛學). In this tradition, emerging Confucian schools, 
including Neo-Confucianism and the Wang Yangming School, have used this 
general term to refer to themselves. Yet Takahashi’s idea of a practical school 
seems to derive from a Eurocentric perception of Asian history, because we can 
discern in the features of this “practical school” a mere collection of European 
“universal values” such as individualism, capitalism, empiricism, and rationality.
In fact, the idea of a practical school is closely related to the reorganiza-
tion of the world of learning in nineteenth-century Europe, characterized by 
the nation-state-funded rehabilitation of the university and professional fields. 
During the nineteenth century, the European world of learning began to 
define itself as a concentration of professionals pursuing objective truth (the 
rise of positivism) between two extremes—reactionaries and radicals—for the 
betterment of the people and the nation-state. For example, the newly uni-
fied German Verein für Sozialpolitik (Social Policy Association), founded in 
1873, was the operational organization for supporting a Bismarckian centrist 
social- program legislation that avoided both the liberal-economic circle and 
social revolutionaries. It is well known that the Prussian (German) model of 
the world of learning was the object of emulation by Japanese academics during 
the nineteenth century. One of these was Shiratori Kurakichi, the founder of 
Eastern History (Tōyōshi 東洋史) in Japan, who studied under Ludwig Reiss, 
himself a student of Leopold von Ranke. Enshrining positivism as an analytical 
and universal method, Shiratori established the particularistic and nationalist 
historiography of Eastern History. The aim of the Imperial universities in Japan 
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was the teaching of arts and academics and the pursuit of in-depth research to 
meet the demands of the state. The Japanese construction of modern higher 
learning did not differentiate between the state and the people. It supported the 
ideal of objectivity and positivism as a method, and “practical studies” to meet 
the demands of the state.8
These days, an increasing number of Koreanists have found the term Sirhak 
or “Practical Learning” in seventeenth- through nineteenth-century Chosŏn to 
be not an indigenous term but one imposed by a linear-progressive view of his-
tory. Chŏng Yag-yong was not antagonistic to Zhu Xi but an admirer of Zhu Xi 
and a revisionist at the same time. The notion of self-interest was not advocated 
by “conservative” Confucians, nor was it by most Sirhak scholars.
Yet, at a deeper level, arguments about the emergence of the practical 
school in the early modern period are a product of the modern notion of time 
being linear and progressive. This teleological view, giving priority to a certain 
“end of history” toward which the deterministic historical route was fixed, is 
not congruent with postmodern sensibilities in the humanities, social sciences, 
and natural sciences, or with Confucian tradition. Non-linear and irreversible 
time as posited by Ilya Prigogine does not allow any teleological end to the his-
torical process.9 Rather, evolving systems have their internal times of birth and 
death, such as oscillations, cycles, progression, and the emergence of novelty, 
without any transcendent, deterministic sense of the beginning or ending of 
time. The idea of time (shi 時) in the Yijing is historicist, emphasizing the pri-
ority of process over causal or teleological agency. In such concepts of time, a 
universal standard or inevitable route of history dissolves into the shifting pro-
pensities (shi 勢) as alternating modes of centralization and decentralization, 
unification and diversification—that is, yang and yin.
Co n f u c i a n ism  a n d  t h e  Stat e :  
Wa s  T ’o egy e  a n  I m p er i a l  T e ac h er ?
The dominance of Pan-Asianism from 1930 on was the basis for a strategy of 
“otherness,” assuming there was that essential other called the “East” in opposi-
tion to the “West.” As we have seen, as part of a Pan-Asian tradition, the Confu-
cian tradition as a whole was interpreted in a more positive light than before, as 
in the aforementioned case of T’oegye. Yet, was Neo-Confucianism in Korea, 
including T’oegye’s philosophy, supportive of central statism? There is much 
evidence to show that T’oegye’s ideas were rather supportive of the domination 
of local elites in the Yŏngnam area, for example in his commitment to local edu-
cation and community compacts, while sympathetic to the criticism of legalists 
and Wang Anshi, the state-led reformer of the Northern Song.10 Many topics of 
his counsels to the King include the necessity of a self-effacing and deferential 
kingship. Dismissing the arrogance of the king, T’oegye said, “When there is 
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no reciprocal trust, [no] agreement between ministers and kings in governing 
the country, benefits are not able to reach the people.”11 His family consisted 
of local landlords who owned large areas of land and slaves in the Andong 
area. Though the actual relationship between Confucian scholar-officials and 
the monarchy during the Chosŏn period is complex, the power of the kings in 
sixteenth-century Chosŏn was limited, and, relative to the period of Japanese 
imperial rule in Korea in the 1930s, Confucians and communities at the local 
level enjoyed autonomy. After denouncing Korean Confucians, Japanese colo-
nialists invented the image of T’oegye as an imperial or national teacher and 
educator who supported highly centralized power.
On a deeper philosophical level, I argue that Occidentalism after 1930 was 
the reverse of the liberalism-Orientalism of the Taishō era, because both were 
based on a modernist epistemology of essentialism entailing interdependent 
notions of universalism and particularism. One strategy of this way of thinking 
is an assumption that a certain thing, person, or group—such as a race, nation, 
culture, or civilization—has an unchanging, abstract, and inherent essence. Yet, 
defining an entity in this way easily exposes it to historical and geographical 
contingencies. For example, when Occidentalists state that Asian people are 
inherently reticent and obedient, do they mean a person from eighteenth- 
century Andong? Third-century Shandong? Tenth-century Okinawa? Twenty-
first-century Hong Kong?
One of the most insightful arguments against essentialist knowledge 
comes from the pragmatist John Dewey. According to Dewey, the most per-
vasive fallacy of philosophical thinking is the error of ignoring the historical, 
developmental, and contextualizing aspects of experience, something termed 
“the philosophical fallacy.” It is the abstracting of one element from the organ-
ism that gives it meaning and sets it up as absolute, and then proceeds to revere 
this one element as the cause and ground of all reality and knowledge. In the 
same context, John Dewey mentioned the invalidity of the essentialist notion 
of the East or West in his congratulatory remarks in the inaugural issue of Phi-
losophy East and West:
I think that the most important function your journal can perform in 
bringing about the ultimate objective of the “substantial synthesis of East 
and West” is to help break down the notion that there is such a thing as 
“West” and “East” that have to be synthesized. . . . Some of the elements 
in Western cultures and Eastern cultures are so closely allied that the 
problem of “synthesizing” them does not exist when they are taken in 
isolation. But the point is that none of these elements—in the East or the 
West—is in isolation. They are all interwoven in a vast variety of ways 
in the historical-cultural process. The basic prerequisite for any fruitful 
230 Limitations & Critical Reform of Confucian Cultures
development of inter-cultural relations—of which philosophy is simply 
one constituent part—is an understanding and appreciation of the com-
plexities, differences, and ramifying interrelationships both within any 
given country and among the countries, East and West, whether taken 
separately or together.12
Appreciating Uncommon Assumptions for a Viable Confucianism:  
Aesthetic Communities
Since the early twentieth century, assumptions of European universalism, such 
as universal values, nationalism-racism, scientism, a progressive view of history, 
capitalist economics, technological advancement, individual rights, citizenship 
and national sovereignty, and essentialism and objectivism, have all become 
objects of criticism by late-modern philosophers and Asian thinkers, and in the 
frontiers of some natural sciences. At the same time, cultural studies have dis-
missed the Western canons of white male European bias. Philosophers from 
the West have been urged to look within Western cultural elements, heretofore 
marginalized. We can observe a surging interest in pragmatism, hermeneutics, 
process philosophy, feminist philosophy, and postcolonialism. There is also an 
increased interest in non-Western philosophies, including Confucianism and 
Buddhism, distinctive cultural assumptions far from European universalism.
I believe we need imagination and a knowledge of viable Confucianism 
beyond Euro-Japanese universalism (Orientalism) and its antagonistic particu-
larism (Occidentalism) because they have been neither philosophically coher-
ent nor sound, and they have been historically catastrophic. It is tragic to real-
ize that since the advent of European-Japanese universalism around 1875, the 
Korean people have had to endure two Sino-Japanese Wars, the Russo-Japanese 
War, colonization, the Japanese invasions of China, World War II, and the Viet-
nam War, and they are still technically fighting the Korean War. If war is the 
most horrible event that can befall the common people, Orientalism and Occi-
dentalism, which have dominated the intellectual atmosphere over the last cen-
tury in Korea, may be the primary sources and consequences of such tragedies.
According to Confucian philosophy, war, social conflict, sectarianism, and 
exclusion are the result of a failure of communication of shared experience—a 
lack, that is, of ritual propriety. We also need new ways to interpret Confucian 
philosophy and tradition that come without assumptions regarding essential-
ism and the linear notion of time, which are constituents of liberal ideologies.
I mentioned an essentialist strategy as one of the epistemological assump-
tions of European universalism. Debates over individualism and collectivism, 
the core concepts of modern political philosophy, are attempts to establish 
answers in this manner. They are conflicting answers to the same question 
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regarding the identity of “the people.” This became a focus of debates after the 
French Revolution, in which the sovereignty of the monarch was replaced by 
popular sovereignty. While the liberal answer has been that the people consti-
tute a collection of “individuals” bearing rights, on the extreme other end of the 
spectrum it is said that the people constitute a single collective society. The issue 
is as follows: when many modern political philosophers deal with the relation-
ship between the individual and society, they tend to use atomistic, essentialist, 
quantitative language that assumes there are two distinct entities in the form 
of a right-bearing individual and a general social will. As we have seen in the 
emergence of the modern Yomeigaku (Wang Yangming School) in nineteenth-
century Japan, the controversy over the nature of the “people”—between the 
nationalist, state-oriented, right-wing idea of kokumin 國民 and the cosmopoli-
tan, civic-oriented, left-wing idea of heimin 平民—was the East Asian form of 
the sovereignty debates in the modern nation-state.
However, it is hard for us to encounter the Leviathan as a personalized 
collective polity. Society as a whole, independent of process, is an abstraction 
from larger complex transactional processes. According to Ch’oe Han-ki, a 
nineteenth-century Korean Confucian scholar, if you achieve proper commu-
nication between self and others (in his words, the penetration of configurative 
energy), there is continuity between them, and relationships will be productive. 
In the same context, it is hard to assume a discrete self in our experience. Once 
you accept this abstract entity as reality, there are two contested entities, namely 
the discrete individual and the collective society. These entities, far from authen-
tic experience, can become a source of the variety of social and ethical theo-
ries in which ideas regarding the individual or state compete with each other 
for priority. Individualism is closely related to liberalism and utilitarianism, in 
which individual rights, freedom, and autonomy are an end where government 
or communal purpose cannot intervene and rather are used as a means for the 
happiness of individuals. By contrast, collectivism is closely related to totalitari-
anism, which argues that individuals should be in the service of a greater good, 
such as the aims and interests of the nation-state. Seemingly contradictory, what 
they have in common is their view of the individual or community as a self-
sufficient entity that requires others as a means to achieve its own ends.
Elsewhere I mentioned that we need to construct a viable Confucian phi-
losophy without essentialist assumptions. Now we begin to focus on experi-
ence instead of abstraction. Experience is communal and aesthetic. The term 
aesthetic is derived from the Greek αἰσθητικός (aisthetikos), meaning “esthetic, 
sensitive, sentient,” which is in turn derived from αἰσθάνομαι (aisthanomai), 
meaning “I perceive, feel, sense.” I argue for the notion of “aesthetic communi-
ties” as conceptual sources for a viable interpretation of Confucianism without 
an essentialist assumption.
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The self is not a discrete entity but an experiential or aesthetic field in 
the sense that the person has as many selves as there are others who recognize 
the person. This is also true for a variety of groupings, such as ethnicity, gen-
der, sexual preference, one’s own lived body, family, fraternity, religious com-
munity, nations, international communities beyond national boundaries, and 
so on. Fields are composites, vague and full of shared experience constituting 
their meaning. Ch’oe Han-ki thought it was configurative energy forming the 
emergence of the self and others as focus-field relations. This radical relatedness 
permits the self and others to communicate at a deep level and to achieve an 
associated humanity (Ch. ren 仁; K. in), penetration of the spiritual configura-
tive energy (Ch. shenqi tong 神氣通; K. shin’gi t’ong), consensus (Ch. yitong 一
統; K. ilt’ong), and impartiality (Ch. gong 公; K. kong) in shared experiences. 
This vagueness of shared experience is focused and made immediate through its 
embodiment by a particular focus, such as this communal exemplar, this mother, 
this leader of a fraternity, and this historical model. This is a performance of 
optimal signification ( yi 義) by which the meaning of the group is made present 
in its exemplary personalities or symbols.13
Optimal signification of shared experience means responding to the world 
with our senses in meaningful, skilled, productive, active, and shared ways. It is 
the art of communities (li 禮) that allow humans to feel one with each other in 
a meaningful, rich, and productive way. The term art or aesthetic here denotes 
neither individualistic creativity nor a special domain outside the ordinary 
business of life. Art is an integral part of communal life (li). It includes facial 
expressions, calligraphic style, table manners, and quality human relations in 
the workplace and at memorial services, which are the source and expression of 
collaborative creativity.
Lastly, it seems worthwhile to think about democracy from a Confucian 
standpoint. As I mentioned, these days we may be entering a period of disintegra-
tion for European universalism, in which liberal democracy, capitalist economic 
systems, and technological progress lose their legitimacy and power. Yet democ-
racy should not be thought of as the product of a European bias, but in fact as 
something in conflict with liberalist assumptions in general. John Dewey did not 
think democracy to be the product of the inevitable progress of Western civiliza-
tion, nor possible with liberalist assumptions. Rather he presumed that democ-
racy meant full participation and communication in many forms of communi-
ties. The interpretation of the Confucian idea as aesthetic communities may be 
a viable alternative to the European universalist interpretation of Confucianism 
as well as democracy. How can we reconstruct the idea of democracy and viable 
Confucianism without intellectual assumptions constructing the modern world? 
I believe this to be the direction of the collective discussions and research being 
conducted today worldwide by scholars interested in Confucian philosophy.
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CHAPTER 14
State Power and the Confucian Classics
Observations on the Mengzi jiewen and Truth Management under  
the First Ming Emperor
Bernhard FUEHRER
D iscuss i o n s  o f  t h e  r el at i o n between state power and the Confu-
cian classics tend to revolve around distinct events such as the infamous burn-
ing of the books, the central government’s attempts to re-take possession of the 
classics in the late medieval periods after the reunification of the empire that 
led to the “correct meanings” (zhengyi 正義), regulations for prohibiting for-
eigners access to the classics, or the stocktaking-cum-censoring enterprise that 
produced the Siku quanshu 四庫全書.
Notwithstanding academic trends, China’s intellectual history as well as 
the distinctly political nature of discussions of this topic in the contemporary 
context attest to the mere truism that the state’s exercise of control over the 
Confucian classics was—and still is—an ongoing project, not limited to dis-
crete events. As ultimate authority governing intellectual discourse, the Confu-
cian classics constituted not only a comprehensive and definitive intellectual 
framework but also an instrument of state power to ensure continuation of 
existing hierarchies of social status and political power, embedded in which 
was the authority to define, disseminate, and enforce orthodoxy. Where the 
interests of the supreme earthly powers required new interpretative norms and 
directions, these changes tended to be set out by leading scholars under imperial 
directives, on some occasions even through emperors directly engaging with the 
classics as commentators.1
The canon and its exegetical directives were enforced via education. From 
236 Limitations & Critical Reform of Confucian Cultures
the Han onward the curriculum, with its focus on the classics and associated 
works—such as the Analects (Lunyu 論語) or, in later periods, the Xiaojing 孝
經 and the Mencius (Mengzi 孟子)—functioned as the primary mechanism not 
only to shape the minds of the educated classes but also to control their intel-
lectual pursuits. Despite the textually heterogeneous nature of the classics, they 
were traditionally perceived as an embodiment of the dao 道—which we read 
here as “the ultimate truth.” At first glance, this textual embodiment of “the 
ultimate truth” seems to provide learners with basic ethics in a given environ-
ment, a method to better oneself, a procedure that ideally leads to the attain-
ment of the highest level of self-cultivation, that is, to become an “accomplished 
person” ( junzi 君子). But then, the classics and their state-sanctioned readings 
had another and—in our context here—far more significant function. They 
offered clear guidelines on how established hierarchies were to be maintained, 
and imperatives that—once internalized through educational indoctrination—
demanded subordination by means of a philosophy of “knowing one’s station” 
in society.
Of course, the primary corpus of the classics ( jing 經) is not an eternally 
fixed textual body but has gone through various stages of complex canonization 
processes. But it seems perhaps more important that the real prowess of the clas-
sical canon lies in its interpretations and the way in which earthly authorities 
invested authority in their readings. Different periods showed different levels 
of tolerance toward divergent interpretations, some institutionalized interpre-
tative diversity even in the highest educational bodies, and at other times some 
allowable co-existence of conflicting and sometimes even mutually contradic-
tory readings. The degree to which the canonical texts are perceived as open 
texts often tends to coincide with periods of governance characterized by the 
ineffectiveness of the political mandate. In times when we observe strong cen-
tral power, the authority’s urge to take possession of the intellectual foundations 
of state power, namely the Confucian classics, tends to become preeminent. At 
the direction of emperors, scholar-officials set out to narrow the range of allow-
able readings. This standardization of readings of the canon aims at bringing 
out a particular version of “the ultimate truth,” a process that renders the canon-
ical texts serviceable in a specific historical and political context.
In this chapter I shall concentrate on Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 (1328–1398; 
r. 1368–1398), the founding emperor of the Ming (1368–1644), his manage-
ment of truth, and his attempts to ensure the serviceability of canonical writ-
ings. In pursuit of these aims, he applied various strategies.2
As he felt discontent with interpretations of the Shujing 書經 by Cai Chen 
蔡沈 (1167–1230), Zhu Yuanzhang ordered his trusted advisor Liu Sanwu 
劉三吾 (1312–1399) to revise the parts of Cai Chen’s commentary that the 
emperor considered deficient or unsuitable.3 Liu Sanwu, an erudite scholar who 
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found favor in the eyes of the emperor at a very late stage in his life, revised over 
sixty passages in Cai Chen’s Shu jizhuan 書集傳 (1210), parts of which carry 
glosses made by his former teacher Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) shortly before 
his death.4 After its completion in 1394, the Shu zhuan huixuan 書傳會選 by 
Liu Sanwu and his team of Hanlin scholars was promulgated to the empire until 
it underwent further revisions during the Yongle 永樂 period (1403–1425).5 
What we witness in this case is an emperor who challenges received norms and 
orders a revision of crucial explanatory material. In the Shu zhuan huixuan the 
transmitted jingwen 經文 (“main text”) remains untouched. Nonetheless, the 
readings extracted from the jingwen as well as their implications undergo signif-
icant changes pontificated by the emperor. The new exposition of the canon is a 
redefinition of a classic by exegetical means, constructed through rectifications 
according to a new interpretative standard.6 The newly established readings are 
promoted throughout the empire as standard for examinations. Non-adherence 
to this new standard simply means that the doors to any career as a scholar-
official remain closed.
Zhu Yuanzhang also applied the classics to regulate and remedy hierar-
chies. His continuous revisions of various ritual prescriptions were aimed at 
keeping potentially treacherous members of the imperial family in check, and 
at making visible the envisaged hierarchies through the symbolic language of 
ritual performances. The revised ritual prescriptions and their points of refer-
ence stemmed from the venerated exegetical traditions in exactly the same way 
as the pre-reform prescriptions. While remaining within the multifaceted rep-
ertoire of exegetical traditions for ritual affairs, revisions of ritual prescriptions 
allowed the emperor to react to changing political situations. These revisions 
were confirmed in tandem with points of reference in the tradition, which 
consented—or could be explained as consenting—to changes implemented to 
address perceived new operative needs. The classics and their exegetical cor-
pora served as a repository of glosses at the disposal of erudite literati, who, 
in accordance with the imperial directive, formulated codified credenda of 
governance.7
In biji 筆記 notebooks—which I perceive as highly valuable accounts that 
not only offer information otherwise not transmitted in official historical source 
material but provide us with an alternative historiography—Zhu Yuanzhang 
tends to appear primarily in an unfavorable light.8 However, these sources con-
tain interesting accounts of the first Ming emperor’s elaborations on the read-
ings of the classics. They tell us of his aversion to the contemplative interaction 
with canonical texts that was so fashionable during the Song (960–1279), and 
of the issues Zhu Yuanzhang had with Zhu Xi’s readings.9 Although biji authors 
may well aim at caricaturizing the first Ming emperor, the important point here 
is that some of the readings put forward by Zhu Yuanzhang do actually coincide 
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with interpretations suggested by earlier scholars.10 This is to say that the man 
who is widely perceived as the embodiment of an emperor with an educational 
deficit, and whose views on the classics are often in open disagreement with 
Zhu Xi’s line of scholarship, which was elevated to the national standard during 
the Mongol period, arrived at readings shared with earlier scholarship.11
A particularly noteworthy case of manipulation of the classics by state 
power is Zhu Yuanzhang’s short-lived suppression of substantial portions of 
the Mencius.12 The Qing scholar Quan Zuwang 全祖望 (1705–1755) trans-
mitted a short account of Zhu Yuanzhang faulting the Mencius for promoting 
insurrection and subversive teachings.13 In 1372, so Quan Zuwang reports, the 
emperor set his mind on prohibiting the transmission of such outdated views.14 
But shortly after he had the tablet of Mencius removed from the Confucius 
temple, Zhu Yuanzhang saw himself forced to withdraw his order following the 
occurrence of an inauspicious omen.15 In the same source we also learn of his 
rage over the warning given by Mencius to King Xuan of Qi (齊宣王) which 
Zhu Yuanzhang deemed entirely unacceptable.16 The relevant passage in Men-
cius 4B3 reads:
君之視臣如手足，則臣視君如腹心；君之視臣如犬馬，則臣視君如
國人； 君之視臣如土芥，則臣視君如寇讎。17
If the ruler looks upon subjects as [his] hands and feet, then the subjects 
look upon the ruler as [their] belly and heart. If the ruler looks upon 
subjects as dogs and horses, then the subjects look upon the ruler as a 
passerby.18 If the ruler looks upon [his] subjects as mud and weeds, then 
the subjects look upon the ruler as a robber and enemy.19
With the office of prime minister abolished and the government reorganized 
in 1380, Zhu Yuanzhang’s ministers thus expurgated from the Mencius the pas-
sages faulted by the emperor and produced an abridged version of the Mencius 
that, it would appear, became part of the reading list for civil examinations after 
the restoration of the examinations in 1384–1385.20
One decade and several serious episodes of political turbulence later, Zhu 
Yuanzhang ordered Liu Sanwu to cleanse the Mencius, once again, of material 
that he found objectionable.21 In 1394 the Mengzi jiewen 孟子節文 was estab-
lished by the Imperial Academy as the standard version of the Mencius in civil 
examinations.22 Two decades later, Zhu Di 朱棣 (1360–1424; r. 1403–1424) 
abolished the version censored according to his father’s wish and reinstated the 
full transmitted version of the Mencius, which—in the compendium of com-
mentaries on the Five Classics and the Four Books, the Wujing Sishu daquan 
五經四書大全 (1415), compiled by the Hanlin academician Hu Guang 胡廣 
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(1370–1418) and his staff—became part of the newly established reading list 
for civil examination candidates.23
In the introduction to his excerpts from the Mencius, Liu Sanwu endeavors 
to provide a rationale for censoring this book.24 He states that during the time 
of Mencius, titled lords (zhuhou 諸侯) behaved without restraint, “valued their 
own profit most highly, and no longer knew of the existence of humankindness 
(ren) and sense of duty ( yi).”25 And with reference to the first section of the 
Mencius, that is, Mencius’ encounter with King Hui of Liang/Wei, Liu Sanwu 
notes the philosopher’s failure to grasp the actual threat that the king and his 
country faced from their mighty neighbors:26
仁義正論也。所答非所問矣。是以所如不合，終莫能聽納其說。27
Humankindness and sense of duty are the correct teachings. [But Men-
cius] did not answer [the king’s] question(s). Hence their destinations 
were not in accord, and in the end his suggestions could not/cannot be 
accepted.28
Liu Sanwu clearly agrees with the Mencius that, as a matter of principle, ren 仁 
and yi 義 are the right measures.29 Nevertheless, he—as well as Zhu Yuanzhang 
and others before them—came to consider his approach starry-eyed and thus 
unable to deal with the actual political situation. In their judgment the Mencius 
is deemed incapable of providing counsel that Zhu Yuanzhang would deem fit 
for his purpose.30 Section 1A1 of the Mencius, which according to Zhao Qi 趙
岐 (d. 201) sets the main theme of the entire book, is subsequently taken out.31 
With Mencius 1A2 also deleted on similar grounds, the Mengzi jiewen begins 
with Mencius 1A3.
Where he spotted a need for censorial action, Liu Sanwu did not doctor 
sentences, words, or characters but deleted entire sections (zhang 章) and noted 
that these sections would no longer be included in examination questions and 
topics.32 As a result, the Mengzi jiewen carries only about two-thirds of the sec-
tions transmitted in Zhu Xi’s Mengzi jizhu 孟子集注 (1177).33
In the sections deleted by Liu Sanwu we observe a clear focus on the relation-
ship between subjects and rulers, a crucial point in the Mencian political philoso-
phy that Zhu Yuanzhang found particularly difficult to endorse. In his preface to 
the Mengzi jiewen the realpolitiker Liu Sanwu summarized his objections to the 
Mencius with reference to its historical environment. The current situation under 
the first Ming emperor, Liu argued, was fundamentally different from the War-
ring States (475–221 B.C.E.) environment in which the Mencian argument was 
situated. Strategies suitable then would thus not be applicable under the newly 
established regime. In his view, the Mencian strategies and postulates
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. . . 在當時列國諸侯可也。 若夫天下一君，四海一國， 人人同一尊君
親上之心，學者或不得其扶持名教之本意。34
. . . were allowable in those days of various states and titled lords. Now-
adays there is one ruler of the “all-under-heaven,” one state within the 
four seas, and all men are united in their mind of honoring the ruler and 
having affection for the supreme [emperor], [but] some scholars do not 
grasp his genuine intention to support the venerated teachings [on Con-
fucian morality and ethics].
In the reception history of the Mencius, Zhu Yuanzhang—and Liu Sanwu 
with him—stands in an illustrious line of scholars who vented their skepticism 
about or outright denial of the efficiency of core political concepts outlined in 
the Mencius.35 Though Zhu Yuanzhang and Liu Sanwu clearly paid lip service 
to—or may even have agreed with—some of the more widely shared aspects of 
its general ethics, the book Mencius and its commentarial traditions provided 
no valuable perspectives for some of their more pressing lines of inquiry. From 
an exegetical standpoint, the crucial task of interpreters, namely to take older 
traditions and reinterpret them in light of their own situation, seemed impos-
sible: the deficit of the Mencius could not be bridged; central portions of the 
book were deemed to be “beyond repair.” Rather than attempting to have the 
message of the Mencius adjusted to Zhu Yuanzhang’s needs through reinter-
pretation of the main text, he thus decided to repress the operative force of the 
Mencian tradition.36 With interpretative projections of meaning being rooted 
in the situation of the interpreter, the sections expurgated by Liu Sanwu, which 
can be divided into the following groups, offer insights into Zhu Yuanzhang’s 
political and social philosophy.37 None of the following five topic areas was a 
natural paradigm for the first Ming emperor to employ.38
1. Sections in which the Mencius proposes the people as the ultimate locus 
of political sovereignty: the Mencian hierarchy (in descending order: 
people, state, ruler) clashed with the emperor wielding power oppressively 
and striving at ruling with absolute power. This includes Mencian views 
on the prerogatives and duties of rulers, namely to serve and look after 
their people.39
2. Sections in which the Mencius explores its vision of an idealized relation-
ship between ruler and subject: from the Northern Song (960–1127) 
onward, this had become an increasingly popular stance among officials. 
In Zhu Yuanzhang’s view, the teachings of the Mencius led to unrest and 
lack of respect for the ruler; and he took decisive action wherever he 
encountered any signs of these.
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3. Sections in which the Mencius discusses the possibility of dethroning a 
ruler and the conditions under which such an act would be legitimate.
4. Sections in which the Mencius hints at a certain degree of (intellectual) 
autonomy of members of the educated class, which, in the eyes of Zhu 
Yuanzhang, led to insufficient subordination and disputatious officials.
5. Sections in which the Mencius makes pacifistic statements or argues 
against the wars between titled lords that lead to nothing but suffering 
and destruction.40
Though Zhu Yuanzhang’s attempts to eradicate Mencius from the Confu-
cian pantheon were short-lived, the case of the Mengzi jiewen remains rather 
unique—so unique, in fact, that some challenged the historical truthfulness of 
accounts of the first Ming emperor’s anti-Mencian activities.41 Some go so far as 
to urge us to disregard entirely the Mengzi jiewen in our considerations and dis-
courses. Because of—what he perceived as—a lack of reliable records, the emi-
nent Qing scholar Zhu Yizun 朱彝尊 (1629–1709), among others, refused to 
regard accounts of Zhu Yuanzhang’s censorship of the Mencius as trustworthy.42
What may have seemed most inconceivable in the traditional environment 
is the candid nature of Zhu Yuanzhang’s management of orthodoxy. Whereas 
other rulers adjusted the classics—or had them adjusted—to their needs via 
exegetical procedures without major amendments of the venerated main texts 
( jingwen), Zhu Yuanzhang stands out in assigning to himself such authority 
over the main text of a classic as to be permitted to make significant editorial 
changes.43 And in contrast to others who engaged in censorship and who made 
possession or dissemination of uncensored material a criminal offense, Zhu 
Yuanzhang allowed the unabridged version of the Mencius to remain in circu-
lation. If the examination system is seen as a means to implement a new state 
orthodoxy, the decision to keep the uncensored version in circulation may be 
understood as a confident manifestation of imperial power that is—inter alia—
formulated through and symbolized in the bold contrast between the old and 
the new Mencius.
The founding father of the Ming dynasty attributed great importance 
to education; his efforts to establish schools throughout the empire are well 
documented.44 And the Confucian classics, which are traditionally presumed 
to elevate their readers out of their own lives to another reality with overriding 
purposes and concerns, played a prominent role in this education campaign: 
they were held as an indispensable requisite in every household.45 Within this 
context of education, the expurgated version, that is, the Mengzi jiewen, was 
established as the only valid version of the Mencius in the compulsory reading 
list for examination candidates. Its main purpose was to make a claim on its 
readership so as to rein in potential criticism rooted in the political philosophy 
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of the Mencius. As a function of the examination mechanism, education was 
the channel through which he promulgated and tried to enforce his “Mencius 
light,” excerpts from one of the traditionally celebrated Confucian core read-
ings cleansed of edges and potential points of reference for critical minds in an 
autocratic system.
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(reprint of a 1879 block print) 3918–3927, vol. 2, p. 84 ( juan 14).
16. See Quan Zuwang, Jieqiting ji, 35:3a–4b (370). This anecdote appears, with some 
modifications, in a number of sources. Mingshi 139:3982 records it in the biography of Qian 
Tang 錢唐 (1314–1394) and states that Zhu Yuanzhang considered the speech transmitted 
in Mencius 4B3 utterly inappropriate for any subject, and that he would regard those who 
argued in support of such thought (like Qian Tang) guilty of lèse majesté (da bu jing 大不敬). 
On this incident see also the discussion in Huang Yunmei 黃雲眉, Mingshi kaozheng 明史考
證, 8 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979), vol. 4, pp. 1189–1191. Qian Zeng relates that 
Zhu Yuanzhang’s reaction to reading this passage in Mencius 4B3 was to order Liu Sanwu to 
censor the Mencius. The modern compilers of the Xuxiu Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao: Jing bu, 
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vol. 2, p. 921, also copied this anecdote into their entry on the Mengzi jiewen and describe it as 
the event that led to Liu Sanwu producing the Mengzi jiewen. Others see the narrative about 
Zhu Yuanzhang reading Mencius 4B3 as an earlier event that triggered an entirely separate 
attempt at dealing with perceived inadequacies in the Mencius. In his Shuanghuai suichao 雙
槐歲抄, 10 juan (1495), Huang Yu 黃瑜 (1425–1497) also reports on this event but does 
not relate it to the compilation of the Mengzi jiewen; see Huang Yu, 黃瑜 Shuanghuai suichao 
雙槐歲抄 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, [1999] 2012), Lidai shiliao biji congkan: Yuan Ming 
shiliao biji congkan 歷代史料筆記叢刊 : 元明史料筆記叢刊, pp. 12–13.
17. Sishu jizhu 四書集注 [Song block print] (Taipei: Xuehai Chubanshe, 1984), pp. 
307–308 (Mencius 4B3).
18. The reading of the term guoren 國人 as “passerby” follows Zhu Xi’s gloss; see Sishu 
jizhu, pp. 307–308.
19. For other translations see D. C. Lau, Mencius (London: Penguin, 1970), p. 128, 
and Bryan W. Van Norden, Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries (India-
napolis: Hackett, 2008), p. 104.
20. The official account in the Mingshi does not seem to be particularly forthcoming 
on this: in the biography of Qian Tang it states: “but in the end [the emperor] ordered (a) 
Confucian minister(s) to prepare the Mengzi jiewen” (然卒命儒臣修孟子節文); see Ming-
shi 139:3982; cf. also Chen Jian 陳建 (1497–1567) (with additions by Jiang Xuqi 江旭奇), 
Huang Ming tong ji jiyao 皇明通紀集要 [late Ming block print], SKJHSCK, Shi 34, 9:5b 
(120). With reference to this account Benjamin Elman seems to suggest that Qian Tang 
agreed to excise passages deemed insulting to the imperial authority (bu jing 不敬) from the 
Mencius; see Elman, “Where is King Ch’eng?” p. 44. However, no such early version of the 
Mencius cleansed (by Qian Tang?) of passages that Zhu Yuanzhang judged as an offense to 
his sovereign power has yet been identified or located. In the Mingshi as well as elsewhere, 
Qian Tang is portrayed as a dedicated defender of Confucius, Mencius, and the Cheng-Zhu 
orthodoxy who managed to change the emperor’s mind on a number of occasions. In an 
earlier episode when the emperor restricted sacrifices to Confucius to celebrations at the 
master’s old hometown (1369), Zhu Yuanzhang did not, at first, listen to Qian Tang’s objec-
tions but only “followed his advice” ( yong qi yan 用其言) after “a long time” ( jiu zhi 久之) 
in 1382 when the nationwide sacrifices were reinstated; see Mingshi 139:3982. As the nar-
rative of this incident (as well as accounts of other events) in the Mingshi jumps forward in 
time by a considerable number of years, we understand zu 卒 (in the end) in the reference to 
the compilation of the Mengzi jiewen as pointing to a much later event, namely the censor-
ing of the Mencius under Liu Sanwu (1394). On the restoration of the civil examinations in 
1384/1385 see Zhang Chaorui 張朝瑞 (1536–1603), Huang Ming gong ju kao 皇明貢舉考 
(1589), XXSKQS 828, 1:4a–4b (149).
21. Following the abolition of the post of prime minister in 1380, the status of the 
Hanlin Academy, an eminent locus in the interaction between imperial power and scholar-
ship, was readjusted and transformed to formulate and implement imperially sanctioned 
doctrines and orthodoxies more efficiently. On the Hanlin Academy during the Hongwu 
period see Zheng Liju 郑礼炬, “Mingdai Hongwu zhi Zhengde nianjian de Hanlinyuan 
yu wenxue” 明代洪武至正德年间的翰林院与文学 (unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Nanjing Shifan 
Daxue, 2006), esp. pp. 49–78.
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22. The Mengzi jiewen was the standard Mencius version for civil examinations 
between 1394 and 1411. With the Mengzi jiewen being submitted to the throne just a few 
months after completion of his Shu zhuan huixuan in 1394, it appears that although Liu 
Sanwu worked simultaneously on these two works for some time, he applied rather differ-
ent strategies to ensure adherence to imperial directives; cf. the notes by Song Duanyi 宋
端儀 (1447–1501) in his Lizhai xianlu 立齋閒錄, 4 juan, in Guochao diangu, vol. 2, pp. 
913–914 ( juan 39). The imperial order to compile the Mengzi jiewen was issued in 1390; 
see, e.g., Peng Sunyi 彭孫貽 (1615–1673), Mingshi jishi benmo bubian 明史紀事本末補
編, 5 juan ( juan 1), in Lidai jishi benmo 歷代紀事本末, 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 
1997), vol. 2, p. 1516. Cf. Liu Sanwu, “Mengzi jiewen tici” 孟子節文題辭, 3a–3b, in Mengzi 
jiewen 孟子節文 (1394), 1a–4b, in Beijing Tushuguan guji zhenben congkan 北京圖書館
古籍珍本叢刊 (Beijing: Shumu Wenxian Chubanshe, 1988– ) 1:955–1016, esp. p. 956, 
on Liu Sanwu working on the two projects at the same time. For a rounded discussion of 
the Mengzi jiewen and related issues see Zhang Jiajia 张佳佳, “Mengzi jiewen yanjiu” 孟子
节文研究 (unpubl. M.A. diss., Qinghua Daxue, 2007), and Wolfgang Ommerborn, “Der 
Ming-Kaiser Taizu und das Mengzi jiewen,” in Wolfgang Ommerborn, Gregor Paul, and 
Heiner Roetz, Das Buch Mengzi im Kontext der Menschrechtsfrage, 2 vols. (Berlin: LIT Ver-
lag, 2011), vol. 1, pp. 419–439.
23. See the imperial preface to the Sishu jizhu daquan 四書集注大全, SKQSCMCS, 
Jing 170, 1a–11a (641–646), and Elman, “Where is King Ch’eng?” pp. 50–58. See also Pan 
Chengzhang 潘檉章 (1626–1663), Guoshi kaoyi 國史考異, 6 juan, in Chen Shoushi 陳守
實 et al., Mingshi kaozheng juewei 明史考證抉微 (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1968), p. 113 
(Guoshi kaoyi, juan 3, chap. 17), where Pan Chengzhang elaborates on the negative effects 
of the Mengzi jiewen on the orthodox transmission of the “wisdom of the ancient sages”; cf. 
Guoshi kaoyi, XXSKQS 452, 3:27b–29b (58–59). For the commentary versions of the Five 
Classics and the Four Books used in examinations during the reign of Zhu Yuanzhang see 
Zhang Chaorui, Huang Ming gong ju kao, 1:4b–5b (149).
24. See Liu Sanwu, “Mengzi jiewen tici,” 1a–4b (955–956).
25. Liu Sanwu, “Mengzi jiewen tici,” 1a (955): . . . 以功利為尚, 不復知有仁義.
26. For Mencius 1A1 see Sishu jizhu, pp. 197–198; Lau, Mencius, p. 49; and Van Nor-
den, Mengzi, pp. 1–2.
27. As indicated in the translation above, the last phrase of this passage carries some 
ambiguity. If read in relation to the encounter(s) between Mencius and King Hui of Liang, a 
reading such as “. . . and in the end [the king] could not accept his suggestions” seems appro-
priate. Where this is contextualized as part of Liu Sanwu’s concluding statement regarding 
the preceding examples of expurgated passages, it may be perceived as part of his argument 
for censoring the Mencius. In this case, we observe a switch of focus that leads to a more 
general perspective: “. . . and in the end his suggestions cannot be accepted” by the emperor 
(Zhu Yuanzhang), Liu Sanwu (who carried out the imperial will), and indeed, by extension, 
anyone.
28. Liu Sanwu, “Mengzi jiewen tici,” 1b (955).
29. Mingshi 135:3923, for example, records Zhu Yuanzhang’s approval of humankind-
ness (ren) and sense of duty ( yi) as guiding principles, his verdict that it was the lack of these 
two virtues that led to Xiang Yu’s 項羽 (232–202 B.C.) defeat, and his intention to not 
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make the same mistake as Xiang Yu. For Zhu Yuanzhang’s views on humankindness (ren) as 
a strategic requisite in warfare see also Ming Taizu shilu 16:1b (vol. 1, p. 214).
30. On the wider perspective of Zhu Yuanzhang’s limited commitment to a Confu-
cian worldview and his selective approach to its teachings see Farmer, “Social Regulations of 
the First Ming Emperor,” p. 108. For another interpretation of Zhu Yuanzhang’s esteem for 
Confucius and the teachings attributed to him see Zhu Honglin, “Ming Taizu de Kongzi 
chongbai,” pp. 483–530, whose arguments appear to be embedded in the contemporary dis-
course on a so-called renaissance of Confucianism. John D. Langlois, Jr. and Sun K’o-k’uan 
孫克寬, “‘Three Teachings Eclecticism’ and the Thought of Ming T’ai-tsu,” in Harvard 
Journal of Asiatic Studies 43, no. 1 (1983): 97–139, describe Zhu Yuanzhang as “a syncretist 
at heart” (quote, p. 97).
31. See Zhao Qi’s 趙岐 note in his Mengzi shisi juan 孟子十四卷, SBCK 2, 1:1a 
(4). On this earliest extant commentary on the Mencius see Bernhard Fuehrer, “Mencius 
for Han Readers: Commentarial Features and Hermeneutical Strategies in Zhao Qi’s Work 
on the Mencius,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 164, no. 2 (2014): 
501–526.
32. See Liu Sanwu, “Mengzi jiewen tici,” 3b (956). A close textual comparison of the 
jingwen in Mengzi jiewen and in Zhu Xi’s version of the Mencius reveals a few minor tex-
tual discrepancies, none of which, however, has a major impact on the message. Liu Sanwu’s 
approach to the text also means that in the context of Zhu Yuanzhang’s literary persecution 
(wenziyu 文字獄), otherwise tabooed characters (such as zei 賊) remained unchanged in the 
Mengzi jiewen. On the literary persecution during the Hongwu reign see also the sources 
listed in Bernhard Fuehrer, “An Inauspicious Quotation or a Case of Impiety? Mr. Zhang 
and Literary Persecution under the First Ming Emperor,” in China and her Biographical 
Dimensions: Commemorative Essays for Helmut Martin, ed. Christina Neder et al. (Bern: 
Peter Lang, 2001), pp. 75–82. Cf. also Hok-lam Chan, “Ming T’ai-tsu’s Manipulation of 
Letters: Myth and Reality of Literary Persecution” [reprint from Journal of Asian History 29 
[1995]: 1–60), in Hok-lam Chan, Ming Taizu (r. 1368–98) and the Foundation of the Ming 
Dynasty in China (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011)]. For a discussion of the Mencius in civil 
examinations during the Ming see Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examina-
tions in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 78–88. It 
seems noteworthy that although Liu Sanwu clearly confirmed that the expurgated sections 
of the Mencius would no longer be included in the exams, Huang Yu reports that, in fact, 
from 1384/1385 (Hongwu jiazi 洪武甲子) onward there was no fixed rule for selection of 
the three examination topics on the Four Books, and that some exams did not include the 
Mencius; see Huang Yu, Shuanghuai suichao, p. 91 ( juan 5), and the quote of this passage in 
Zhang Chaorui, Huang Ming gong ju kao, 1:5b (149). The omission of topics on the Mencius 
seems to indicate a certain disinclination of top scholars to fully implement the imperial 
directives via the examination system.
33. See Zhu Ronggui 朱榮貴, “Cong Liu Sanwu Mengzi jiewen lun junquan de xian-
zhi yu zhishi fenzi zhi zizhuxing” 從劉三吾孟子節文論君權的限制與知識份子之自主
性, Zhongguo Wenzhe jikan 中國文哲研究季刊 6 (1995): 173–198, esp. p. 179. As the 
Mengzi jiewen carries 172 out of the 260 sections in the Mengzi jizhu, Liu Sanwu deleted a 
total of 88 sections from the Mencius. Cf. also Huang Jingfang 黃景昉 (1596–1662), Guoshi 
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weiyi 國史唯疑 (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1969), pp. 32–33. ( juan 1), who, like many 
others, follows Liu Sanwu’s count of 85 omitted sections; see Liu Sanwu, “Mengzi jiewen 
tici,” 3b (956).
34. Liu Sanwu, “Mengzi jiewen tici,” 2b–3a (955–956).
35. These include early figures such as Xunzi 荀子 and Wang Chong 王充 (27–ca. 97), 
and a considerable number of Song scholars such as He She 何涉 (fl. 1041), Sima Guang, Li 
Gou 李覯 (1009–1059), Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101), and so forth. For concise summaries on 
the anti-Mencian points of view in the wider political and philosophical context of the Song 
see Huang Chun-chieh (黃俊傑), Mencian Hermeneutics: A History of Interpretations in 
China (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 155–171, and Huang Junjie 
黃俊傑, Mengzi sixiangshi lun 孟子思想史論 (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan, 1997), vol. 
2, pp. 127–190.
36. In his Mingshi jishi benmo bubian, juan 1, Peng Sunyi notes that “all [passages] 
which do not focus on [the proper] respect for the ruler such as ‘[if the ruler] is remon-
strated but does not listen, then [he] is to be removed from [his] position’ [諫而不聽則
易位] [Mencius 5B9] or ‘[the] ruler is the least important’ [君為輕] [Mencius 7B14] and 
the like were all to be expurgated”; see Mingshi jishi benmo bubian, juan 1, in Lidai jishi 
benmo, vol. 2, p. 1516. The quote from Mencius 5B9 exhibits significant omissions; compare 
Sishu jizhu, p. 350; Lau, Mencius, p. 159; and Van Norden, Mengzi, p. 142. On Mencius 
7B14 see Sishu jizhu, pp. 403–404; Lau, Mencius, pp. 195–196; and Van Norden, Mengzi, 
p. 187. On the passages quoted by Peng Sunyi see also Chen Jian, Huang Ming tong ji jiyao, 
9:6a (120). Cf. Huang Yunmei, Mingshi kaozheng, vol. 4, p. 1191, who emphasizes that the 
Mengzi jiewen contains only a small fraction of the “real spirit” of the Mencius. The excision 
of Mencius 5B9 and 7B14 is also mentioned in Liu Sanwu, “Mengzi jiewen tici,” 2b (955). As 
Huang Jingfang, Guoshi weiyi, p. 32 ( juan 1), draws our attention to the omission of Men-
cius section 2A2, we note that Mencius 2A (“Gongsun Chou: Shang”) begins with section 5. 
The first four sections of this chapter are omitted.
37. On the Mengzi jiewen as a means of indoctrination and a document transmitting 
insights into despotism in action see Rong Zhaozu 容肇祖, “Ming Taizu de Mengzi jiewen” 
明太祖的孟子節文, Dushu yu chuban 讀書與出版 2, no. 4 (1947): 16–21, esp. p. 18.
38. For the first four groups of topic areas see Zhu Ronggui, “Liu Sanwu Mengzi 
jiewen,” pp. 184–191. The last group follows a suggestion in Jiang Guozhu 姜国柱, “Wen-
hua zhuanzhi de yi li: Zhu Yuanzhang de Mengzi jiewen” 文化专制的一例：朱元璋的孟
子节文, Liaoning Daxue xuebao 辽宁大学学报 3 (1981): 17–19, esp. p. 18. Rong Zhaozu, 
“Ming Taizu de Mengzi jiewen,” pp. 18–21, identified a total of eleven doctrines eradicated 
from the Mencius.
39. Under the ninth moon of the fifth year of the Hongwu period, the Ming Taizu 
shilu 明太祖實錄, in Ming shilu 明實錄 (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan, 1962–1968), 
76:4b (vol. 4, p. 1402), records that in his earlier years Zhu Yuanzhang followed the concept 
of the “people as the root/basis of the country” ( guo yi min wei ben 國以民為本). And 
under the fourth moon of the third year of his reign, Ming Taizu shilu 51:8a (vol. 3, p. 1005) 
records his use of the analogy of the people as the water and the ruler as a boat. Further 
to this, Zhu Yuanzhang presented “himself in temples of Confucius in 1356 and 1360 . . . , 
bestowed honors on the heirs of the sage . . . ,” and “granted special privileges to the descen-
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dents of the disciple Yen Hui 顏回 and of Mencius 孟子” (quotes from Romeyn Taylor, 
Basic Annals of Ming Tai-tsu [San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1975], p. 19). For 
a discussion of the source material regarding his attitude toward descendents of Confucius 
see Zhu Honglin, “Ming Taizu de Kongzi chongbai,” pp. 504–513. Notwithstanding a few 
(possibly rhetorical) references to these political concepts during his later years, the sources 
seem to suggest a personal development that made it increasingly difficult for the emperor 
to subscribe to the political concepts outlined in the Mencius.
40. For Zhu Yuanzhang commenting on the negative consequences of prolonged 
fighting on agricultural production at the end of the Mongol period see Ming Taizu shilu, 
22:1a (vol. 1, p. 313), and Taylor, Basic Annals of Ming Tai-tsu, p. 52.
41. See, e.g., Jia Naiqian 贾乃谦, “Cong Mengzi jiewen dao Qianshu” 从孟子节文到
潜书, Dongbei Shida xuebao 东北师大学报 2 (1987): 43–50, esp. pp. 43–44. The Ming 
Taizu shilu deals with the Mengzi jiewen only cursorily, and Zhu Yuanzhang’s other anti-
Mencian activities such as the removal of Mencius from the Confucius temple do not seem 
to attract much of the compilers’ interest.
42. See Zhu Yizun 朱彝尊, Pushuting ji 曝書亭集, SBCK 81, 69:8b–9b, esp. 69:9a 
(526). Zhu Yizun understands Zhu Yuanzhang as showing great respect for Confucius and 
therefore finds it inconceivable that such a man would censor the Mencius. Others who 
rejected the historical truthfulness of the so-called “Qian Tang incident” and of Zhu Yuan-
zhang’s censoring of the Mencius include Tan Qian 談遷, Guoque 國榷, 6 vols. (Beijing: Guji 
Chubanshe, 1958), vol. 1, p. 478 (“Taizu Hongwu wu nian”); cf. Zhu Honglin, “Ming Taizu 
de Kongzi chongbai,” pp. 483–530. For discussions of relevant material see Huang Yunmei, 
Mingshi kaozheng, vol. 4, pp. 1189–1191, and Zhang Jiajia 张佳佳, “Mengzi jiewen shijian 
benmo kaobian” 孟子节文事件本末考辨, Zhongguo wenhua yanjiu 中国文化研究, 2006, 
pp. 84–93.
43. As far as we can see from the extant copies, it appears that the Mengzi jiewen cir-
culated in two versions: one that carries only the main text with no glosses or commentary 
and one that includes Zhu Xi’s glosses, which seem to remain unaltered. With regard to 
amending the main text of the classics, and without going into the thorny question of what 
happened to the classics during the Han period, scholars throughout the imperial periods 
(especially during the Song) adjusted the main text of the Confucian classics (and associated 
works), but they aimed at rectifying the text so as to arrive at good readings. For examples of 
emendations of the classics made by Song scholars see Ye Guoliang 葉國良, Songren yijing 
gaijing kao 宋人疑經改經考, Wenshi congkan 文史叢刊, 55 (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan Daxue, 
1980). Needless to say, these activities are fundamentally different from the way in which 
Zhu Yuanzhang carried out his censoring exercise.
44. On the status of Confucian learning in the educational policies of Zhu Yuanzhang 
see Chen Hanming 陈寒鸣, “Hongwu Ruxue jiaoyu yu keju bagu de xingcheng” 洪武儒
学教育与科举八股的形成, Zhongzhou xuekan 中州学刊 5 (1993): 105–111, and Chen 
Hanming 陈寒鸣, “Zai lun Hongwu Ruxue jiaoyu” 再论洪武儒学教育, Hebei xuekan 河
北学刊 5 (1997): 60–63. On Zhu Yuanzhang’s efforts to reshape the educational infrastruc-
ture see Wu Han 吳晗, “Mingchu de xuexiao” 明初的學校, Qinghua xuebao 清華學報 15, 
no. 1 (1948): 33–61. Sarah Schneewind, Community Schools and the State in Ming China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 6–32, emphasizes the function of schools 
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as a means to uphold and enforce new state doctrines, and questions reports that suggest an 
efficient implementation of Zhu Yuanzhang’s educational policies.
45. See Huang Pu 黃溥, Xianzhong jingu lu 閒中今古錄, 2b, in Wuchao xiaoshu 
daguan 五朝小說大觀 (1926), 6 vols. (Taipei: Guangwen Shuju, 1979), vol. 6, p. 2648. 
On the republication and dissemination of the Five Classics and the Four Books to schools 
at an earlier stage of Zhu Yuanzhang’s career (1380–1381) see Ming Taizu shilu, 136:3b 
(vol. 5, p. 2154), and Taylor, Basic Annals of Ming Tai-tsu, p. 89. For the Mengzi jiewen and 
the Shangshu huixuan being distributed to schools throughout the empire see Liu Sanwu, 
“Mengzi jiewen tici,” 3b (956), and the remark by Song Duanyi in his Lizhai xianlu, in Guo-
chao diangu, vol. 2, p. 913 ( juan 39).
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CHAPTER 15
Striving for Democracy
Confucian Political Philosophy in the Ming and Qing Dynasties
WU Genyou
Co n f u c i a n  p h i l oso p h er s  l au n c h ed a political philosophy 
movement from the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644) to the early Qing dynasty 
(1600–1700). The core idea of this movement was opposition to the royal tyr-
anny that had lasted for over two thousand years. This movement promoted the 
idea of a division of political power and allowed more freedom for the people. 
Chinese Marxists early in the twentieth century called it the “Early Enlighten-
ment,” while Mizoguchi Yūzō and John King Fairbank both agreed that late 
Ming and early Qing Chinese society were trending toward modernization. I 
believe that this movement was in pursuit of political democracy, but I under-
stand that “democracy” in modern English is quite different from minzhu 民主 
in modern Chinese. In modern Chinese, democracy is the opposite of autoc-
racy. Any expression of opposition to autocracy is regarded as democratic, 
although it may not include actual details about democratic institutions. In any 
case, with regard to these details, I do not think that the separation of powers 
practiced in the West should be the only model; any idea that promotes the 
limitation of royal power may be considered democratic. Therefore, I believe 
that there is a continuity of thought from the Ming to the Qing in the criticism 
by the literati of those times of any concentration of royal power. It may seem 
that the demise of the Ming and the establishment of the Qing were a direct 
cause of this movement, but it may be more accurate to say that it was a result 
of the transition to modernization in China. My reason for this claim is as fol-
lows. When the Qing government became stable and the whole society became 
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politically and economically more developed than the previous dynasty, a few 
Confucian philosophers, such as Yuan Mei 袁枚 (1716–1797), continued to 
argue for the same political reforms. What Yuan Mei and other thinkers of the 
Qing period attempted to do was in part a continuation of what Gu Yanwu 顾
炎武 (1613–1682), Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 (1610–1695), and Wang Fuzhi 王
夫之 (1619–1692) had been doing in the late Ming.
The central idea behind this movement was that the monopolization of 
power by the throne was the source of social and political turmoil. During that 
period in China’s history this was a revolutionary idea. Philosopher Dai Zhen 
戴震 (1724–1777) argued that “those who hold political position lack virtue 
and are good at deceiving people. They are a disaster for the people.” Further-
more, he made the revolutionary claim that “Social chaos originates from the 
top, which hurts the people.”1 Historian Qian Daxin 钱大昕 (1728–1804) 
argued against this kind of despotism, saying that it was wrong to infer that 
loyalty to family was equivalent to loyalty to the government. He made a clear 
distinction between the private life of the family and public life, where loyal-
ties were impartial, arguing that the filial piety valued in family life was not 
applicable to the relation between a subordinate and a superior in the affairs of 
state.2 Public officials should be loyal to the people, rather than to an emperor. 
And emperors should not take away the rights of the people, such as the right 
to free speech. Qian’s distinction between the public and private domains and 
between loyalty to the emperor and to the people was representative of the anti-
despotism movement of the late Ming.
In this chapter I will discuss the political thought of four philosophers of 
the early Qing period: Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi, and Yuan Mei. 
I will argue that these four Confucian thinkers are consistent in voicing their 
opposition to despotism and calling for political reform and democracy.
Gu Yanwu’s Idea of Political Reform and Democracy
Gu Yanwu proposes that “We should combine the feudalistic system of dukes 
with the system of counties.”3 He argues that the sharing of power among the 
feudal dukes implemented in the Western Zhou dynasty (1046–771 B.C.E.) 
could be duplicated by absorbing each feudal state into a centralized county 
system, which would enable the people to overcome the monopolization of 
power by the throne. Gu sees the feudal state system as what we today would 
call a “division of power,” while the county system would be a “centralization of 
power.” Combining the two systems would create a better system.
There were problems with each of the two systems in Gu’s time. In the 
feudal state system, Gu points out, the dukes have more powers than county 
magistrates and easily become dictators of a region. In the county system, a 
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county magistrate does not have enough power to oversee his district. Gu was 
concerned with the critical problems of the county system of his day. He claims 
that under this system, an emperor is always thinking that his territories are not 
large enough, that he does not trust his local officials, and that he wants to regu-
late every detail of local administration. Thus, there would be more paperwork 
and regulations. Then the local government agency would become too large to 
be run effectively, and local county magistrates would constantly be worrying 
more about whether they might break any rules than about how they might bet-
ter serve the people. Gu believes that under this system, the people have become 
poorer and the state weaker. There is no way out of this dire situation without 
changing the system itself.4
According to Gu, the solution to this predicament would be to increase 
the power of the county magistrates by giving them the necessary financial sup-
port and administrative authority. For example, the emperor should give county 
magistrates the same authority to collect taxes and appoint lower-ranking gov-
ernment officials that is allowed in the feudal state system. Gu argues that the 
central government should abolish the government agencies that spy on local 
magistrates and also allow magistrates with exemplary records of achievement 
to pass their positions on to their competent descendants. Furthermore, in 
selecting magistrates there should be alternatives to accepting those who pass 
the national examinations.5 All these measures would be justified by the argu-
ment that the division of power in the feudal state system could be introduced 
into the county system. Gu is confident that the emperor would endorse his 
view if the emperor wanted a powerful country.
Gu’s understanding of the division of power is quite different from that of 
a liberal democracy. The system of checks and balances in modern democracy 
is best seen as a process on the horizontal level, but Gu’s division of power is 
more vertical. In Gu’s ideal, the regional governments share power with the cen-
tral government. But on the horizontal level, there are no checks and balances 
among the local government agencies. Nonetheless, Gu’s proposal is innovative 
and significant compared to the dominant county system in existence at that 
time. The following discussion explains why.
First of all, Gu’s idea of a division of power is motivated by his view of human 
nature. Gu believes that humans are selfish; everyone works for him/herself. In 
contrast, the county system is based on the idea that everyone should work for 
the emperor, the representative of the public good. In the county system, the 
whole nation actually works for the royal family. For example, during the Tang 
dynasty the people worked for the Li royal family; during the Song dynasty they 
worked for the Zhao royal family; and during the Ming dynasty they worked for 
the Zhu royal family. Although these royal families established political order in 
the name of the national interest, in reality they only worked for their own fam-
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ily interests. They endorsed Confucianism, especially Mengzi’s idea that human 
nature is basically good. They condemned the view that human beings by nature 
are selfish and that it is good to be selfish. But Gu argues that everyone should 
to some degree express love for their family and recognize that this is natural and 
even normative. Gu believes that the ancient sage-kings did not forbid or con-
demn this ideal but encouraged it. The sage-kings divided the land, awarded it to 
the dukes, and finally established the “sage-king government,” which motivated 
the dukes to serve for the good of the nation by letting them pursue their own 
legitimate interests.6 According to Gu, what the sage-kings did not do was teach 
people to be selfless. What motivates Gu’s political reforms is a different theory 
of human nature from the one that underlies the county system.
Second, Gu’s proposal for a division of power includes the distinction 
between the management of the local governments and the ownership of the 
central government. He proposes that a magistrate (zhixian 知县) should not 
only be given more managerial power and be promoted from the political rank 
of the seventh level to the fifth level, but also be given a new name: county 
commander (xianling 县令). Furthermore, every three years there would be an 
assessment of the achievement of any commander. Gradually, the commander 
would have managerial autonomy. Finally, the commander’s position could 
be passed on to his capable descendants. It is believed that this tenure system 
could motivate the commander to be more responsible for the welfare of the 
public. The commander could lease mining rights, which would increase local 
revenue.7 For Gu, the commander is in a political contract with the emperor. 
Gu’s design definitely would cause new problems, such as unintentionally creat-
ing space that would allow separatist regimes to arise. Nonetheless, his design is 
meant to weaken the centralization of the county system.
Finally, these political reforms come with Gu’s proposal to reform the 
imperial examination system. He suggests that the exams should not be the 
only way to select government officials. There should be alternatives, such as 
what was practiced during the Han dynasty (202 B.C.E.–220 C.E.); that is, can-
didates for political positions could be recommended by the people. Another 
alternative would be to select officials based on certain talents, such as public 
speaking, calligraphy, and legal knowledge—a method that was practiced in the 
Tang dynasty (618–907 C.E.).8 Both alternatives would avoid the limitation 
of one single examination to determine eligibility for political office. Further-
more, this might motivate some scholars who did not have these talents to pur-
sue other career tracks, such as teaching. If becoming an official were the only 
recognized career track for scholars, then it would be a wasted effort for those 
scholars who did not have the politically relevant talents to pursue this career.
Overall, I believe that Gu’s proposal for political reform was meant to 
alleviate the monopolization of power in the county system. His proposal also 
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implies a new political ideal, one that shares some similarity with modern lib-
eral democracy, which recognizes the importance of the division of power. To 
some extent, Gu’s proposal can be seen as a seventeenth-century Chinese appeal 
for liberal democracy.
Huang Zongxi’s Political Ideal and the Prototype of  
Chinese Liberal Democracy
Compared to Gu’s proposal for political reform, Huang Zongxi elaborates a 
more comprehensive and intensive criticism against monarchy. Huang is the 
first Chinese philosopher to propose a clear democratic ideal. He argues that 
promoting people’s well-being should be the only aim of political activity. He 
further argues that the rise and fall of different dynasties has nothing to do with 
the aim or essence of politics.9
How is this political ideal different from the traditional idea that the 
people are the “root” of a country (minben 民本)? I believe that there are five 
differences.
First of all, Huang proposes a political arrangement that would establish 
a new type of relationship between the emperor and his ministers. From the 
standpoint of the division of power, the emperor and his ministers are equal. 
They all serve the people. However, the traditional idea that the people are the 
root of a country takes the people as the only means to keep the country at 
peace. The end is the stability of the country. The emperor and his ministers are 
not equal. The emperor has an absolute power that cannot be challenged by the 
ministers. However, Huang believes that since the country is so big and the pop-
ulation so large, one man cannot rule it all. A division of power is necessary.10 
Furthermore, Huang uses a metaphor to describe the relationship between the 
emperor and his ministers: all of them are working to pull a log forward. The 
only difference is in the division of labor.11 Thus, Huang believes that the tra-
ditional metaphor of a father and sons is not an accurate way to capture the 
relationship. Huang perceives the relationship from the standpoint of serving 
the people. If a minister resigns from his position, then he is like a stranger to 
the emperor without any further duty to serve. If a scholar who holds a political 
position does not serve the public, then he is merely a servant of the emperor. 
However, if he is to serve the public, then he is either a teacher or a friend to the 
emperor.12 What Huang proposes about the relationship between the emperor 
and the ministers is quite different from the traditional idea that people are the 
root of the country.
Second, Huang argues that there is a difference between public law and 
private law. Public law refers to law made by the people. Private law refers to 
law made by the emperor. Furthermore, Huang argues that public law should 
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replace private law, and that public law should regulate the following aspects 
of life: farming, herding, schooling, marriage, and taxation. The spirit of the 
law does not show itself in private law. Huang offers the criticism that, since the 
establishment of the county system in the Han and later the Qing, there has 
been no real system of laws. All the laws practiced were made by and for royal 
families.13
Third, Huang proposes that a prime minister (zaixiang 宰相) should be 
reinstated to assist the emperor or even to substitute for the emperor. The rea-
soning is that since the purpose of an emperor is to manage the public affairs 
of the whole country, a responsibility that cannot be handled by just one man, 
additional positions should be established. Thus, various political positions are 
set up for deputies of the emperor. An emperor is only one public official among 
others. There is no barrier between him and other public officials. He can even 
be replaced. An emperor is more of a symbol of the highest power. Thus, in 
Huang’s political design, a prime minister is different from the traditional offi-
cial who must obey the emperor unconditionally. A prime minister should be 
equal to the emperor and be able to replace the emperor and carry out executive 
power if the emperor is incompetent.14 Huang’s political design is not compat-
ible with the traditional idea that the emperor as the son of heaven has absolute 
power over everything.
In the historical context, when the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty 
abolished the position of prime minister, all officials reported to the emperor, 
which resulted in a monopoly of power in his person. Furthermore, in political 
practice the emperor was not able to manage the government by himself, and 
it was then possible for a few corrupt ministers or persons close to the emperor 
to seize power, as in the eunuch period of the Ming dynasty. Huang proposes 
that the prime minister should be given more authority so that power would 
not fall into the hands of royal relatives or royal servants. Since royal relatives 
and servants lack political knowledge or training, they would not be expected 
to act in the interests of the country. Rather, they would act in the interest of the 
emperor or even in their own interests. Thus, government becomes a tool for a 
group of people to gain benefits for themselves. Huang points out that if the 
prime minister can work with the emperor, the emperor does not need to deal 
with public affairs alone. To some extent, the power of the emperor is weakened 
or divided.15 This political design is very similar to what happened in the consti-
tutional monarchies of some early modern European countries.
Fourth, Huang argues that the function of schools should be expanded and 
that schools should also be made into places for training officials. Emperors and 
officeholders alike should be educated as culturally informed intellectuals. But 
what the emperor affirms is not necessarily right, and thus the emperor should 
leave judgments to places like schools, where scholars can discuss and debate. 
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Obviously, this design is very different from the reality in which the emperor 
determines what is right or wrong. Huang even suggests that the emperor should 
go to listen to the critics from the royal academy, and that officials should do 
the same.16 This proposal can be traced back to the traditional idea that local 
schools should participate in local politics. But according to Huang, the politi-
cal involvement of schools should be more extensive. This might strengthen the 
political function of schools, but it could also jeopardize the academic indepen-
dence of the schools from politics, since schools are supposed to be politically 
neutral.
Fifth, Huang suggests that there should be different methods of selecting 
officials, that the royal examinations cannot be the only way; other methods 
such as recommendations should be included. Furthermore, the government 
should also employ those with special talents and a strong commitment to serve 
the country.17
Overall, Huang’s political design is quite different from the traditional idea 
that the emperor alone should hold absolute power. Huang believed that the 
purpose of a government is to function for the good of the people.
Wang Fuzhi’s “Gong Tian Xia” (The Good of the Country)
With regard to the criticism of monopolization of power in the county system, 
Wang Fuzhi shares a similar view with Gu Yanwu and Huang Zongxi. Wang 
criticizes King Wen of the Zhou dynasty (1152–1106 B.C.E.), who was well 
respected by Confucians. Wang points out that in both the Xia and Shang 
dynasties there was the position of prime minister. But starting with King Wen 
of the Zhou, the position of prime minister was abolished and absolute monar-
chy in China began.18 Wang argues that the power of the emperor should hence-
forth be shared.
Wang proposes the political ideal of “gong tian xia” (the good of the coun-
try). His principle is that the well-being of the people is more important than 
the power of the royal family. This principle is similar to Huang Zongxi’s idea 
that the well-being of a country depends on the life of the people rather than 
the power of the royal family. Wang also compares the county system with 
the feudal state system, arguing that the county system is much better for the 
country. However, Wang also points out that since the county system assumes 
the monopoly of power by the emperor, it is not good for the well-being of 
the people. Furthermore, the length of rule of a royal family has nothing to 
do with whether or not the people are well cared for. Wang believes that the 
first emperor of the Qin dynasty (259–210 B.C.E.) was overthrown because 
the royal family was interested only in passing the royal line to its descendants. 
However, afterward many royal families did not see this as the reason for the 
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failure of the Qin royal family.19 Wang argues that the good of the people should 
be the only criterion of political legitimacy.
However, regarding the best way to restrain the power of the emperor, 
Wang’s view is different from Gu’s and Huang’s. Huang argues that the emperor 
and the ministers should share power and suggests that a senior minister can 
even exercise executive authority when the emperor is incompetent. Wang dis-
agrees. He proposes that the position of the emperor should be more like a sym-
bol of power and that a set of laws and regulations are the basis for government 
policies to be made and carried out. Wang even argues that the early sage-kings 
were humble and never used power to dominate others. They acted in accord 
with the spirit of Daoism, wuwei 无为, letting the ministers perform their duties 
according to the laws and regulations.20 In this way are the political institution 
and the existing laws and regulations the key to good government.
Wang also proposes that there are three ways to transfer the power of the 
emperor: inheritance, recommendation, and revolution. He points out that 
when the security of the nation is at stake, those who can defend it should be 
leaders so that the nation does not fall into the hands of foreigners.21
With regard to how to achieve a balance of power, based on his research 
of Chinese political history Wang proposes that the emperor, the prime min-
ister, and the counselors should form the core of the government. According 
to Wang, they have different duties. The duty of the emperor is to appoint the 
prime minister. If the prime minister is incompetent, then the emperor can 
determine whether to discharge him. And the counselors are supposed to point 
out the mistakes made by the emperor, rather than those by the prime minister. 
And the prime minister should weigh in on significant issues, such as national 
security and important appointments. Counselors can participate in the delib-
eration of less significant issues.22 Thus, Wang’s proposal is different from those 
of Huang and Gu with regard to the balance of power. Overall, the emperor 
appoints the prime minister, the prime minister appoints counselors, and the 
counselors evaluate the political performance of the emperor. Wang believes 
that this arrangement of the balance of power could keep the government stable.
Compared to Huang’s proposal, Wang’s idea of the balance of power is less 
radical. It is much closer to the traditional political setup in the Tang dynasty. 
Compared to Gu’s proposal to balance power vertically by increasing the power 
of the county magistrates, Wang’s idea is to balance power horizontally at the 
highest level. Nevertheless, the balance of power is the goal of both, and both 
are drawn to the spirit of modern liberal democracy. Their proposals present 
different alternatives for early Chinese democratic ideals. In fact, Gu and Huang 
did communicate with each other about their political ideals, but Wang did not 
participate. However, they all targeted the problems of the county system.
In addition to the balance of power, Wang also discusses the issue of land 
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property rights. Wang argues that the right to land ownership should be pro-
tected; the replacement of one royal family by another one should not affect 
people’s rights to their land since the land was not given to them by the new 
emperor.23 Thus, people’s property rights are immune from political change. 
This is a huge challenge to the idea that the land is owned by the royal govern-
ment under the county system. This idea is similar to what modern philoso-
phers hold concerning the legitimacy of private property.
Political Thought of the Middle Qing Period and the Modern 
 Transformation of Confucian Political Thought
Even under the tight literary inquisition during the rule of the Qianlong 
Emperor in the Qing dynasty, philosopher Yuan Mei made a comparison of the 
county and feudal state systems and pointed toward the direction of modern 
democracy.
With regard to political reform, Yuan Mei’s proposal is close to Gu’s. Yuan 
argues that the county system does not carry out the ancient sages’ idea of “the 
good of the country,” and that the feudal state system does a better job. Here 
is Yuan’s argument: as the ancient sages pointed out, since the emperor can-
not govern the country by himself, in the feudal state system the dukes would 
share power with the emperor, and this would serve the country better. As there 
are many dukes, they would challenge and even overthrow any emperor who is 
incompetent and corrupt.24
Furthermore, Yuan argues for the feudal state system from the perspective 
of personal liberty. First of all, Yuan argues that the feudal state system would 
prevent a corrupt emperor from abusing power since the dukes share some of 
the power. A local riot against a duke would not jeopardize the stability of the 
whole country. But it would in the county system, as it did in the peasant riot 
against the Qin dynasty, which rapidly resulted in its overthrow.25
Second, under the feudal state system, scholars have more freedom. What 
Kongzi, Mengzi, and other early Chinese philosophers achieved occurred dur-
ing the time of the feudal states. If a scholar was not welcomed or valued by 
one duke, he could move and make proposals to another duke, as Kongzi and 
Mengzi did in their times. However, under the county system, the standard 
examination was implemented nationwide. If a scholar failed this exam twice, 
he would not be given credentials to move to another county and find a job 
there. Therefore, under the feudal state system, scholars would have more space 
to exercise their capacities.26
Yuan shares many arguments with Gu. But Yuan has some distinct views 
of his own. For example, Yuan perceives the space for scholars to exercise their 
capacities as intrinsically valuable, and he believes that a diversity of profes-
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sional skills is also good in itself. This view is compatible with the value given to 
diversity in modern society.
I believe that what Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi, and Yuan Mei 
each argue for, and sometimes disagree about, in their stated political ideals 
and designs is far from liberal democracy, but what I have tried to explain up 
to this point is something that has been ignored by many philosophers: they 
miss the significance of the anticipation by these four thinkers of political mod-
ernization in China. Gu, Huang, Wang, and Yuan should not be perceived as 
classical Confucians, such as the New Confucians during the Song and Ming 
periods. However, they are still Confucians and are inspired by Confucianism. 
Therefore, I believe that Confucian political thought has the potential to con-
tribute to modernization in China today. During the seventeenth, eighteenth, 
and nineteenth centuries there was no Western political democracy in theory 
or practice that developed from the native Confucian tradition. However, 
this does not imply that during these three centuries that no Chinese political 
democracy, at least in theory, emerged from the Confucian tradition. Probably 
due to the influence of this newly emergent thought, many Confucian scholars 
during the transition from the Qing to the Republic endorsed Western political 
democracy. The political reform launched by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao 
was an experiment that resulted from this endorsement. Even if it did not last 
long and ultimately failed, it marked the official beginning of the pursuit of real 
political democracy, an experiment that continues today.
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